Abstract
Recent scholarship claims that group grievances due to political exclusion and discrimination drive civil wars. The grievance perspective suggests that socio-psychological factors allow groups to overcome collective action problems. We argue that the grievance perspective (over)focuses on the ends and not means, which are critical to explain how groups survive state sanction, allowing contention to escalate to civil war. We suggest that inclusive economic governance reduces investment in state-evading infrastructures for quotidian economic reasons, leading to the buildup of rebellion-specific capital. Physical and human infrastructures of state evasion form the logistical bases for survival against state sanction. Our analyses show that group-grievance-generating political factors are poorer predictors of civil war compared with economic freedoms measured as free-market friendly policies and the private ownership of economies, which should reduce economic rents accruing to state-evading shadow markets. Our results are robust to several alternative models, data, and estimating method. Theory that ignores the means explain the main causes of costly violence only partially, or mistake symptom for cause. Freedom and inclusiveness, which should reduce grievances, are intrinsically valuable, but they are hard to obtain when violence is waged successfully for more narrower ends.
Acknowledgments
We are extremely grateful to the editor and three anonymous reviewers for excellent comments and suggestions. The paper is a lot better because of their interventions. Comments received at the VIP research seminar at the Dept. of Sociology and Political Science at NTNU are gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Gleditsch for comments on a much earlier draft. Any remaining errors must be blamed only on us.
See Figures A1, A2, and A3

Conditional effects of group-based job discrimination and state ownership of the economy on the risk of civil war.

Conditional effect of group-based business access discrimination and state ownership of the economy on the risk of civil war.

Precision recall curves for private ownership and economic freedom on conflict onsets for the global and LDC samples.
Logistic regression estimates of the effects of economic freedom and private ownership of the economy on the risk of civil war, 1990–2017. Entropy weight applied.
Dep var = civil war onset | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Global | LDCs | Global | LDCs | |
Private ownership of economy | −0.40** | −0.33** | ||
(0.17) | (0.17) | |||
Economic freedom index | −0.06 | −0.24 | ||
(0.18) | (0.18) | |||
Entropy weights applied | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
No of countries | 155 | 132 | 155 | 132 |
Observations | 3488 | 2867 | 3449 | 2828 |
-
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Logistic regression estimates of the effects of economic freedom and private ownership of the economy on the risk of civil war, 1990–2017. Between- and within-unit effects.
Dep var = civil war onset | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Global | LDCs | Global | LDCs | |
Private ownership of economy (between-unit effects) | −0.12 | −0.14 | ||
(0.15) | (0.16) | |||
Private ownership of economy (within-unit effects) | −0.19 | −0.26 | ||
(0.45) | (0.46) | |||
Economic freedom index (between-unit effects) | −0.45*** | −0.52*** | ||
(0.17) | (0.19) | |||
Economic freedom index (within-unit effects) | −0.15 | −0.12 | ||
(0.24) | (0.25) | |||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
No of countries | 155 | 132 | 155 | 132 |
Observations | 3488 | 2867 | 3449 | 2828 |
-
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS estimates of the effects of economic freedom and private ownership of the economy on the risk of civil war, 1990–2017.
Dep var = civil war onset | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Global | LDCs | Global | LDCs | |
Private ownership of economy | −0.015** | −0.015** | ||
(0.007) | (0.007) | |||
Economic freedom index | −0.010* | −0.009 | ||
(0.005) | (0.006) | |||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
No of countries | 155 | 132 | 155 | 132 |
Observations | 3488 | 2867 | 3449 | 2828 |
-
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
PDSLASSO estimates of the effects of economic freedom and private ownership of the economy on the risk of civil war, 1990–2017.
Dep var = civil war onset | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Global | LDCs | Global | LDCs | |
Private ownership of economy | −0.012* | −0.017** | ||
(0.006) | (0.007) | |||
Economic freedom index | −0.012** | −0.015** | ||
(0.006) | (0.006) | |||
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
No of countries | 155 | 132 | 155 | 132 |
Observations | 3488 | 2867 | 3449 | 2828 |
-
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration
- Group Grievances, Opportunity, and the Onset of Civil War: Some Theory and Tests of Competing Mechanisms, 1990–2017
- The Military Expenditure – Economic Growth Nexus Revisited: Evidence from the United Kingdom
- Why Americans Support Strict Counterterrorism Measures: Examining the Relationship between Concern about Terrorism and Public Support for Counterterrorism
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration
- Group Grievances, Opportunity, and the Onset of Civil War: Some Theory and Tests of Competing Mechanisms, 1990–2017
- The Military Expenditure – Economic Growth Nexus Revisited: Evidence from the United Kingdom
- Why Americans Support Strict Counterterrorism Measures: Examining the Relationship between Concern about Terrorism and Public Support for Counterterrorism