Band 58, Heft 4

This paper provides a detailed analysis of Plato’s account of real astronomy in Book VII of the Republic . It aims to reconcile two seemingly contradictory instructions: to employ visible astral motions as paradigms to learn about the intelligible ones (529d7–e2) while leaving the things in the heavens alone and focusing on problems (530b6–c2). By relying on the image-original relationship between the sensible and the intelligible realms, the paper argues that the real astronomer must interact with celestial entities, but solely for the purpose of using them as paradigms for learning about the intelligible ones.

This paper challenges the common view that the Myth of Er is an incongruous or extraneous conclusion to Plato’s Republic , particularly in relation to the work’s treatment of justice and critique of poetry. It argues that in Books II and III, Plato establishes a framework for an ideal form of poetry – one that is not only permissible but integral to the cultivation of virtue. Within this framework, a crucial distinction emerges between mimetic poetry, which Plato excludes from the ideal city, and simple poetry, which plays a formative role in shaping a just soul. The Myth of Er, I contend, fully meets the formal and thematic requirements of simple poetry, reinforcing rather than contradicting the dialogue’s central claim that justice intrinsically benefits the just. More than a poetic epilogue, the myth is a targeted philosophical intervention, specifically directed at Glaucon. His philonikia (love of victory) risks distorting his spirited nature, preventing its alignment with reason. Through its eschatological vision, the myth illustrates why only a soul properly ordered by philosophy and justice can attain true and lasting eudaimonia . It thus reaffirms the Republic ’s core argument that justice is its own reward.

This paper explores two Stoic theses. The first is what I call the Other-Oriented Thesis, which says that the virtuous person cultivates virtue in others. The second thesis is the Self-Sufficiency Thesis, according to which the virtuous person’s happiness is entirely up to her. Both theses are central to Stoicism, yet there is a deep tension between them. In order for the Self-Sufficiency Thesis to hold, it must be the case that (1) an individual’s virtue is necessary and sufficient for her own happiness and that (2) an individual’s virtue is completely within her control. I argue that the Other-Oriented Thesis, in combination with other Stoic axiological commitments, puts pressure on both these claims. The Stoics have good reason (given their commitments) to hold that the individual’s virtue is not sufficient for her own happiness (i.e. they have good reason to hold that happiness requires the virtue of others as well). Additionally, I show that when an agent attempts to cultivate virtue in another person, she must do so without reservation. The fact that reservation does not apply to this type of action renders the virtuousness of this action dependent on factors outside the agent’s control. My account explains why Stoicism lends itself to radically different depictions of the sage. It also shows that Stoicism is less monolithic than it is sometimes assumed to be. Stoics did not have a unified approach to resolving this tension.

In Parts of Animals II 1, 646a12-24, Aristotle identifies three compositions, arranged from simple to complex. Although the passage clearly indicates that non-uniform parts are constructed from uniform parts, two ambiguities in the passage call the status of uniform compounds into question. Both ambiguities point toward divergent interpretations of (1) the relationship between uniform parts of living things and their inanimate or inorganic counterparts, and (2) the relationship of uniform compounds to their own material causes. The objective of this paper is to identify and resolve the two ambiguities in PA II 1, 646a12-24, with an eye toward the consequences for uniform materials in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. In doing so, this paper argues that for Aristotle, uniform parts of living things, while they are parts of living bodies, are structurally as well as functionally distinct from inorganic and non-functional compounds.

This paper provides a new interpretation of how Aristotle most plausibly reasoned to the conclusion that ‘there is no time without change’ in lines 218b21–219a10 of Physics book IV, section 11. Following the criticisms made about both the Verificationist and Endoxic Interpretations of this argument, it draws from what appears to be correct about those interpretations, but also looks to Aristotle’s own views about how to properly reason – particularly as they are developed in his Prior and Posterior Analytics , Topics , and Rhetoric – in order to suggest the form of his reasoning. Overall, what results is the “Tekmeriodic” Interpretation, according to which Aristotle’s reasoning (1) is informal and enthymematic; (2) employs endoxa to show that change is a “token” ( tekmerion ) of time’s passage; and lastly, (3) is “deductively proper” – insuring both the “validity” of his argument and that there is no time without change, but not vice versa .