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Political Cycles in Military Deployment

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Published/Copyright: September 4, 2017
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
From the journal Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Volume 23 Issue 4

Abstract

The determinants of military deployment have been extensively discussed in the literature. Empirical studies indicate that, next to the international security arena, also domestic socio-economic variables play an important role. For example, wealth and size of the supplying nation tend to positively influence the number of military troops being deployed. The present study contributes to this literature by focusing on a set of political variables, i.e. the effect of upcoming elections as well as the composition of government. For a cross-sectional time-series of 34 democratic countries, covering the period from 1990 until 2014, we run a linear (fixed effects) panel regression model correcting for a first order autoregressive disturbance term as well as linear dynamic models with diverse corrections. When studying deployment at country level, we find a negative and significant impact of elections on the number of troops deployed, meaning that a country deploys fewer troops close to elections. As for government composition, we observe that rather central administrations deploy substantially fewer troops than right- or left-wing governments.

Keywords: troop contribution; political cycles; foreign policy
JEL Classification: F51; D74; F53

A Appendix

Table 3:

Overview of all UN and non-UN missions and locations included in the dataset (alphabetical order).

MissionLocationMissionLocation
UN missions
 BINUBBurundiONUMOZMozambique
 BONUCACentral African RepublicONUSALEl Salvador
 IPTFBosnia and HerzegovinaUNAMAAfghanistan
 LBBItalyUNAMETTimor-Leste
 MICAHHaitiUNAMIIraq
 MINUCIIvory CoastUNAMICCambodia
 MINUGUAGuatemalaUNAMIDSudan
 MINURCACentral African RepublicUNMIHHaiti
 MINURCATChadUNMIKSerbia
 MINURSOWestern SaharaUNMILLiberia
 MINUSCACentral African RepublicUNMINNepal
 MINUSMAMaliUNMISSudan
 MINUSTAHHaitiUNMISETTimor-Leste
 MIPONUHHaitiUNMISSSouth Sudan
 MONUAAngolaUNMITTimor-Leste
 MONUCDR CongoUNMOGIPPakistan
 MONUSCODR CongoUNMOPCroatia
 ONUBBurundiUNMOTTajikistan
 ONUCAHondurasUNOAAngola
 ONUCIIvory CoastUNOCIIvory Coast
 UNAMIRRuandaUNOMILLiberia
 UNAMSILSierra LeoneUNOMSILSierra Leone
 UNAVEMAngolaUNOMURUganda
 UNCROCroatiaUNOSOMSomalia
 UNDOFSyrian Arab RepublicUNOTILTimor-Leste
 UNFICYPCyprusUNPFCroatia
 UNFORCroatiaUNPREDEPMacedonia
 UNIFILLebanonUNPROFORCroatia
 UNIIMOGIranUNPSGCroatia
 UNIKOMIraqUNSMIHHaiti
 UNIOSILSierra LeoneUNSMISSyrian Arab Republic
 UNISFASudanUNTACCambodia
 UNMAAngolaUNTAESCroatia
 UNMEEEritreaUNTAETTimor-Leste
 UNMIBHBosnia and HerzegovinaUNTMIHHaiti
 UNOMIGGeorgiaUNTSOIsrael
Non-UN missions
 AFORAlbaniaKVMKosovo
 AMISIIEthiopiaLicorneCôte d’Ivoire
 AMISONSomaliaMFOEgypt
 AMMIndonesiaMIATMMalta
 ArgusAfghanistanMICOPAXCentral African Republic
 ASTUTETimor-LesteMinsk ConferenceArmenia and Azerbaijan
 Augural (AMIS)SudanMNF-Iraq/US Forces IraqIraq
 BoaliCentral African RepublicNATOMacedonia and Kyrgyzstan
 BougainvillePapua New GuineaNATO COMMZ-WAlbania
 BPSTKenyaNATO HQ TiranaAlbania
 BronzeBosnia-HerzegovinaNew DawnIraq
 CJTFDjibuti and KuwaitNNSCS Korea
 CMACCambodiaNorthern WatchTurkey
 CSCEFormer YugoslaviaNTM-IIraq
 Deliberate ForgeItalyOEFAfghanistan, Kuweit, Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Horn of Africa, Gulf, US, Pakistan
 Dent FlightItalyOp AccordionUnited Arab Emirates
 DIATMMoroccoOp AlbaAlbania
 DIEAlbaniaOp Amber FoxMacedonia, FYR
 ECMMFormer YugoslaviaOp BarkhaneChad, Mali and Niger
 EEKosovoOp ConcordiaMacedonia, FYR
 EECCroatiaOp GritlockSierra Leone
 EpervierChadOp ImpactKuwait and Iraq
 EU Military StaffUS, New YorkOp JaguarJamaica
 EUFORBosnia-HerzegovinaOp New DawnIraq
 EUFOR (RCA)Central African RepublicOp OkraUnited Arab Emirates
 EUFOR IBosnia-Herz and ItalyOp SangarisCentral African Republic
 EUFOR IIBosnia/CroatiaOp United AssistanceLiberia
 EUFOR II/KFORItalyOSCEGeorgia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia and Moldova
 EUFOR RD CongoDR Congo and GabonOSCE Higher Level PlanningVienna
 EUFOR Tchad/RCAChad and Central African RepublicPeace Support (Iraq)Iraq and Kuweit
 EUMMAlbania, Serbia, Bosnia-HerzOSCE Minsk ConferenceArmenia and Azerbaijan
 EUMM/EUPMMacedonia and BosniaProteusJerusalem
 EUPM (Proxima)Macedonia, FYRProvide ComfortTurkey
 EUPOLAfghanistanProvide PromiseFormer Yugoslavia
 EUPOL KinshasaCongo, DRRAMSI (Op Anode)Solomon Islands
 EUTMUgandaServalMali
 SHAPEBelgiumSFOR (Air C)Croatia, Bosnia, Hungary and Italy
 HRSaKuwaitSFOR Air Element (Op Joint Guard)Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, France, Germany, UK
 IFORBosnia, Croatia, HungarySFOR IIBosnia
 IFOR Air CompItalySFOR II/KFORItaly
 IMATT (Sculpture)Sierra LeoneSouthern WatchSaudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq and Kuweit
 Iraqi FreedomKuwaitSupport HopeRwanda
 ISAF (OEF)AfghanistanTamourJordan
 ISFTimor-LesteTask Force Tampa or Foundation (US CENTCOM)US and Bahrain
 Joint GuarantorKosovoTIPH (2)Palestinian Autonomous Areas of Gaza and Jericho
 Joint GuardianYugoslaviaTIPHZHebron
 KFOR(Former) YugoslaviaUnknownIraq, Rwanda, Tajikistan, (former) Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Kuweit, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
 KFOR (Joint Enterprise)Serbia (Kosovo) and MacedoniaUXOLLaos
 KFOR ISerbia and Montenegro and Macedonia

