Abstract
This paper explores two Stoic theses. The first is what I call the Other-Oriented Thesis, which says that the virtuous person cultivates virtue in others. The second thesis is the Self-Sufficiency Thesis, according to which the virtuous person’s happiness is entirely up to her. Both theses are central to Stoicism, yet there is a deep tension between them. In order for the Self-Sufficiency Thesis to hold, it must be the case that (1) an individual’s virtue is necessary and sufficient for her own happiness and that (2) an individual’s virtue is completely within her control. I argue that the Other-Oriented Thesis, in combination with other Stoic axiological commitments, puts pressure on both these claims. The Stoics have good reason (given their commitments) to hold that the individual’s virtue is not sufficient for her own happiness (i.e. they have good reason to hold that happiness requires the virtue of others as well). Additionally, I show that when an agent attempts to cultivate virtue in another person, she must do so without reservation. The fact that reservation does not apply to this type of action renders the virtuousness of this action dependent on factors outside the agent’s control. My account explains why Stoicism lends itself to radically different depictions of the sage. It also shows that Stoicism is less monolithic than it is sometimes assumed to be. Stoics did not have a unified approach to resolving this tension.
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