Zur Normativität von Sprachregeln. Ist Sprechen regelgeleitetes Handeln? [On the Normativity of Language Rules. Is Speaking a 'Rule-governed' Activity?]

Abstract

In her book Sprache, Sprechakt, Kommunikation  S. Krämer argues that most linguistic theories of the twentieth century can be put into two categories: proponents and opponents of a language conception she calls the "Zwei-Welten-Modell". Krämer herself rejects this model, which has – as she points out – two main characteristics:

1) 'Language' and 'speech' constitute a dualistic schema. In this sense there is 'a language behind speech'.

2) Language precedes speech, competence precedes performance – logically and genealogically.

I agree with Krämer's rejection of this model, but the conclusions she draws are too far-reaching in my opinion. Rejecting the "Zwei-Welten-Modell", she takes too strong a stand for performance, so that her own argumentation becomes one-sided and is not able to grasp the structural and the normative  aspect of language sufficiently. For instance, she appeals to Wittgenstein in this context to claim that language rules are not normative at all, not even in the sense of felicity conditions in speech act theories (Krämer 2001: 130). My paper can be understood as a critical reply to this radical anti-normativism  formulated by Krämer. Such an anti-normativism is neither plausible, nor is it Wittgenstein's view. As an alternative to this I try to develop a view that takes into account the normative aspect of rule-following without getting caught up in the misleading "Zwei-Welten-Modell". Here I focus on the concept of implicit rules. Is it totally wrong to say that speaking is a 'rule-governed' activity? If not, what does 'rule-governed' mean in this context? Krämer's criticism of the "Zwei-Welten-Modell" is right; but the speech act theory is too fruitful to be thrown overboard without further ado.