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Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution
-
Klaus Kultti
und Hannu Vartiainen
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
14. November 2007
We apply the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set to the n-player cake division problem. Only time-preferences á la Rubinstein (1982) are assumed. The stable set is defined with respect to the following dominance relation: x dominates y if there is a player who prefers x over y even with one period lag. The Nash bargaining solution is characterized in the language of stable sets. Through the characterization, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash solution.
Published Online: 2007-11-14
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
stable set;
bargaining;
Nash solution;
time-preferences
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Topics Article
- Equilibria in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions
- A Note on Generating Globally Regular Indirect Utility Functions
- Value Maximization as an Ex-Post Consistent Firm Objective When Markets are Incomplete
- On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
- Best Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining
- First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice
- Interbank Competition with Costly Screening
- Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly
- The Many Faces of Rationalizability
- Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions
- Price Interventions in a Cournot Oligopoly with a Dominant Firm
- Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty
- Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment: The Role of Capacity Exchanges
- Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
- When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?
- Herding with Costly Observation
- Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players
- Competing Gatekeepers
- Monotone Comparative Statics in Ordered Vector Spaces
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets
- Decreasing Relative Risk Premium
- Advertising as a Distortion of Social Learning
- Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers
- Auctions with Opportunistic Experts
- A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle: An Analysis
- On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies
- Contributions Article
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- Staged Financing with a Variable Return
- A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good
- Effective Scrappage Subsidies
- Sunspot Rational Beliefs Structures, Equilibria and Excess Volatility
- Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
- A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Oligopoly, Endogenous Monopolist and Product Quality
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- Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
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