Abstract
The relationship between government defence expenditure and economic growth is a debated topic. This study uses UK data for the period of 1960–2012 and applies two of the most prevailing theories used within the literature, the ‘Feder-Ram’ and the ‘augmented Solow’ models, to assess this question. We utilise traditional model specifications, alongside extensively altered versions of both models, enabling a comprehensive comparison between them. The alterations to the models include re-evaluating how core variables are expressed, inclusion of measures of conflict, the impact of recession, etc. The results show that the augmented Solow model outperforms the Feder-Ram model, and we provide some explanations for this result. In addition, our results suggest that military expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth within the UK, implying that the decision to reduce defence spending may have been detrimental to the UK economy.
Unit root tests for Feder-Ram and augmented Solow models.
| Unit root test for: | Change in GDP, Δ GDP | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −5.210 | −2.600 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −5.063 | −2.600 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Capital investment,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −12.681 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −15.010 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Labour,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −12.681 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −15.010 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Changes in defence spending share of GDP,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −4.391 | −2.928 | 0.0003 |
| Phillips-Perron | −4.379 | −2.928 | 0.0003 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Changes in non-defence government spending share of GDP,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −4.997 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −4.913 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Changes in defence spending share of government spending,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −4.372 | −2.599 | 0.0003 |
| Phillips-Perron | −4.359 | −2.599 | 0.0003 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Changes in non-defence government spending share of government spending,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −4.916 | −2.928 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −4.828 | −2.928 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Defence sector externality,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −4.884 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −4.846 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Non-defence sector externality,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −4.893 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −4.806 | −2.599 | 0.0001 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Arms exports,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −11.117 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −10.918 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Arms imports,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −6.146 | 2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −6.127 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military equipment expenditure,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −7.482 | 2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −7.501 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military personnel expenditure,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −7.118 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −7.124 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military infrastructure expenditure,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −6.755 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −6.745 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military other expenditure,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −6.073 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −6.100 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military equipment expenditure growth,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −5.755 | 2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −5.739 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military personnel expenditure growth,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −5.281 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −5.264 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military infrastructure expenditure growth,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −8.645 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −8.749 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military other expenditure growth,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −5.849 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −5.778 | −2.599 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: | Change in logged GDP, Δ ln GDP | ||
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −4.650 | −2.600 | 0.0001 |
| Phillips-Perron | −4.594 | −2.600 | 0.0001 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Capital investment lagged GDP, ln
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −7.536 | −2.930 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −7.707 | −2.930 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: | Labour, ln (g + n + d) | ||
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −5.023 | −2.928 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −5.030 | −2.928 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: | Military spending share in lagged GDP, ln m | ||
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −11.063 | −2.930 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −11.223 | −2.930 | 0.0000 |
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| Unit root test for: |
Military spending share in lagged gov spending,
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| Test statistic | 10 % critical value | P-value | |
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| Augmented Dickey-Fuller | −11.063 | −2.930 | 0.0000 |
| Phillips-Perron | −11.223 | −2.930 | 0.0000 |
Variance inflation factor results for Feder-Ram models 10–12.
| Feder-Ram models 10–12 | Variance inflation factor (VIF) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Model 10 | Model 10a | Model 11 | Model 12 |
| Capital investment,
|
1.10 | 1.13 | 1.14 | 1.34 |
| Labour,
|
1.13 | 1.116 | 1.16 | 2.21 |
| Defence expenditures,
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22.92 | 4.11 | – | – |
| Defence sector externality,
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20.69 | – | 3.86 | – |
| Non-defence expenditures,
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163.43 | 4.12 | – | – |
| Non-defence sector externality,
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152.54 | – | 3.88 | – |
| First difference, defence sector externality,
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– | 4.06 | – | 3.98 |
| First difference, non-defence sector externality,
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– | 4.40 | – | 4.92 |
| Defence expenditures as share of lagged gov spending,
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– | – | 4.37 | 4.42 |
| Non-defence expenditures as share of lagged gov spending,
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– | – | 4.07 | 5.28 |
| First difference, inflation Π | – | – | – | 2.73 |
| Recession dummy | – | – | – | 2.71 |
| Medium intensity conflict dummy | – | – | – | 2.05 |
| High intensity conflict dummy | – | – | – | 2.02 |
| Arms exports,
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– | – | – | 1.47 |
| Arms imports,
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– | – | – | 1.35 |
| Mean VIF | 60.30 | 3.10 | 3.12 | 2.88 |
Variance inflation factor results for Feder-Ram models 13–13a.
