Article
Licensed
Unlicensed
Requires Authentication
Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
-
Hayley H Chouinard
and Jonathan K Yoder
Published/Copyright:
June 11, 2007
This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid repeated auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders' value distributions. When contract value is constant from one auction to the next and winners' values are publicized, agents retain the value of incumbency and bids are identical to one-shot auctions. When each agent's contract values are random across auctions, agents choose to bid away the full expected value of incumbency, providing a measure of the value of information in this context.
Keywords: repeated auctions; right of first refusal
Published Online: 2007-6-11
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
You are currently not able to access this content.
You are currently not able to access this content.
Articles in the same Issue
- Topics Article
- Equilibria in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions
- A Note on Generating Globally Regular Indirect Utility Functions
- Value Maximization as an Ex-Post Consistent Firm Objective When Markets are Incomplete
- On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
- Best Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining
- First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice
- Interbank Competition with Costly Screening
- Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly
- The Many Faces of Rationalizability
- Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions
- Price Interventions in a Cournot Oligopoly with a Dominant Firm
- Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty
- Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment: The Role of Capacity Exchanges
- Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
- When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?
- Herding with Costly Observation
- Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players
- Competing Gatekeepers
- Monotone Comparative Statics in Ordered Vector Spaces
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets
- Decreasing Relative Risk Premium
- Advertising as a Distortion of Social Learning
- Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers
- Auctions with Opportunistic Experts
- A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle: An Analysis
- On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies
- Contributions Article
- Information Goods Upgrades: Theory and Evidence
- Staged Financing with a Variable Return
- A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good
- Effective Scrappage Subsidies
- Sunspot Rational Beliefs Structures, Equilibria and Excess Volatility
- Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
- A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Oligopoly, Endogenous Monopolist and Product Quality
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Free Cash Flow and Managerial Entrenchment: A Continuous-Time Stochastic Control-Theoretic Model
- Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution
- Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games
- Contests with Ties
- Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure
- Advances Article
- Relating Network Structure to Diffusion Properties through Stochastic Dominance
- Firm Size, Productivity, and Manager Wages: A Job Assignment Approach
- Rule-Based and Case-Based Reasoning in Housing Prices
- Market Entry Dynamics with a Second-Mover Advantage
- The Compensation Principle and the National Income Test
Articles in the same Issue
- Topics Article
- Equilibria in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions
- A Note on Generating Globally Regular Indirect Utility Functions
- Value Maximization as an Ex-Post Consistent Firm Objective When Markets are Incomplete
- On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
- Best Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining
- First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice
- Interbank Competition with Costly Screening
- Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly
- The Many Faces of Rationalizability
- Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions
- Price Interventions in a Cournot Oligopoly with a Dominant Firm
- Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty
- Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment: The Role of Capacity Exchanges
- Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
- When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?
- Herding with Costly Observation
- Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players
- Competing Gatekeepers
- Monotone Comparative Statics in Ordered Vector Spaces
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets
- Decreasing Relative Risk Premium
- Advertising as a Distortion of Social Learning
- Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers
- Auctions with Opportunistic Experts
- A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle: An Analysis
- On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Two-Person, Two-State Finance Economies
- Contributions Article
- Information Goods Upgrades: Theory and Evidence
- Staged Financing with a Variable Return
- A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good
- Effective Scrappage Subsidies
- Sunspot Rational Beliefs Structures, Equilibria and Excess Volatility
- Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
- A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Oligopoly, Endogenous Monopolist and Product Quality
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Free Cash Flow and Managerial Entrenchment: A Continuous-Time Stochastic Control-Theoretic Model
- Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution
- Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games
- Contests with Ties
- Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure
- Advances Article
- Relating Network Structure to Diffusion Properties through Stochastic Dominance
- Firm Size, Productivity, and Manager Wages: A Job Assignment Approach
- Rule-Based and Case-Based Reasoning in Housing Prices
- Market Entry Dynamics with a Second-Mover Advantage
- The Compensation Principle and the National Income Test