  1. aHumanitarian reconstruction support.

B Appendix

The first model allowing for an autoregressive disturbance term is run under fixed effects following the results of a simple Hausman test. The Baltagi Wu Lbi statistic is calculated to check for potential autocorrelation issues. It is just above the critical value of 2. In general, higher values than 2 could indicate an underestimation of significance levels. Both the second (Arellano and Bond) and third (Blundell and Bond) estimation are evaluated by testing for potential serial correlation in the transformed errors and for the validity of the over-identifying conditions.[8] The former indeed reveals slight issues, suggesting that the Windmeijer correction is be more appropriate. The Sargan post-estimation test for the latter indeed seems to confirm more consistent estimates.

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Published Online: 2017-9-4

©2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Introduction to the Proceedings of the 17th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference
  2. On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies
  3. Ornithology and Varieties of Conflict: A Personal Retrospective on Conflict Forecasting
  4. Conflict Fragmentation Index
  5. Income and Armed Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
  6. Land-Use Change and Communal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa
  7. Bridging Economics and International Relations to Understand State Capacity and War in Sub-Saharan Africa
  8. Political Regimes and Government’s Reaction to Terrorism. A Simple Model
  9. A Perfect Match? Are Dogmatic Belief Systems Simply a Reconciliation of Cognitive and Emotional Human Needs?
  10. Urban Protests, Coups d’état and Post-Coup Regime Change
  11. Nonviolent Resistance and Peaceful Turnover of Power
  12. Political Cycles in Military Deployment
  13. Buying Friends? The Importance of Economic Flows in Assembling the Iraq War Coalition
https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2017-0025
Keywords for this article
troop contribution; political cycles; foreign policy

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Introduction to the Proceedings of the 17th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference
  2. On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies
  3. Ornithology and Varieties of Conflict: A Personal Retrospective on Conflict Forecasting
  4. Conflict Fragmentation Index
  5. Income and Armed Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
  6. Land-Use Change and Communal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa
  7. Bridging Economics and International Relations to Understand State Capacity and War in Sub-Saharan Africa
  8. Political Regimes and Government’s Reaction to Terrorism. A Simple Model
  9. A Perfect Match? Are Dogmatic Belief Systems Simply a Reconciliation of Cognitive and Emotional Human Needs?
  10. Urban Protests, Coups d’état and Post-Coup Regime Change
  11. Nonviolent Resistance and Peaceful Turnover of Power
  12. Political Cycles in Military Deployment
  13. Buying Friends? The Importance of Economic Flows in Assembling the Iraq War Coalition
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