Abstract
Michael Dummett offered a semantic characterisation of a variety of realism-antirealism debates. This approach has fallen out of fashion. This has been to the detriment of metaphysics. This paper offers an accurate characterisation of Dummett’s view, often lacking in the literature, and then defends it against a range of attacks (from Devitt, Miller and Williamson). This understanding of realism debates is resilient, and if we take it seriously the philosophical terrain looks importantly different. In particular, the philosophy of language has a foundational role with respect to metaphysics.
Funding source: Leverhulme Trust
Acknowledgments
Thanks to John Divers, Alex Douglas, Jade Fletcher, Jonathan Nassim, Tasia Scrutton, Naomi Thompson and Robbie Williams for discussion. The work presented here was supported by a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship, and was presented to audiences at the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, Leeds, and the University of Southampton.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hylomorphism and Complex Properties
- Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation
- No Good Arguments for Causal Closure
- Semantic Realism, Actually
- Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism
- Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay
- Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hylomorphism and Complex Properties
- Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation
- No Good Arguments for Causal Closure
- Semantic Realism, Actually
- Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism
- Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay
- Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory