Information Goods Upgrades: Theory and Evidence
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V. Brian Viard
A substantial portion of information goods is sold through upgrades. I model a monopolist offering successive generations of an information good in a dynamic model. In each period, the monopolist offers up to two prices for each generation: a full price to those who have never purchased and a version upgrade price to consumers who own a previous generation. I employ an overlapping generations model with infinite-lived firms and consumers that reflects the effect of future profits on current decisions better than previous two-period models. The model's predictions accord well with data from the PC software industry. The model explains why: 1) firms issued version upgrades with every new generation, 2) firms provided a discount to those upgrading relative to first-time buyers and 3) late adopters commonly purchased the latest version at full price even though some earlier adopters with higher valuations did not upgrade to the latest version.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
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- Equilibria in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions
- A Note on Generating Globally Regular Indirect Utility Functions
- Value Maximization as an Ex-Post Consistent Firm Objective When Markets are Incomplete
- On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
- Best Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining
- First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice
- Interbank Competition with Costly Screening
- Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly
- The Many Faces of Rationalizability
- Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions
- Price Interventions in a Cournot Oligopoly with a Dominant Firm
- Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty
- Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment: The Role of Capacity Exchanges
- Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
- When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?
- Herding with Costly Observation
- Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players
- Competing Gatekeepers
- Monotone Comparative Statics in Ordered Vector Spaces
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets
- Decreasing Relative Risk Premium
- Advertising as a Distortion of Social Learning
- Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers
- Auctions with Opportunistic Experts
- A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle: An Analysis
- On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies
- Contributions Article
- Information Goods Upgrades: Theory and Evidence
- Staged Financing with a Variable Return
- A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good
- Effective Scrappage Subsidies
- Sunspot Rational Beliefs Structures, Equilibria and Excess Volatility
- Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
- A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Oligopoly, Endogenous Monopolist and Product Quality
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Free Cash Flow and Managerial Entrenchment: A Continuous-Time Stochastic Control-Theoretic Model
- Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution
- Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games
- Contests with Ties
- Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure
- Advances Article
- Relating Network Structure to Diffusion Properties through Stochastic Dominance
- Firm Size, Productivity, and Manager Wages: A Job Assignment Approach
- Rule-Based and Case-Based Reasoning in Housing Prices
- Market Entry Dynamics with a Second-Mover Advantage
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Articles in the same Issue
- Topics Article
- Equilibria in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions
- A Note on Generating Globally Regular Indirect Utility Functions
- Value Maximization as an Ex-Post Consistent Firm Objective When Markets are Incomplete
- On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
- Best Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining
- First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice
- Interbank Competition with Costly Screening
- Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly
- The Many Faces of Rationalizability
- Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions
- Price Interventions in a Cournot Oligopoly with a Dominant Firm
- Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty
- Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment: The Role of Capacity Exchanges
- Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
- When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?
- Herding with Costly Observation
- Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players
- Competing Gatekeepers
- Monotone Comparative Statics in Ordered Vector Spaces
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets
- Decreasing Relative Risk Premium
- Advertising as a Distortion of Social Learning
- Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers
- Auctions with Opportunistic Experts
- A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle: An Analysis
- On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies
- Contributions Article
- Information Goods Upgrades: Theory and Evidence
- Staged Financing with a Variable Return
- A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good
- Effective Scrappage Subsidies
- Sunspot Rational Beliefs Structures, Equilibria and Excess Volatility
- Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
- A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Oligopoly, Endogenous Monopolist and Product Quality
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Free Cash Flow and Managerial Entrenchment: A Continuous-Time Stochastic Control-Theoretic Model
- Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution
- Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games
- Contests with Ties
- Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure
- Advances Article
- Relating Network Structure to Diffusion Properties through Stochastic Dominance
- Firm Size, Productivity, and Manager Wages: A Job Assignment Approach
- Rule-Based and Case-Based Reasoning in Housing Prices
- Market Entry Dynamics with a Second-Mover Advantage
- The Compensation Principle and the National Income Test