| Feder-Ram models 13–13a | Variance inflation factor (VIF) | |
|---|---|---|
| Variables | Model 13 | Model 13a |
| Capital investment,
|
4.42 | 4.75 |
| Labour,
|
2.16 | 2.26 |
| First difference, non-defence sector externality,
|
4.53 | 4.79 |
| Non-defence expenditures as share of lagged gov spending,
|
2.26 | 2.38 |
| First difference, inflation Π | – | 3.31 |
| Recession dummy | – | 4.38 |
| Medium intensity conflict dummy | – | 1.99 |
| High intensity conflict dummy | – | 2.39 |
| Arms exports,
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– | 1.72 |
| Arms imports,
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– | 1.39 |
| Military equipment expenditure,
|
2.20 | 2.51 |
| Military equipment expenditure growth,
|
2.34 | 2.50 |
| Military personnel expenditure,
|
4.65 | 4.94 |
| Military personnel expenditure growth,
|
4.63 | 4.92 |
| Military infrastructure expenditure,
|
2.01 | 2.16 |
| Military infrastructure expenditure growth,
|
1.50 | 1.64 |
| Military other expenditure,
|
2.25 | 2.51 |
| Military other expenditure growth,
|
2.23 | 2.50 |
| Mean VIF | 2.93 | 3.21 |
Variance inflation factor results for augmented Solow models 24–26.
| Augmented solow models 24–26 | Variance inflation factor (VIF) | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Model 24 | Model 25 | Model 26 |
| GDP t − 1, ln y t−1 | 1.19 | 2.37 | 2.89 |
| First difference, capital investment,
|
1.09 | – | – |
| First difference, capital investment share of lagged GDP,
|
– | 1.36 | 1.56 |
| Labour, technical progress and depreciation, ln(g + n + d) | 1.19 | 2.37 | 2.28 |
| Defence expenditure, ln d | 1.10 | – | – |
| Defence expenditure t − 1, ln d t−1 | 1.09 | – | – |
| Defence expenditure share of lagged gov spending,
|
– | 2.50 | 3.05 |
| Defence expenditure share of lagged gov spending
t−1,
|
– | 1.45 | 1.49 |
| Inflation, ln Π | – | – | 1.34 |
| Recession dummy | – | – | 1.33 |
| Medium intensity conflict dummy | – | – | 2.06 |
| High intensity conflict dummy | – | – | 2.08 |
| Arms exports expenditures share of lagged GDP,
|
– | – | 1.15 |
| Arms imports expenditures share of lagged GDP,
|
– | – | 1.15 |
| Mean VIF | 1.13 | 1.90 | 1.80 |
Variance inflation factor results for augmented solow models 27–27a.
| Augmented solow models 27–27a | Variance inflation factor (VIF) | |
|---|---|---|
| Variables | Model 27 | Model 27a |
| GDP t−1, ln y t−1 | 1.67 | 1.72 |
| First difference, capital investment share of lagged GDP,
|
1.48 | 1.56 |
| Labour, technical progress and depreciation, ln(g + n + d) | 2.45 | 2.82 |
| Military equipment expenditure, ln eq | 1.99 | 2.03 |
| Military personnel expenditure, ln pe | 2.56 | 3.09 |
| Military infrastructure expenditure, ln in | 1.38 | 1.39 |
| Military other expenditure, ln ot | 2.34 | 2.61 |
| Lagged military equipment expenditure, ln eq t−1 | 1.56 | 1.93 |
| Lagged military personnel expenditure, ln pe t-1 | 1.36 | 2.64 |
| Lagged military infrastructure expenditure, ln in t−1 | 1.01 | 1.24 |
| Lagged military other expenditure, ln ot t−1 | 2.04 | 2.29 |
| Inflation, ln Π | – | 1.52 |
| Recession dummy | – | 1.68 |
| Medium intensity conflict dummy | – | 2.09 |
| High intensity conflict dummy | – | 2.26 |
| Arms exports expenditures share of lagged GDP,
|
– | 1.42 |
| Arms imports expenditures share of lagged GDP,
|
– | 1.26 |
| Mean VIF | 1.80 | 1.97 |
VAR model with two lags, GDP and military expenditure.
