Band 58, Heft 3

In the case of Anaximander, there are two sources of indirect reports or of what Diels called testimonia: 1) Aristotle’s works and 2) Theophrastus’ lost writing Physikai Doxai , which is to be reconstructed by means of reports in other doxographers. Usually, it is assumed that both sources of testimonia complement each other. However, at least as regards Anaximander’s alleged principle of the Apeiron , there is a deep gap between Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ testimonies, as while Aristotle interprets Anaximander in pluralistic terms (not mentioning the Apeiron anywhere), Theophrastus attributes a monistic concept of the Apeiron to him. The comparison of how Aristotle and Theophrastus approached Anaximander suggests that both tried to categorise or conceptualise the original cosmogonical mass by means of principles. Thus, it was only Theophrastus who introduced the concept of the Apeiron as a designation of the original mass from which the world subsequently developed.

Isocrates is usually excluded from histories of philosophy. Two likely reasons are his tendency not to formulate rigorously structured arguments and his tendency not to deploy such arguments in support of universalizing positions that he takes – for example, about virtue or the good life. Nonetheless, Isocrates does come close to performing these functions, typical of what we expect from philosophers today, in Against the Sophists , written in the late 390s. In this work Isocrates criticizes, among others, educators who, he says, ‘involve themselves in disputations’. It is clear that these include followers of Socrates – at the least, Antisthenes and perhaps Plato. The disputers, Isocrates says, claim to teach a knowledge, ἐπιστήμη, that tells us what to do and thereby guarantees happiness. Against this claim, Isocrates does formulate a structured argument in service of universalizing claims, viz., his argument from Foreknowledge. He argues that the disputers’ purported knowledge requires that we foreknow outcomes of the actions about which we deliberate, if we are to attain happiness as promised. But humans do not have foreknowledge. Therefore, the disputers’ claims are false, and the cognitive attitude that we need for a happy life is not knowledge. Isocrates does not invent his rivals’ Foreknowledge premise, for Antisthenes, Plato and Xenophon present versions of it. As I ‘steelman’ and analyze Isocrates’ Foreknowledge argument, I find it sound if happiness consists in enjoying external goods, as in some Socratic dialogues, but not sound if genuine happiness is immune to fortune, as later in Plato and certain works of Antisthenes. I argue for dating those Antisthenic works later than Against the Sophists . Although certainty is elusive, it is attractive to think that Isocrates’ Foreknowledge argument played some role in pushing Plato, and perhaps Antisthenes, to seek to inoculate happiness and the good against fortune and to bring the virtuous one close to the divine.

In Metaphysics Δ .7 (1017a22-30), Aristotle claims that being per se is said in as many ways as the katēgoriai . An interpretative question, where there is disagreement among scholars, concerns what is meant by ‘being per se ’ in Δ .7. I offer an answer that provides fresh insights. I argue that being per se (in Δ .7) is a being relation expressed by the ‘is’ of categorical predication. In support of this, I appeal to Aristotle’s distinction in Posterior Analytics I.22 between two ways of speaking: predicating genuinely ( haplōs ), e.g., ‘Socrates is walking’ and predicating incidentally ( kata sumbebēkos ), e.g., ‘This walking thing is Socrates’.

In the opening segment of the third volume of Historia animalium , Aristotle launches into a detailed description of the heart and the intricate network of blood vessels surrounding it. Central to his exploration is the mechanism by which blood is propelled from the heart through these vessels to nourish the body’s tissues. Within this discourse, Aristotle grapples with the nomenclature of the major vessels now called the vena cava and the aorta. Aristotle recounts that some (philosophers or physicians) attributed the term aortē to that vessel’s conspicuous visibility, which resulted not least from the sinewy-like material comprising it. Despite its significance, the etymological basis for Aristotle’s naming of the aortē has remained largely unexplored in scholarly commentaries. This paper proposes a new hypothesis concerning the relationship between the Greek term aortē and the aorta’s observability. This investigation encompasses both ancient linguistic conventions and medical-anatomical considerations that provide context for Aristotle’s discourse. Specifically, I contend that the ancient etymology of aortē as alluded to by Aristotle can be understood as a verbal adjective derived from the verb horaō augmented with an alpha intensivum as a prefix. On the basis of this hypothesis, in the framework of the etymological explanations given by the ancient physicians mentioned by Aristotle, the aorta would thus designate the ‘distinctly visible’ blood vessel. This examination serves to underscore the usefulness of folk etymological inquiry for enhancing our understanding of the conceptual framework, categorization, and representation of ancient medical knowledge.

In Plato’s Republic , Socrates takes it that the best regime is doomed to fail. This failure is often attributed to inevitable errors in the rulers’ eugenic calculations. I propose that the city’s constitution must decline not because the eugenic calculations go wrong, but because the calculations must have always been wrong, and this on account of congenital errors in the city’s establishment. In this dramatic arc, from noble founding to destined fall, the reversal arguably reveals the city to be a tragic figure. The Republic , then, would not be, as some read it, a prescription for authoritarianism or totalitarianism, but a reflection on political lies, human sacrifice, and the tragedy of politics.