Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay

John Biro

doi:10.1515/mp-2020-0018

Article

Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay

John Biro

Published/Copyright: September 9, 2020

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From the journal Metaphysica Volume 21 Issue 2

Abstract

Some philosophers think that two distinct things can occupy exactly the same region of space, as with a statue and a piece of clay. Others think that the statue and the piece of clay are identical, but not necessarily so. I argue that Alan Gibbard’s well-known story of Goliath and Lumpl does not support either of these claims. Not the first, as there is independent reason to think that it cannot be true. Not the second, because there is no need to invoke the dubiously intelligible notion of contingent identity to account for the facts of the story.

Keywords: pluralism; contingent identity; separability; properties

Corresponding author: John Biro, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA, E-mail: jbiro@ufl.edu

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Published Online: 2020-09-09

Published in Print: 2020-10-25

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https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0018

Keywords for this article

pluralism; contingent identity; separability; properties