| Sample: 1963-2012 | Coefficient (standard error) | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Lags: 2 | |||
| GDP (first differenced) | First lag GDP | 0.5703*** | |
| (0.2203) | |||
| Second lag GDP | −0.3751* | ||
| (0.2233) | |||
| First lag military expenditure | −7.8781 | ||
| (7.8702) | |||
| Second lag military expenditure | 0.2095 | ||
| (8.0743) | |||
| Constant | 4.76e+10*** | ||
| (1.70e+10) | |||
| Military expenditure (first difference) | First lag GDP | 0.0108* | |
| (0.0064) | |||
| Second lag GDP | −0.0117* | ||
| (0.0065) | |||
| First lag military expenditure | −0.1162 | ||
| (0.2318) | |||
| Second lag military expenditure | 0.2423 | ||
| (0.2379) | |||
| Constant | 1.18e+09*** | ||
| (5.02e+08) | |||
-
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
VAR stability condition.
| Eigen value | Modulus |
|---|---|
| 0.2102599 + 0.5744609i | 0.611731 |
| 0.2102599 − 0.5744609i | 0.611731 |
| 0.5032038 | 0.503204 |
| −0.469638 | 0.469638 |
-
All eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies stability condition.
Lag selection criteria.
| Sample: 1963–2012 | Number of observations: 50 | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lag | Log likelihood (LL) | Likelihood ratio (LR) | Degrees of freedom (df) | P-value | Final prediction error (FPE) | Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) | Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) | Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) |
| 0 | 129.2 | 2E-05 | −5.0881 | −5.01156* | −5.05892* | |||
| 1 | 134.1 | 9.8381* | 4 | 0 | 0.0002* | −5.12481* | −4.89537 | −5.0374 |
| 2 | 135.8 | 3.421 | 4 | 0 | 2E-05 | −5.0332 | −4.65082 | −4.8876 |
Johansen test for cointegration.
| Sample: | 1962–2012 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of observations: | 50 | ||||
| Lags: | 2 | ||||
| Maximum rank | Parms | Log likelihood (LL) | Eigen value | Trace statistic | 5 % critical value |
| 0 | 6 | −2533.48 | 3.3150* | 15.41 | |
| 1 | 9 | −2531.84 | 0.06219 | 0.0402 | 3.76 |
| 2 | 10 | −2531.82 | 0.00079 | ||
Granger causality test for GDP and military expenditure.
| Initial variable | Excluded variable | Chi2 | Degrees of freedom (df) | P-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP | Military expenditure | 1.0127 | 2 | 0.603 |
| Military expenditure | GDP | 4.8198 | 2 | 0.09 |
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© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration
- Group Grievances, Opportunity, and the Onset of Civil War: Some Theory and Tests of Competing Mechanisms, 1990–2017
- The Military Expenditure – Economic Growth Nexus Revisited: Evidence from the United Kingdom
- Why Americans Support Strict Counterterrorism Measures: Examining the Relationship between Concern about Terrorism and Public Support for Counterterrorism
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration
- Group Grievances, Opportunity, and the Onset of Civil War: Some Theory and Tests of Competing Mechanisms, 1990–2017
- The Military Expenditure – Economic Growth Nexus Revisited: Evidence from the United Kingdom
- Why Americans Support Strict Counterterrorism Measures: Examining the Relationship between Concern about Terrorism and Public Support for Counterterrorism