Volume 77, Issue 1 - Special Issue: Kamalaśīla and His Place in the Intellectual History of Buddhism

The Tattvasaṅgraha (TS) has been considered a comprehensive encyclopedia of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical subjects. According to Kamalaśīla’s Vajracchedikāṭīkā , however, the refutations of objections (* codyaparihāra ) by other systems of thought is merely a means to indirectly make the reader understand the topic (* abhidheya ) and ultimately achieve the purpose (* prayojana ) of the work. The topic of TS is “the true states [of things]” ( tattva ), which is interpreted by Kamalaśīla as “the various qualifiers of the entities that have arisen having depended on causes and conditions” ( pratītyasamutpāda=pratītyasamutpanna ) enumerated in TS 1–6ab. It is well-known that the first ten qualifiers of the pratītyasamutpāda in TS 1–4ab correspond to the topics of the first twenty-three chapters of TS, while the remaining elements in TS 4cd–6abc were known to be difficult to allocate to specific chapters. This paper sheds light on the possibility of analyzing the latter elements as well, suggesting that they form the qualifiers of the pratītyasamutpāda . Consequently, the eleventh and twelfth qualifiers of the pratītyasamutpāda, “which is free from all conceptual proliferation” and “which is not understood by others” in TS 4cd, qualify the pratītyasamutpāda as the object of the Buddha’s cognition characterized by the negation of conceptual cognition and heathen cognition. They summarize the first twenty-three chapters and all twenty-six chapters, respectively. Furthermore, the qualifications of the Buddha who teaches the pratītyasamutpāda in TS 5–6abc are convertible to the thirteenth and fourteen qualifications of the pratītyasamutpāda , “which is taught by [the direct seer] who does not depend on an autonomous Veda” and “which is taught by the Omniscient One for whom the great compassion became natural.” These paired qualities, wisdom ( prajñā ) and compassion ( dayā ), form the essential qualities of a qualified teacher of the pratītyasamutpāda and are described in Chs. 24–25 and Ch. 26, respectively.

Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are those who, while putting the ‘intention of the speaker’ ( vivakṣā ) at the core of their analysis of verbal communication, opt for a formal and technical treatment of the topic. In order to prove through coherent arguments that śābdajñāna is inference and therefore to support Dignāga’s reduction of the valid means of correct knowledge, they all identify vivakṣā with the property-possessor ( dharmin ) or probandum ( sādhya ), and śabda (‘word’) with the logical mark ( liṅga ) or probans ( sādhana ). They do so to counteract the criticisms of the opponents (Kumārila first of all). Nevertheless, while Jinendrabuddhi, following Dharmakīrti, recognizes the sheer pragmatic value of verbal cognition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to follow Dignāga more closely and also recognize its epistemic value. The purpose of this article is precisely to describe the essential points of the arguments of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and show their most original aspects.

The final chapter of the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā (TSP) contains a lengthy discussion on omniscience. In this paper, I will first review the relationship between the idea that the Buddha is a pramāṇa , as presented in the Pramāṇavārttika , and the view of the omniscient one in the TSP. I will then examine the concept of “remainderless” ( aśeṣa ) discussed in Devendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (PVP) and in Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (PSṬ) to show that the understanding of aśeṣa in the PVP and the PSṬ is related to Kamalaśīla’s understanding of the omniscient one. Finally, I will propose that the concept of aśeṣajñāna can serve as key to considering Dharmakīrtian’s understanding of the omniscient one.

In the *Vajracchedikāṭīkā , while commenting on a specific passage of the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā , Kamalaśīla presents a refutation of the Self ( ātman ). As is well known, the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā is one of the most important sūtra s of the Buddhist Mahāyāna tradition and concerns the correct practice for those who proceed in the path of a Bodhisattva. In this article, I shall analyze a portion of Kamalaśīla’s refutation, based on a new critical edition and English translation of the *Vajracchedikāṭīkā . I will show how he takes the opportunity, while commenting on scriptures, to combine logic/epistemology and soteriology. He does this by including philosophical arguments in his explanation of the cultivation of insight, and accordingly within the spiritual path of a Bodhisattva. In the process, I shall also investigate sources containing disputes between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas (as well as Vaiśeṣikas) regarding the Self. These are evidently the background of Kamalaśīla’s refutation. In particular, he defends the so-called Buddhist non-apprehension argument against Uddyotakara’s doctrine of the perceptibility of the Self.

