Buying Friends? The Importance of Economic Flows in Assembling the Iraq War Coalition
-
Robert Riegler
,
Piotr Lis
Abstract
Economic ties between countries are likely to influence the alignment of their international policies. This paper investigates whether countries’ historical economic ties with the United States and their expectation of changes in future economic flows had a role in their decision to join the US-led coalition in Iraq from 2003 onwards. We use data on 115 countries over the period 2003–2009 to estimate panel random effects probit models of war coalition participation. We measure the intensity of economic ties with three variables: bilateral trade flows between the partner country and the US as well as FDI and aid flows from the US to the partner country. Our results suggest that both good trade relations prior to the conflict and the prospects of their further improvements increase the willingness of countries to join the coalition. In spite of the anecdotal evidence, we find no empirical evidence that the dependence on American FDI or aid affected countries’ decision on Iraq war participation.
Appendix
RE probit results for economic flows and selected political variables.
| Period | 2003–2009 | 2003–2008 | 2003–2007 | 2003–2006 | 2003–2005 | 2003–2004 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade/GDP 2001 | 8.55 | 7.83* | 6.82 | 8.51* | 7.48 | 6.70** |
| (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.15) | (0.09) | (0.27) | (0.05) | |
| Trade/GDP difference | 18.80** | 14.41 | 17.72* | 25.36** | 17.39 | 6.04 |
| (0.04) | (0.15) | (0.10) | (0.04) | (0.10) | (0.72) | |
| FDI/GDP 2001 | 33.98 | 32.15 | 40.19 | 33.99 | 27.18 | 38.43 |
| (0.46) | (0.49) | (0.24) | (0.28) | (0.54) | (0.32) | |
| FDI/GDP difference | −12.05 | −6.33 | −6.81 | −14.30 | −7.63 | −9.36 |
| (0.31) | (0.58) | (0.52) | (0.27) | (0.69) | (0.80) | |
| Milit. Aid Oblig. 2001 | −406.50 | −75.10 | 79.45 | 140.68 | 224.32 | −445.60 |
| (0.48) | (0.87) | (0.87) | (0.79) | (0.73) | (0.67) | |
| Milit. Aid Oblig./GDP Diff. | −255.89 | −352.32 | −259.40 | −155.89 | −216.82 | 362.50 |
| (0.29) | (0.25) | (0.28) | (0.55) | (0.51) | (0.82) | |
| Econ. Aid Oblig. | −72.52 | −20.72 | 1.90 | −70.79 | −104.88 | −16.45 |
| (0.34) | (0.79) | (0.98) | (0.56) | (0.44) | (0.91) | |
| Econ. Aid Oblig./GDP Diff. | −249.27** | −87.34 | −66.43 | −248.93 | −296.83* | −112.55 |
| (0.02) | (0.27) | (0.41) | (0.13) | (0.08) | (0.63) | |
| Colony | 6.48** | 3.60* | 4.22 | 3.63* | 3.55 | 8.60*** |
| (0.00) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.07) | (0.13) | (0.00) | |
| ISAF | 7.73** | 6.51* | 6.95** | 7.29*** | 7.42** | 11.26*** |
| (0.00) | (0.05) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.00) | |
| Military exp./GDP | 98.37** | 57.82 | 36.31 | 27.58 | −24.38 | −79.42 |
| (0.01) | (0.21) | (0.37) | (0.57) | (0.71) | (0.34) | |
| Warsaw Pact | 12.68*** | 10.66*** | 10.60*** | 10.76*** | 11.03*** | 15.13*** |
| (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | |
| US Ally | 2.33 | 1.88 | 2.19 | 2.51* | 4.24** | 4.82** |
| (0.16) | (0.22) | (0.17) | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.00) | |
| Distance to Iraq (in km) | 0.0007** | 0.0006* | 0.0005* | 0.0004* | 0.0003 | 0.001*** |
| (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.21) | (0.00) | |
| Observations | 684 | 588 | 492 | 397 | 297 | 201 |
| Time Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
p-values are in parantheses, * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
With the exception of the economic ties variables, only variables which were significant in at least one regression are presented.
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- On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies
- Ornithology and Varieties of Conflict: A Personal Retrospective on Conflict Forecasting
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- Urban Protests, Coups d’état and Post-Coup Regime Change
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Articles in the same Issue
- Introduction to the Proceedings of the 17th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference
- On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies
- Ornithology and Varieties of Conflict: A Personal Retrospective on Conflict Forecasting
- Conflict Fragmentation Index
- Income and Armed Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
- Land-Use Change and Communal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Bridging Economics and International Relations to Understand State Capacity and War in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Political Regimes and Government’s Reaction to Terrorism. A Simple Model
- A Perfect Match? Are Dogmatic Belief Systems Simply a Reconciliation of Cognitive and Emotional Human Needs?
- Urban Protests, Coups d’état and Post-Coup Regime Change
- Nonviolent Resistance and Peaceful Turnover of Power
- Political Cycles in Military Deployment
- Buying Friends? The Importance of Economic Flows in Assembling the Iraq War Coalition
