Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory
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Vassilis Livanios
Abstract
Until recently, the powerful qualities view about properties has been effectively identified with the so-called identity theory. Yet, the difficulties that the latter faces (especially concerning the interpretation of its core claim that dispositionality and qualitativity are identical) have led some metaphysicians to propose (at least provisionally) new versions of the powerful qualities view. This paper discusses the prospects of three such versions: the compound view, the higher-order properties theory and the dual aspect account. It is argued that the compound view is in fact property dualism in disguise, while the higher-order properties theory does not by itself provide a metaphysically convincing solution to Armstrong’s dilemma concerning the modal status of the relation between dispositionality and categoricality. Finally, it is argued that it is not clear whether the dual aspect account is distinct from identity theory and pure powerism.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Joaquim Giannotti for the clarification of certain aspects of his view.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hylomorphism and Complex Properties
- Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation
- No Good Arguments for Causal Closure
- Semantic Realism, Actually
- Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism
- Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay
- Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hylomorphism and Complex Properties
- Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation
- No Good Arguments for Causal Closure
- Semantic Realism, Actually
- Actualistic Foundation of Possibilism
- Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay
- Powerful Qualities Beyond Identity Theory
