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Why do we accept a narrative discourse ascribed to a “third-person narrator” as true? The classical, and a cognitive approach

  • Erzsébet Szabó

    Erzsébet Szabó (b. 1970) is a senior lecturer at the University of Szeged 〈saboe@lit.u-szeged.hu〉. Her research interests include literary theory, narratology, and the theory of possible worlds. Her publications include “Das Phänomen der Ambivalenz aus Sicht der Theorie der möglichen Welten und der klassischen Narratologie” (2009); “A lehetséges világok elmélete a narratológiában” [The possible-worlds-theory in narratology] (2010); “A narratívák olvasásának kognitív modellálása” [Cognitive modelling of narratives] (2012); and Narrative theory (2013).

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Published/Copyright: January 30, 2015

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to discuss the question of why readers accept a literary narrative discourse attributed traditionally to an “omniscient third-person narrator” unconditionally as true. I will advocate two theses. First, that this characteristic of narrative comprehension is a consequence of a grammatical feature of the narrative discourse, namely, the absence of the “narrating-I.” This format mimics what Cosmides and Tooby label as scope-free representation, i.e., a representation that is not bound by scope-operators and thus treated by a cognitive architecture as architecturally true. Second, narrative discourse ascribed traditionally to a third person narrator should be understood as the linguistic representation of the true states of affairs of a narrative world.

About the author

Erzsébet Szabó

Erzsébet Szabó (b. 1970) is a senior lecturer at the University of Szeged 〈saboe@lit.u-szeged.hu〉. Her research interests include literary theory, narratology, and the theory of possible worlds. Her publications include “Das Phänomen der Ambivalenz aus Sicht der Theorie der möglichen Welten und der klassischen Narratologie” (2009); “A lehetséges világok elmélete a narratológiában” [The possible-worlds-theory in narratology] (2010); “A narratívák olvasásának kognitív modellálása” [Cognitive modelling of narratives] (2012); and Narrative theory (2013).

Published Online: 2015-1-30
Published in Print: 2015-2-1

©2015 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Munich/Boston

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