The “middle wayˮ ( madhyamā pratipad ) is a concept of great significance in Buddhism. For Mahāyāna philosophers, the concept of the middle way free from the two extremes of superimposition ( samāropa ) and denial ( apavāda ) has ontological import. In the history of the development of Mahāyāna thought, we also see a tendency to work out a dimension of the middle way related to yogis’ spiritual cultivation and to combine it with the middle way’s ontological aspect. The eighth-century Mādhyamika thinker Kamalaśīla is one whose theory of the middle way has a close connection with his theory of spiritual cultivation. The purpose of this paper is to explore Kamalaśīla’s view on the relationship between (1) the middle way that lies between the two extremes of superimposition and denial, and (2) his theory of spiritual cultivation. I first clarify Kamalaśīla’s definition of the two extremes of superimposition and denial by examining his Madhyamakāloka and Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā . Based on the knowledge thus gained, I then delve into the fourteenth chapter of the Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā , a text where Kamalaśīla clearly reveals his take on the relationship between yogi’s meditative examination and the middle way of the two extremes of superimposition and denial. My conclusion is that for Kamalaśīla, meditative examination from the perspective of Madhyamaka ontology is the means to abandon the two extremes of superimposition and denial. Moreover, the middle way itself consists in the attainment of non-conceptual gnosis ( nirvikalpajñāna ) and the awareness obtained subsequently to that ( pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna ), both of which result from such meditative examination.

Madhyamaka philosophy is considered the philosophy of the middle way ( madhyamā pratipad ). Madhyamaka philosophers acknowledge that the middle way is free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence. However, when analyzing the way they understand the middle way, we encounter differing interpretations. In his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18, Nāgārjuna says “precisely this [voidness] is the middle way ( pratipad … madhyamā )” (18d). According to Avalokitavrata, Bhāviveka interprets the term pratipad madhyamā in stanza 18d as referring to two types of middle way, i.e., a conventional type and an ultimate one, while Candrakı̄rti comments on stanza 18d that voidness is the middle way. When in his Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā Kamalaśı̄la comments on verse 18, he seems to interpret that term neither as voidness or the two types of middle way. His interpretation of the term seems to be different from Nāgārjuna’s and his commentators’. In this article, in order to clarify his interpretation and philosophy of the middle way, we first analyze Kamalaśı̄la’s comments on verse 18. Next is an examination of whether he accepts the conventional type of middle way and the ultimate type, that is, voidness (= ultimate reality) free from the two extremes, and a clarification of his central idea of the middle way and his systematization of the different types of middle way. After an analysis of his idea of the practice for eliminating the two extremes, we will lastly examine his philosophy of the middle way. These analyses will allow us to say that by means of his central idea of the middle way, Kamalaśı̄la systematized his Madhyamaka philosophy as the path ( mārga ) for fully achieving the understanding of the middle way.

Directly or indirectly, by way of scriptural commentary or philosophical investigation, dependent origination ( pratītyasamutpāda ) plays an important role in several of Kamalaśīla’s works. His interpretation is remarkably consistent. As earlier “Yogācāra-Mādhyamika” authors such as Śrīgupta, Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla regards dependent origination as one of the characteristic features of genuine conventional reality, non-origination ( anutpāda ) being characteristic of ultimate reality/truth. Genuine conventional reality and ultimate reality correspond to the two modes – conventional and ultimate – of dependent origination in the ŚSūṬ, a commentary whose purpose was to provide the ŚSū with a Mādhyamika interpretation. Although it seems to leave no room for the Madhyamaka and culminates in a Yogācāra analysis of reality, the TSP likely is no exception to this, as its maṅgala’s indebtedness to Nāgārjuna already suggests. Close comparative and intertextual analysis reveals that the intention underlying the TS(P) was to provide a description of true conventional reality, i.e., the domain of dependently originated though ultimately essenceless entities similar to magical horses and elephants. As a corollary, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla attempted to “purify” it from pseudo-entities, i.e., non dependently originated fictions, or, equivalently, entities with incongruous causes ( viṣamahetu ), such as a rabbit’s horn, the self, and God. In this perspective, the TS(P) can be read as a detailed philosophical propedeutics to a Mādhyamika analysis of reality, cognition, and truth.

The Samyé debate (792–794) between the Chinese Chan monk Moheyan and his Indo-Tibetan opponents has long been one of the key issues in the study of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. This article attempts to approach this debate from a different angle, by focussing on the common ground that enabled the debate in the first place, instead of the doctrinal opposition between the two parties. This article argues that there are several areas where Kamalaśīla’s doctrinal positions are comparable to or even compatible with the doctrinal positions found in Northern Chan texts. First, the article points to the centrality of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra and how it signifies their commitment to a form of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis. Second, the controversy revolving around the “Single Vehicle” (Ekayāna) is discussed. Third, the article discusses how to understand the “interface” between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in Kamalaśīla’s texts and Northern Chan texts. Lastly, the article compares yogic perception discussed by Kamalaśīla and the extrasensory apprehension alluded to in Northern Chan texts.

This article reflects on the activities of the Indian Buddhist scholar-monk Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795) in imperial Tibet. Following accounts offered by Tibetan historians of later periods, these activities have so far been understood as more or less limited to Kamalaśīla’s victorious participation in the historically momentous “Great Debate” at Bsam yas monastery against the Chinese Chan master Heshang Moheyan. This article suggests that he also composed altogether seven of his works – and possibly more – while residing in Tibet, and sketches aspects of his intellectual profile on this basis. While remaining focused on Kamalaśīla, the article also raises wider-ranging questions regarding the activities of Indian Buddhist scholars in imperial Tibet against the backdrop of interconnected histories across South, Central and East Asia.