Abstract
Hylomorphism is the Aristotelian theory according to which objects are composites of form and matter. Form is what unifies the various parts of an object – the matter – into a cohesive whole. Some contemporary hylomorphists argue their theory applies beyond the realm of concreta, and that it explains the unity of various abstract entities. Not everyone agrees. Recent criticism alleges that hylomorphism fails to explain the unity of certain abstract entities, namely, complex properties – properties with other properties as proper parts. Here, I both respond to this criticism and show that and how hylomorphism extends to the domain of complex properties. By discussing hylomorphism’s applicability to the hitherto unchartered domain of complex properties, I hope to defend its credentials as a general mereological theory.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Niklas Andersson, Will Bell, John Heil, Lauren Olin, James Peters, Jeremy Skrzypek, Qiong Wu and audiences at Rhodes College, Vanderbilt University, and Washington University in St. Louis for helpful comments on and suggestions for previous drafts of this paper. Special thanks to Teresa Britton for her patience in discussing the ideas in this paper and her very helpful comments on a penultimate draft.
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Supplementary Material
The online version of this article offers supplementary material (DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0003).
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hylomorphism and Complex Properties
- Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation
- No Good Arguments for Causal Closure
- Semantic Realism, Actually
- Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism
- Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay
- Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hylomorphism and Complex Properties
- Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation
- No Good Arguments for Causal Closure
- Semantic Realism, Actually
- Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism
- Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay
- Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory