Hate speech mainstreaming in the Greek virtual public sphere: A quantitative and qualitative approach

Yannis Tsirbas; Lina Zirganou-Kazolea

doi:10.1515/commun-2023-0051

Artikel Open Access

Hate speech mainstreaming in the Greek virtual public sphere: A quantitative and qualitative approach

Yannis Tsirbas und Lina Zirganou-Kazolea

Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 1. März 2024

Veröffentlicht von

Veröffentlichen auch Sie bei De Gruyter Brill

Manuskript einreichen Informationen für Autor*innen Erkunden Sie dieses Fachgebiet

Aus der Zeitschrift Communications Band 50 Heft 2

Abstract

This study delves into the manifestation and characteristics of hate speech in the Greek online public sphere, specifically exploring its most prominent forms, namely racism, anti-immigrant sentiment, nationalism, sexism, and homophobia/transphobia. Combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the research analyzes popular Greek online news media. It aims to uncover the visibility and operational patterns of hate speech, addressing key questions about its prevalence and presentation on these platforms. Findings reveal the normalization of discriminatory speech, particularly sexism and nationalism, in the digital landscape. Moreover, distinct themes and linguistic elements associated with different forms of hate speech highlight the intertwined nature of these discriminatory expressions. This research sheds light on the pervasive nature of hate speech in Greece’s online realm, emphasizing its implications for democratic principles.

Keywords: hate speech; online media; Greek public sphere; discriminatory discourse; mainstreaming extremism

1 Introduction

The increasing presence of racism, xenophobia and hate speech in European public spheres has been a phenomenon attracting great theoretical and empirical interest. During the last decade, hate speech has undergone a sharp increase in Greece, as documented by European reports (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2015) and academic research (Assimakopoulos and Baider 2017; Dalakoglou, 2013; Triantafyllidou and Kouki, 2012). This development has been taking place against the backdrop of growing support for extreme right-wing political parties.

This phenomenon has been addressed by a voluminous strain of literature, devoted to the study of hate speech. In addition, many of these studies focus on the online environment which functions as a favorable locus for its articulation and mainstreaming. These ‘words that wound’ (Matsuda, 1993) do not merely describe the injury, or produce it as a result, but rather constitute the harm itself. Acting in a performative manner (Butler, 1997), they create what they name, thus constituting the subject in a subordinate position (Kuntsman, 2008). Therefore, hate speech entails significant repercussions for equality and democratic coexistence, since it legitimizes a reality of discriminations and exclusions, which appear as natural, given and fixed (Van Dijk, 2000). Moreover, the diffusion and normalization of hate speech in the public sphere entails tangible consequences for agenda-setting, political competition and policy making, influencing the way political discourse is articulated, both by political parties and the media (Vasilaki and Souvlis, 2021).

Within this context, this article attempts to delve into the visibility and particular characteristics of hate speech in the Greek online public sphere. More specifically, our research questions are:

RQ1: What was the visibility of hate speech in the most popular online news media in Greece?

RQ2: In what ways was hate speech operationalized? What are the thematic vehicles of its construction and transmission in the most popular online news media?

The paper is structured as follows: In the first part, the issue of hate speech is contextualized in the Greek case, by addressing both the role of political parties and dominant attitudes and media representations that could favor a rise in hate speech. The second part offers a theoretical discussion regarding the conceptualization of hate speech and the prominence of online media as the locus of its reproduction. To tackle the aforementioned research questions, in the third part, we will employ data from the program ‘Hate Speech Monitor 2019’ (HSM2019, Tsirbas, 2022).

2 Contextualizing the rhetoric of hate in the Greek public sphere

In the case of Greece, research on national identity suggests it is largely constituted both by ethnic criteria and against the ‘immigrant other’ (Kadianaki and Andreouli 2017, pp. 833–834; Karamanidou, 2016), leading to the formation of an exclusionary national identity (Lialiouti et al., 2017). Moreover, strong anti-immigration attitudes have been observed since the 1990s (European Commission, 1997; European Social Survey, 2008), when Greece started to transform from a net sender of migrants to being a host of migrants (Ellinas, 2013). These sentiments later became even more profound after the refugee crisis fueled by the Syrian war (Dianeosis, 2020; European Commission, 2018).

Nevertheless, the pre-existence of an exclusive hegemonic identity is not confined to that of Greek national identity; attitudes towards gendered roles and equality should also be taken into consideration. As Tsimouris (2015) argues, intersections between the ‘deep structures’ of nationalism and masculinity are at play in the discourse of both political parties/institutions and the media, constructing a particular image of ‘the Other’ in Greek society. These underlying, ‘banal’ and, up to that point, muffled characteristics of Greek political culture re-emerged and intensified during the crisis, resulting in the dissemination of sexist discourses and practices, even actions of aggressive manhood such as the ones performed by Golden Dawn’s political cadres, often in prime-time television programs (Avdela and Psara, 2012). Here, nationalist and sexist discourses are intertwined, since references to the Greek nation are rooted in a version of aggressive masculinity, which draws from traditional and stereotypical models of gendered relations to praise ‘true’ Greek men and target women who deviate (Avdela and Psara, 2012). Such affinities between nationalism and sexism have also been found in the context of other countries, like Romania and the US (Norocel, 2016; Shook et al., 2020). Turning now to the role of mass media, it has been attested that dominant representations of refugees/immigrants in the media were already negative before the advent of the migrant crisis (Karydis, 1996; Falekas et al., 2012). These representations often relied on a number of social myths and distorted notions, reproduced both by the media and extreme right political parties (Papastergiou and Takou, 2014), resulting in a rather adverse image in public opinion (Tsimouris, 2015) that could instigate or reinforce discriminatory social attitudes (Falekas et al., 2012).

This depiction stands in congruence with research conducted in other European countries that has pinpointed the racist undertone used against refugees and immigrants, who are often vilified by the media, either by being identified with criminal activities (Khosravinik, 2010; Lueck et al., 2015), or depicted as threat to the European way of life (Amin-Khan, 2012; Kallis, 2013a). It has been evidenced that the frames of illegality, criminality and securitization have dominated the Greek public sphere as well (Karamanidou, 2016). During the financial crisis, such hostile representations were aggravated due to the instrumental use by media and political parties of migrants as scapegoats for any social disarray. (Karamanidou, 2016; Doukarelli and Braessa, 2021).

Another important factor in the rise of hate speech in the Greek public sphere has been the unprecedented surge of extreme right-wing parties (Triantafyllidou and Kouki, 2012; Papastergiou and Takou, 2014) as along with the mainstreaming of their agenda (Vasilaki and Souvlis, 2021). Xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes, already present in a latent form within the Greek citizenry, intensified during the economic (and, later, refugee) crisis, when such issues became politicized and entered the agenda not only of far-right, but of mainstream parties (Ellinas, 2013; Tsimouris, 2015). Already before the outbreak of the crisis, these attitudes had found political representation in the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS); a nationalist populist extreme right-wing party that won ten seats in the 2007 national elections. Soon after, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn (GD) was best positioned to benefit from the electoral realignment caused by the crisis (Ellinas, 2013). After GD’s first electoral success in the municipal elections of 2010, when it received 5.3 % percent of the vote in Athens (Georgiadou, 2013), the Greek media showed increased interest in its xenophobic rhetoric and fascist activity (Ellinas, 2013), in alignment with what literature suggests (Ellinas, 2009; Feischmidt and Hervik, 2015). Although most media treated the party critically, its ‘social activities’ were often greeted more positively (Ellinas, 2013; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2015). Meanwhile GD was able to acquire significant online presence in online news sites, ‘infiltrating the digital mainstream’ (Siapera and Veikou, 2016, p. 1). GD managed to become the third strongest political party in the Greek party system 2014 and 2015, but it failed to enter the parliament in the 2019 election. In October 2020, GD’s leadership was convicted of running a criminal organization under the guise of a political party and was sentenced to prison. However, in the 2019 elections, a new far-right nationalist party, Greek Solution (GS), entered the Greek parliament.

This rise of far-right extremism has led to a more generalized right-wing shift among competing parties (Tsimouris, 2015; Vasilaki and Souvlis, 2021). As Triantafyllidou and Kouki (2012) already noted in 2009, there was evidence that a rhetoric of intolerance and discrimination had been adopted by domestic political actors of the greater conservative family Moreover, this ‘contagion’ of mainstream political parties’ discourse has been observed in many other European countries (Kouki and Vidra, 2014). This process of mainstreaming has a dual dimension (Feischmidt and Hervik, 2015): far right-wing parties and movements are rephrasing their political discourse, moving away from an overt rhetoric of hate and towards forms of ‘incendiary racism’ (Amin-Khan, 2012), while, at the same time, ‘previously taboo ideas, frames, and practices are becoming the new ‘common sense’ for growing sections of European politics and societies’ (Kallis, 2013b, p. 221), crossing the boundaries between ‘extremist’ and ‘mainstream’ discourses and, thus, opening the way for the further normalization and legitimization of extreme views and practices, both by mainstream and far-right political actors (Kallis, 2013b; Van Dijk, 2000).

Therefore, it is evident that in the case of Greece the economic and the refugee/immigration crisis have intersected in a way that accentuated intolerance and processes of othering, favoring the rise of extreme right (Triantafyllidou and Kouki 2012; Tsimouris, 2015; Vasilaki and Souvlis, 2021) and online hate speech. These crises, however, have not operated on an empty canvas, but rather they have reinforced preconceived notions, attitudes and representations firmly rooted in the Greek society, laying the ground for the employment of hate speech in the public discourse (Karamanidou, 2016).

The political climate when data collection took place was marked by growing discontent with the governing SYRIZA party, for its handling of the third bailout program, the refugee crisis and the deadly wildfires in Attica in 2018 (Tsirbas, 2021). The signing of the ‘Prespa Agreement’ between Greece and North Macedonia, resolving the long-lasting dispute over its official name, was also dominant in the public discussion. The signing of the agreement faced strong public reaction, was accompanied by massive demonstrations, and proved to be one of the most salient and divisive electoral issues (Tsatsanis et al., 2020).

3 Theoretical framework

Conceptualizing hate speech

Hate speech is inherently related to processes of othering, stereotyping and discriminating, ultimately founded upon the notion of racism (Katsourides et al., 2018, p. 152). Even though racism has undergone various re-conceptualizations across time and space and a thorough examination of the concept is out of the scope of this examination, we will briefly refer to some of its ‘universal’ traits relating to this inquiry. As Goffman (1963) has famously demonstrated, racism operates through stigma, by vilifying, excluding or even dehumanizing and denying agency (Howarth, 2006) to particular individuals and groups on the basis of their race, skin color, national identity and religious beliefs. According to Van Dijk (1991), racism can be defined as a system of group dominance, both structural and ideological, and is thus reproduced simultaneously through individual attitudes and institutionalized practices, placing a particular importance upon the role of the media (Van Dijk, 2000; Amin-Khan, 2012; Falekas et al., 2012; Löwstedt and Mboti, 2017) and political parties (Triantafyllidou and Kouki 2012; Dalakoglou 2013).

Here, we will focus on a particular verbal expression of racism in its wider sense, namely what is usually referred to as hate speech. The conceptual ambiguity of the term, as well as the difficulty in demarcating its content from its legal connotations, has resulted in a plethora of equivalent or metonymic terms describing the same phenomenon, especially its online dimension, including extreme speech (Pohjonen, 2019), dangerous speech, fear speech, hateful speech, excitable speech (Butler, 1997), and cyberhate (Gagliardone, 2019). For the purposes of this research, the term hate speech was preferred due to its wide use and applicability, as well as inclusiveness in the phenomena it may encompass (Feischmidt and Hervik, 2015; Parekh, 2006).

This paper aims at moving beyond the legal aspects of hate speech (which have been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere (see, inter alia, Parekh, 2006; Brown, 2017), and delve into the use of such language in the virtual public sphere. Within this framework, hate speech operates in a threefold way: it distinguishes individuals or groups on the basis of one or more particular traits; it stigmatizes them due to the qualities associated with those traits and then it casts them off the realm of normal and appropriate social relations, resulting in them being ‘legitimately exterminated, expelled, discriminated against, or at best tolerated as an unavoidable evil surviving on the margins of society’ (Parekh, 2006). Drawing on this description, hate speech shall be understood as derogatory or abusive speech targeting specific group characteristics (Warner and Hirschberg, 2012, p. 19), that ‘is meant to offend, exclude, intimidate, or discriminate against members of a group based on their race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, nationality or ethnicity’ (Schulzke, 2016, p. 225).^[1] Relevant literature categorizes hate speech according to the particular social group that is targeted each time (Iordache, 2015; ElSherief et al., 2018). These may include immigrants, national, ethnic, or religious minorities, underprivileged groups such as drug addicts and, more recently, women, sexual minorities (LGBTQIA+) and people with disabilities (Lilian, 2007; Vasvari, 2013; Iordache, 2015; Frenda et al., 2019).

Main concepts

As is already evident, over the past years, hate speech has conceptually expanded, in order to include most kinds of discrimination and potential ‘targets’. This research, however, focuses on the most common and prominent categories of hate speech, namely, racism, anti-immigrant speech, nationalism, sexism and homophobia/ transphobia. Racism operates as an umbrella-term that describes discrimination against individuals on the basis of their race, skin color, ethnicity, religion etc. Even though modern racism is inextricably linked with the notions of nationalism (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991, p. 46; Van Dijk, 1991; Troumbetta, 2000) and anti-immigrant othering (Löwstedt and Mboti, 2017, p. 120), in the context of the present paper it is mainly used with regard to race. Regarding the separate category of anti-immigrant speech, it differentiates between ‘indigenous’ people and immigrants/refugees, referring to the latter in a demeaning way, because of their perceived status. Nationalism refers to the invoking of Greek national identity in a way that creates exclusions and discrimination with respect to participation in the nation; when it highlights the Greek nation’s ‘superiority’ by resorting to particular characteristics attributed solely to white, orthodox Christian Greeks, and moments from Greek history to support this claim; and/or when it uses derogatory references to other populations’ national identity. Sexism is defined as the bulk of prejudices, stereotypes and discrimination stemming from the subjects’ gendered identity, which is very prominent in discourse and employs a language that ignores and/or discredits subjects according to that identity (women in particular), imposes a dichotomic conception of gender and ascribes specific, quasi ‘natural’ characteristics to both ‘female’ and ‘male’ gendered identity. In their influential contribution, Glick and Fiske (1997) have proposed a conceptualization of sexism as ambivalent, consisting of two main components: hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. The former, describes negative attitudes and behaviors towards women, including beliefs and practices that overtly demean, devalue, or discriminate against women. The latter appears seemingly more positive at first glance (and is also perceived as such from the part of the sexist subject), but also draws on and reproduces traditional roles and stereotypes like the idea that women should be protected and admired for their roles as providers of care and as nurturers. Benevolent sexism adores and idealizes women, while at the same time considering them inferior to men; less capable and in constant need of support. These depictions also result in a double bind in which women who do conform to the stereotypically ‘female’ characteristics are presented as incapable and those who don’t are unpopular and not ‘female’ enough. Therefore, both categories serve the maintenance and justification of sexism and gender inequality. Finally, homophobia/transphobia includes negative/derogatory comments and hostile language directed against LGBTQIA+ individuals. It is based on a (fictional) heterosexual normalcy and discriminates subjects due to lack of conformity to the dominant heteronormative standard in defining their gender and sexuality.

Online media as the locus of hate speech

Mass media play a pivotal role in distributing, circulating, and reproducing racist ideas among the members of society (Löwstedt and Mboti, 2017; Van Dijk, 1999), both due to their decisive functions of discourse and communication with respect to the propagating of racism (Van Dijk, 1989), and the role of mass media in shaping public opinion. In this process, they are influenced by a number of factors, including corporate interests, ownership, media regulation, professional ideologies, news values, cognitive strategies (Van Dijk, 1989; Löwstedt and Mboti, 2017), and ties with the political, economic and cultural elites, all of which result in a discourse that favors particular dominant identities (e.g., white, western, male, and middle-class subjects) (Löwstedt and Mboti, 2017).

Hence, the mass media do not act as passive mechanisms that reflect public opinions and attitudes, impartially describing current events, but rather actively interpret and reconstruct them (Van Dijk, 1991, p. 41; Fryberg et al., 2012). Within this context, it is evident that the media can play a crucial role in reproducing, normalizing and legitimizing racism and hate speech in the public sphere (Cammaerts, 2018; Van Dijk, 1999, 1991; Cerase et al., 2015; Feischmidt and Hervik, 2015; Kallis, 2013b; Löwstedt and Mboti, 2017), making their study not only fruitful, but imperative in order to understand the process of mainstreaming hate speech .

This function becomes all the more prominent in the new online environment, with multiple scholars attesting to a sharp growth of racism and hate speech in the digital sphere (Klein, 2012; Assimakopoulos et al., 2017). In addition, women are under and misrepresented in the media, both traditional and online (Ward and Grower 2020; Haraldsson and Wängnerud, 2019; Humprecht and Esser, 2017), where they are often treated as sexual objects, depicted as sexually promiscuous and ill-equipped or inadequate to undertake positions of power and leadership, be they political or corporate, thus, invoking and reproducing traditional gender stereotypes (Iordache, 2015; Campus, 2013). Sexism and misogyny are particularly prevalent in advertisements but have also permeated mainstream columnists, TV shows, sports coverage, and political news websites (Courtney et al., 2020; Blumell, 2020; Iordache, 2015). Although the arrival of the internet and new technologies has, in many aspects democratized the sphere of information, it has also contributed to the normalization of hate speech, constituting a favorable field for expressing bigotry and hate (Klein, 2012; Hirvonen 2013; Cerase et al., 2015). Therefore, apart from the study of hate speech in websites, blogs etc., a voluminous strain of literature is particularly focused on social media and online commentary. In this paper, however, our focus will be placed upon news media and political parties’ websites, since they constitute actors that bear particular significance and influence in the diffusion and mainstreaming of hate speech online.

4 Materials and methods

In order to explore the aforementioned research questions, we will employ empirical data collected in the context of the HSM2019 research program. The project was conducted under the aegis of the Institute of Greek Politics of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. The data used in the present paper refer to the 11 most frequently visited news websites, as ranked by alexa.com (2019; see Table 1), from the April 1, 2019, until the day of the European elections on May 26.

Table 1:

HSM2019, List of news websites covered.

Website	Description	URL
Athens voice	Lifestyle and current affairs website	https://www.athensvoice.gr/
Efsyn	Left-wing, cooperative newspaper	https://www.efsyn.gr/
Gazzetta	Sports website	https://www.gazzetta.gr/
Iefimerida	Current affairs website	https://www.iefimerida.gr/
Ingr	News website	https://www.in.gr/
Kathimerini	Website of a broadsheet center-right newspaper	https://www.kathimerini.gr/
Lifo	Lifestyle and current affairs website	https://www.lifo.gr/
Makeleio	Website of an extreme right wing, nationalist, religious newspaper, which regularly publishes conspiracy theories	https://www.makeleio.gr/
Proto Thema	Website of a popular newspaper	https://www.protothema.gr/
Sport24	Sports website	https://www.sport24.gr/
Zougla	Tabloid-like current affairs website	https://www.zougla.gr/

The sample includes the body of online articles, notwithstanding the section they fell under. The selection of online media over traditional newspapers is a popular methodological choice in this line of research, due to the prominence of the virtual sphere as a locus of hate speech reproduction and dissemination (Klein, 2012; Hirvonen, 2013). The unit of analysis was every independent excerpt demonstrating one or more types of hate speech, resulting in a total of 1,015 unique entries. These categories comprised nationalist, racist, anti-immigrant, sexist, and homophobic/transphobic speech, as we have already discussed in more detail above. Coders were given the aforementioned operational definitions of hate speech categories, along with some indicative keywords and examples, and were instructed to document each excerpt that fell under one or more of these types. Hate speech excerpts that were treated in a condemnatory or critical manner were not included in the documentation. All sources were simultaneously monitored by two researchers rotating between media every week, thus enabling the calculation of intercoder percent agreement for every variable, as a measure of reliability. For each unit of analysis, a number of variables were coded, including information on the source, type of text and subject of enunciation, as well as the kind(s) of hate speech it demonstrated. It should be noted that the aim of this inquiry was not to draw a representative sample in order to find the analogy between hate and non-hate speech on each website, but rather to document the absolute number of hate speech excerpts in every medium we examined. After data collection was completed, the bulk of coded data was reviewed by two independent researchers, achieving an intercoder reliability of more than 80 %. Then, mostly descriptive statistics were employed to tackle the quantitative aspects of our research question.

The data were then qualitatively analyzed according to the principles of thematic analysis. Thematic analysis can be defined as ‘a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within the data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79), while a theme, is a ‘pattern found in the information that at minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon’ (Boyatzis 1996, p. 3). Here, a coding reliability approach was adopted, in which themes are rather identified than developed (Braun and Clarke, 2016). In this approach, coding is seen as a process for looking for evidence of previously identified themes (Braun and Clarke, 2016), according to the conceptualization presented in the previous section. In the next phase, initial codes were reviewed again and transformed into themes and sub-themes, capturing important aspects of the data in relation to the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 82).

5 Findings and discussion

Quantitative analysis: The scope of hate speech mainstreaming

The total number of unique hate speech entries identified in the news websites under investigation was 1,015. By ‘unique’, we mean that each hate speech excerpt could be located several times by the coders, possibly in more than one website, but it was inserted only once in the database, as belonging to the source which published it first. Given the fact that the coding period was eight weeks long, this means that 18 unique hate speech excerpts, without any critical commentary, were transmitted in the Greek virtual public sphere each day, being viewed by literally millions of news website visitors.

The most visible hate speech category was sexism, with 50.2 % of the excerpts being categorized as such (Table 2). The second most salient kind of hate speech was nationalism, with 33.9 %, followed by racism (19.8 %), anti-immigrant speech (11.4 %) and anti-LGBTQIA+ speech, with 6.2 % (Table 2).

The main enunciators of hate speech are the news websites themselves through unsigned articles, which amount to 64.8 % of all entries (Table 3). This finding underlines the role played by online media in the (re)production of hate speech, in accordance with what the literature suggests. Moreover, the articulation of this kind of speech is mostly carried out without the composers’ personally signing the texts; that is without assuming individual responsibility for the hate speech that is being voiced. The connotation of this finding is that hate speech is a fully embedded aspect of mainstream media because by widely adopting unsigned texts they willingly forfeit the right to make the ‘personal responsibility of the author’ an excuse. Furthermore, given the great degree of interconnectedness between the media and other structures of power, for example, politics and businesses, it is safe to assert that the main argument of this paper concerning hate speech mainstreaming seems rather solid. Also, the above-mentioned notion that the media actively interpret and reconstruct public opinions is further supported by these findings.

Table 2:

Hate speech categories in websites in % (Source: HSM2019).

Hate speech category	Percentage of total hate speech excerpts (%)*
Sexism	50.2
Nationalism	33.9
Racism	19.8
Anti-immigrant speech	11.4
Anti-LGBTQIA+ speech	6.2

*Percentages sum to more than 100 percent because each excerpt could be coded under more than 1 category

Politicians/political parties come in second as enunciators, with 18.4 % of the total excerpts, followed by journalists/reporters (5.8 %), anonymous hate speakers whose statements are being reproduced (3.8 %), members of high visibility professions, like artists and athletes (2.3 %), members or representatives of the military and the police (1.3 %), representatives of the church and members of the clergy (1.3 %) and technocrats (1.1 %) (Table 3).

Table 3:

Who enunciated hate speech (Source: HSM2019).

Enunciator	Percentage of total hate speech excerpts (%)
The medium itself (unsigned)	64.8
Politicians	18.4
Journalists	5.8
Anonymous (citizens etc.)	3.8
High visibility professions (athletes, artists, sports club owners, celebrities etc.)	2.3
Military/Police	1.3
Church/Clergy	1.3
Technocrats (lawyers, academics etc.)	1.1
Other	1.2
Total	100.0

Table 4:

Hate speech categories by web outlet (% of total excerpts) (Source: HSM2019).

	Sexism	Nationalism	Racism	Anti-immigrant speech	Anti-LGBTQIA+ speech
Athens voice	5.9	7.6	3.5	0.9	6.3
Efsyn	1.0	3.2	1.0	1.7	1.6
Gazzetta	10.6	0.6	1.0	0.0	3.2
Iefimerida	10.4	5.5	5.0	8.6	4.8
Ingr	9.6	7.8	3.0	5.2	11.1
Kathimerini	1.2	1.7	2.0	5.2	1.6
Lifo	2.2	0.9	0.5	0.9	3.2
Makeleio	34.5	45.1	64.2	68.1	50.8
Proto Thema	17.3	9.9	14.4	5.2	15.9
Sport24	1.6	0.6	0.5	0.0	1.6
Zougla	5.9	17.2	5.0	4.3	0.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Makeleio comes first in all five types of hate speech under examination. Sexism is more equally distributed among the different websites, thus verifying it is the most salient type of hate speech across the virtual public sphere. Sexism is more frequent in Makeleio (34.5 %) and Proto Thema (17.3 %) and it is quite salient, with more than 10 % of excerpts in three more outlets. Nationalism is also rather equally distributed among the different websites. Apart from Makeleio (45.1 % of nationalist speech), the tabloid Zougla (17.2 %) and Proto Thema (9.9 %) contain significant amounts of nationalist speech. Anti-immigrant speech, racism and anti-LGBTQIA+ speech on the other hand, are quite unevenly distributed among different outlets. Makeleio has in every case more than 50 % of the excerpts. The second outlet for racism and anti-LGBTQIA+ is Proto Thema, and regarding anti-immigrant speech it is IEfimerida (Table 4). In sum, sexism and anti-LGBTQIA+ speech are more common in sports and lifestyle outlets while nationalism and anti-immigrant speech is more salient in political outlets. Racism on the other hand is a generic feature of the Greek digital public sphere, since it can be found literally in all kinds of online media.

In Table 5, hate speech categories by enunciator are presented. It is interesting that while unsigned articles have the lion’s share in every category, the hate speech category that is mostly conveyed by this particular enunciator type is sexism (80.6 %), followed by racism (73.6 %). On the other hand, nationalism is the type of hate speech that depends less on the medium (41.6 %) than any other and more on politicians (41 %) to be transmitted. Politicians also have a large share regarding anti-immigrant speech (19.8 %). Anti-immigrant speech and racism are the types of discriminatory speech where representatives of the military and the police are more vocal (3.4 % and 3.5 % respectively). Lastly, anti-LGBTQIA+ speech, besides being transmitted mostly in unsigned pieces, is the type of speech that journalists enunciate eponymously more than any other category (14.3 %) and that high visibility professions, the church/clergy and various technocrats contribute to the most. A plausible explanation for these variations is that sexism and racism, although mainstreamed and embedded, are not socially acceptable as personal labels, thus they are conveyed anonymously. This is not so much the case regarding other categories, which openly assert a kind of group dominance, such as nationalism.

Table 5:

Hate speech by enunciator (Source: HSM2019).

	Sexism	Nationalism	Racism	Antiimmigrant	AntiLGBTQIA+	Total
The medium itself (unsigned)	80.6	41.6	73.6	62.9	57.1	64.8
Politicians	6.5	41.0	5.5	19.8	9.5	18.4
Journalists	5.9	4.7	7.5	7.8	14.3	5.8
Anonymous (citizens etc.)	2	4.7	5	4.3	4.8	3.8
High visibility professions (athletes, artists, sports club owners, celebrities etc.)	2.9	0.9	1	-	4.8	2.3
Military/Police	-	2	3.5	3.4	-	1.3
Church/Clergy	0.8	2	1	-	3.2	1.3
Technocrats (lawyers, academics etc.)	0.8	1.5	1.5	-	4.8	1.1
Other	0.6	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6:

Correlation matrix between hate speech categories (Phi correlation coefficient) (Source: HSM2019).

	Sexism	Nationalism	Racism	Anti-immigrant speech	Anti-LGBTQIA+ speech
Sexism		-.670**	-.326**	-.330**	-.063**
Nationalism			.053*	.004	-.115**
Racism				.319**	.026
Anti-immigrant speech					-.080**

* p < .1, **p < .05

Table 6 contains the correlation coefficients between the different types of discriminatory speech. Phi correlation coefficients are presented. Phi is suitable for testing the relationship between binary variables. Sexism appears to be the more autonomous type of discriminatory speech, demonstrating negative correlations with all four other types of speech. This is expected because sexism is the hate speech category that is overwhelmingly conveyed anonymously, thus limiting the possibilities of co-existing with other types of hate speech. At the same time, three of these negative correlations are the three strongest of the whole matrix, namely with nationalism, anti-immigrant speech and racism. Also, rather intuitively, racist and anti-immigrant speech have the strongest co-existence relation. Anti-LGBTQIA+ speech also seems to be a rather stand-alone type of hate speech, demonstrating negative correlations with sexism, nationalism and anti-immigrant speech, albeit weak ones.

Qualitative content analysis: The mechanisms of hate speech mainstreaming

Qualitative analysis aims at unpacking the mechanisms of hate speech mainstreaming. Specifically, it aims to address the particular ways in which hate speech is operationalized, as well as the thematic vehicles of its construction and transmission, by employing thematic analysis.

Sexism. In the case of sexism, the most common theme is the ‘Aestheticization of the female body’. The male gaze (Mulvey, 2014) is prevalent, leading to a sexualized or even dehumanized depiction of women, who are (re)presented as sexual objects, serving the pleasure of the heterosexual male reader. E.g., ‘We are talking about the Minister’s blonde, juicy secretary.’^[2] This theme is in accordance with the above-mentioned benevolent sexism type. Furthermore, according to a sub-theme, ‘Political correctness equals hypocrisy’. Here, the objectification of women is presented as natural and normal; all political correctness does is to conceal this normality. For example, an article stresses that ‘the mere difference is that now, the conflict among the contemporary, civilized man who claims “it is her right to pose as she wants, against the stereotypes” and the other humble self who confesses that he prefers the picture “with the high stockings” is taking place in public. And, depending on each one’s level of hypocrisy, it becomes disclosed or not.’^[3] This attack against political correctness appears as an attempt by the editors of such texts to a priori deny allegations of sexism, by normalizing and naturalizing the aestheticization of women’s bodies.

The second theme of sexist speech glorifies the ‘Proper man’. Manhood is praised as a value reaffirmed through female conquests, often presenting itself as de facto rational, in stark contrast with the inherent irrationality of women. ‘Papadopoulos is the only [true] male that I have come upon in my career […]. The only one who, without swinging, without pretense, without hesitations, talks with such an honest straightness. The vagina for him is what religious paintings are for every truly devoted Christian’,^[4] an interviewee says, while another interviewee highlights that ‘men, more than before, think that their rationalism is under attack. Women have the advantage of talking more easily’.^[5]

Another theme refers to ‘Ethical and value judgements,’ whereby women are judged based on traditional values and morals. For example, the former Prime Minister’s partner is referred to as the ‘unwed, who has stretched from grubbing.’^[6] Another excerpt claims that ‘few things are so funny and hypocritical as a woman with deep cleavage being annoyed because people are dealing with her breasts.’^[7] The aforementioned themes are in agreement with similar research findings regarding the content of sexist speech. According to Iordache (2015), the objectification of women, the emphasis on their physical appearance, and their portrayal as sexually promiscuous, are the most common themes of sexist discourse.

Nationalism. The first theme of nationalist speech is entitled ‘Unique … and anti-leftist’. This theme refers to the issue of the name of North Macedonia and the signing of the Prespa Agreement, which proved to be one of the most salient and divisive electoral issues (as mentioned above). The common denominator is the uniqueness of Macedonia and its sole identification with Greece, combined with aggressive references to the Left, which is portrayed as a national traitor, surrendering the country to its enemies: ‘The gathered citizens were yelling “scumbags, traitors, left” and “Macedonia is Greek” to the two candidates for the European elections, as well as to everyone else entering the city hall of Eordaia, where SYRIZA’s “Europe of solidarity” was planned to take place.’^[8]

Another theme pertaining to nationalist speech is that current affairs are framed in relation to ‘Conspiracy theories’, which primarily entail a secret plan to subvert the Greek nation. For example, an article claims that ‘it became clear that Soros’ aim was to destroy the national borders and the identity of all member-states for the purposes of a single world, a new order. Hence, the obvious plan is the destruction of national sovereignty, along with the cultural and religious characteristics […]. It is also evident that Soros is just the tip of the iceberg and that a shady elite, responsible for actualizing these special plans, exists.’^[9]

Racism. Beginning our analysis with racist speech, a recurrent theme is ‘The division of labor in criminal activity’. Particular (ethnic) groups of people are linked with delinquent/illegal behaviors. For example, according to an article ‘...the most dangerous (aspect) is that within these squats refuge thugs and undocumented foreigners find refuge, whose origin, past and identity are unknown to the authorities. From Algerian cutthroats, Afghan cigarette sellers and drug dealers to suspicious people moving at the margins of global terrorism, they all compose the weird mosaic of “new Exarcheia”.’^[10] Thus, qualitative analysis is in line with the quantitative findings, indicating that racist speech is mainly xenophobic. Immigrants are perceived as threats to social order and security, as well as public health, a recurring theme in the representations of migrants in the Greek public sphere (Papastergiou and Takou, 2014; Doukarelli and Braessa, 2021).

The second theme is ‘Allegories and metaphors;’ that is, employing specific terms that normally denote something else, to describe a situation in an implicitly derogatory manner. An indicative example is the reference to ‘the Kabul of Acharnon Street’^[11], or the repetitive mentions of ‘Elladistan’.^[12] It has to be noted that the use of specific linguistic strategies, such as metaphors, is not a new phenomenon: Baider et al. (2017, p. 38) stress that they ‘are often employed with a view to constructing the exclusion of the out-group and the cohesion of the in-group,’ while Van Dijk (2000, p. 35), also highlights the use of such ‘rhetorical devices’ in the reproduction of racism.

Anti-immigrant speech. Turning to anti-immigrant speech, one identifiable theme is ‘State of siege’. Greece is being depicted as an ‘open unguarded field’ (Papastergiou and Takou, 2014, p. 21); a castle under constant siege, which needs to endure the recurring waves of foreigners’ attacks, which are threatening to distort the demographic composition of the country (see also Doukarelli and Braessa, 2021). According to one article, ‘considering the pace of our country’s settlement by the uninvited guests, it will not be long before it won’t matter for the system what native Greek’s opinion for politics is. Numbers will have imposed their own ‘justice’ in the place that gave birth to democracy and will soon have sharia implemented.’^[13]

Table 7:

Main themes per hate speech category.

	Theme 1	Theme 2	Theme 3
Sexism	Aestheticization of the female body Subtheme: Political correctness equals hypocrisy	The ‘Proper man’	Ethical and value judgements
Nationalism	Unique … and anti-leftist	Conspiracy theories
Racism	The division of labor in criminal activity	Allegories and metaphors
Anti-immigrant speech	State of siege	Holiday trip
Anti-LGBTQIA+ speech	Belittlement, mockery and shaming

Another interesting theme depicts migration as a ‘Holiday trip’. The process of migration is being flouted as a convenient and opportunistic journey, while immigrants are supposed to receive preferential treatment. For example, immigrants’ transfer from the islands, where they were stranded, to the mainland is described as a cruise that abuses Greek people’s money, with the Greek immigration minister, Mr Vitsas, seen as the cruise leader: ‘Revealing photographs! Immigrants’ “cruise” using Greek people’s money and Vitsas as their “tour guide”-Rage among all Greeks.’^[14] These findings stand in line with research on the field, which, among other findings, pinpoints the emergence of a discourse about ‘immigrants having it too good in Greece’ (Papastergiou and Takou, 2014).

Anti-LGBTQIA+ speech. Finally, homophobic-transphobic speech (which here is also referred to as anti-LGBTQIA+ speech) mostly revolves around the theme of ‘Belittlement, mockery and shaming’. This theme includes derogatory references to any non-heteronormative sexual and gender identity, while at the same time, refusing the LGBTQIA+ subjects’ right to self-identification. The most indicative example of the latter comes from the most popular news portal in Greece, asserting that ‘no matter how much a transvestite puts make-up on, no matter how hard she tries, she cannot become a woman.’^[15] Another excerpt illustrates an attempt to normalize the mockery of trans people, even resorting to ancient Greek comedians for support: ‘Aristofanes used to curse Euripides and Socrates. Can’t Seferlis^[16] curse two transvestites? He is not cursing him. He is just describing him and other people – who are worse than what they curse – laugh at him.’^[17]

6 Conclusion

The paper addressed the increasingly important issue of the proliferation of discriminatory speech in the digital public sphere. It took Greece as a case study, examining the eleven most visited websites in the Spring of 2019. The quantitative and the qualitative dimensions of hate speech, as they were explored here, most likely contribute to the normalization of both symbolic and physical violence and to the further diffusion of extreme-right wing ideology. This bears significance and repercussions for the quality of democracy.

This issue has become all the more topical after the COVID-19 pandemic, as fear of the ‘other’ has dominated public spheres across the globe, intersecting with existing preconceptions and prejudices. In particular, in Greece, but also in other countries where immigration is one of the most salient issues, the proliferation of hate speech, in the form of othering or even in the dehumanizing of certain groups is directly linked to social (in)tolerance and the public accountability of law enforcement authorities. Furthermore, in Greece, from the emergence of the crisis in 2010, until the parliamentary election of June 2023, the popularity of extreme right-wing parties in the Greek parliament remained high, as did their ideas, even after the incarceration of the infamous neo-Nazi Golden Dawn leadership. The new insights that this study brings to hate speech research concern both the quantitative aspects and the qualitative themes through which we have tried to reconstruct the everyday enunciation of hate speech and which may be generalized theoretically in future studies.

More specifically, sexism and nationalism are the two most salient categories of discriminatory speech in the Greek digital public sphere, followed by racism, anti-immigrant speech and anti-LGBTQIA+ speech. The specific character of online media outlets seems to be a differentiating factor of discriminatory speech usage.

Anonymous online articles constitute the main conveyor belt of discriminatory speech, especially for sexism and racism, followed by politicians/political parties. This finding underlines the mainstream character of hate speech, which is fully embedded in online media. Politicians and political parties play a great role in the transmission of nationalism and anti-immigrant speech. Anti-LGBTQIA+ speech is also transmitted mostly through unnamed pieces, as well as by eponymous journalists, high visibility professions, the church/clergy and various professionals/technocrats.

From a qualitative perspective, distinct themes that serve as meaning conveyors, as well as specific lingos have been developed for every discriminatory speech category. ‘serious’ outlets also take part in their usage. In addition, there are certain elective affinities between different types of speech, as in the relationship between racist and anti-immigrant speech, while sexism, on the other hand, is a stand-alone type of hate speech.

Data availability statement

The research data associated with this paper are available with open access in the Social Data Network repository in the following link: https://datacatalogue.sodanet.gr/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.17903/FK2/FG7TX7

References

Alexa.com (2019). Top sites in Greece. https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/GRSuche in Google Scholar

Amin-Khan, T. (2012). New orientalism, securitisation and the Western media’s incendiary racism. Third World Quarterly, 33(9), 1595–1610. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.72083110.1080/01436597.2012.720831Suche in Google Scholar

Assimakopoulos, S. & Baider, F. (2017). Hate speech in online reactions to news articles in Cyprus and Greece. In M. Chondrogianni, S. Courtenage, G. Horrocks, A. Arvaniti & I. Tsimpli (Eds.), Proceedings of the 13^th International Conference on Greek Linguistics (pp. 407-415). https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/106113Suche in Google Scholar

Assimakopoulos, S., Baider, F. & Millar, S. (Eds.) (2017). Online hate speech in the European Union. A discourse-analytic perspective. Springer.10.1007/978-3-319-72604-5Suche in Google Scholar

Avdela, E. & Psara, A. (2012, July 1). Απόκρυφες πτυχές της μελανής ψήφου [Hidden aspects of the dark vote]. Enthemata. https://enthemata.wordpress.com/2012/07/01/agef/Suche in Google Scholar

Baider, F., Constantinou, A. & Petrou, A. (2017). Metaphors related to othering the non-natives. In S. Assimakopoulos, F. Baider & S. Millar (Eds.), Online hate speech in the European Union. A discourse-analytic perspective (pp. 38–42). Springer.Suche in Google Scholar

Balibar, E. & Wallerstein, I. M. (1991). Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities. Verso.Suche in Google Scholar

Blumell, L. E. (2020). Bro, foe, or ally? Measuring ambivalent sexism in political online reporters. Feminist Media Studies, 20(1), 53–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2018.154621110.1080/14680777.2018.1546211Suche in Google Scholar

Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development. Sage.Suche in Google Scholar

Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa10.1191/1478088706qp063oaSuche in Google Scholar

Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2016). (Mis)conceptualising themes, thematic analysis, and other problems with Fugard and Potts’ (2015) sample-size tool for thematic analysis. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 19(6), 739–743. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2016.119558810.1080/13645579.2016.1195588Suche in Google Scholar

Brown, A. (2017). What is hate speech? Part 1: The myth of hate. Law and Philosophy, 36, 419–468. DOI 10.1007/s10982-017-9297-110.1007/s10982-017-9297-1Suche in Google Scholar

Butler, J. (1997). Excitable speech. A politics of the performative. Routledge.Suche in Google Scholar

Cammaerts, B. (2018). The mainstreaming of extreme right-wing populism in the Low Countries: What is to be done? Communication Culture & Critique, 11(1), 7–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/ccc/tcx00210.1093/ccc/tcx002Suche in Google Scholar

Campus, D. (2013). Women political leaders and the media. Springer.10.1057/9781137295545Suche in Google Scholar

Cerase, A., D’Angelo, E. & Santoro, C. (2015). Monitoring racist and xenophobic extremism to counter hate speech online: Ethical dilemmas and methods of a preventive approach. F3 Magazine, 11, 111–119. https://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Andrea-Cerase-et-al.pdf10.18356/d8b3d6ca-enSuche in Google Scholar

Courtney, M., Breen, M., McGing, C., McMenamin, I., O’Malley, E. & Rafter, K. (2020). Underrepresenting reality? Media coverage of women in politics and sport. Social Science Quarterly, 101(4), 1282–1302. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.1282610.1111/ssqu.12826Suche in Google Scholar

Dalakoglou, D. (2013). From the bottom of the Aegean Sea to Golden Dawn: Security, xenophobia, and the politics of hate in Greece. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 13(3), 514–522. DOI: 10.1111/sena.1205410.1111/sena.12054Suche in Google Scholar

Dianeosis (2016). Το μεταναστευτικό-προσφυγικό ζήτημα στην Ελλάδα [The migrant-refugee issue in Greece]. https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/immigration_apopseis-ellinon.pdfSuche in Google Scholar

Doukarelli, K. & Braessa, N. A. (2021). Συμβατικά ΜΜΕ και αντισυμβατικοί λόγοι: ηθικός πανικός και κανονικοποίηση της ακροδεξιάς ρητορικής [Mainstream media and non-mainstream discourses: moral panic and normalizing the far-right rhetoric]. In R. Vasilaki & G. Souvlis (Eds.), Η κανονικοποίηση του Ακροδεξιού λόγου στην Ελλάδα. Φύλο, ΜΜΕ, Ένοπλες δυνάμεις, Εκκλησία (pp. 71–120). Rosa Luxemburg Institution.Suche in Google Scholar

Ellinas, A. A. (2009). Chaotic but popular? Extreme-right organisation and performance in the age of media communication. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 17(2), 209–221. https://doi.org/10.1080/1478280090310865010.1080/14782800903108650Suche in Google Scholar

Ellinas, A. A. (2013). The rise of Golden Dawn: The new face of the far right in Greece. South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 543–565. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2013.78283810.1080/13608746.2013.782838Suche in Google Scholar

ElSherief, M., Kulkarni, V., Nguyen, D., Yang Wang, W. & Belding, E. (2018). Hate lingo: A target-based linguistic analysis of hate speech in social media. Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, 12(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v12i1.1504110.1609/icwsm.v12i1.15041Suche in Google Scholar

European Commission (1997). Eurobarometer 48: Report. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb48/eb48_en.pdfSuche in Google Scholar

European Commission (2018). Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Eurobarometer 469: Summary. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/results-special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-european-union_enSuche in Google Scholar

European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2015). Report on Greece (fifth monitoring cycle). https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-greece/16808b5796Suche in Google Scholar

European Social Survey (2008). ESS4-2008 Edition 4.5. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ESS4e04_5&y=2008Suche in Google Scholar

Falekas, N., Karasavvoglou, A., Tsourgiannis, L. & Polychronidou, P. (2012). Immigrants and media in Greece: An empirical investigation for the period 2002–2008. European Research Studies, XV(1), 43–54. https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/3100210.35808/ersj/343Suche in Google Scholar

Feischmidt, M. & Hervik, P. (2015). Mainstreaming the extreme: Intersecting challenges from the far right in Europe. Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 1(1), 4–17. https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v1i1.8010.17356/ieejsp.v1i1.80Suche in Google Scholar

Frenda, S., Ghanem, B., Montes-y-Gomez, M. & Rosso, P. (2019). Online hate speech against women: automatic identification of misogyny and sexism on Twitter. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, 36, 4743–4752. DOI: 10.3233/JIFS-17902310.3233/JIFS-179023Suche in Google Scholar

Fryberg, S. A., Stephens, N. M., Covarrubias, R., Markus, H. R., Carter, E. D., Laiduc, G. A. & Salido, A. J. (2012). How the media frames the immigration debate: The critical role of location and politics. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 12(1), 96-112. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2011.01259.x10.1111/j.1530-2415.2011.01259.xSuche in Google Scholar

Gagliardone, I. (2019). Defining online hate and its “public lives”: What is the place for “extreme speech”? International Journal of Communication, 13, 3068–3087.Suche in Google Scholar

Georgiadou, V. (2013). Right-wing populism and extremism: The rapid rise of “Golden Dawn” in crisis-ridden Greece. In R. Melzer & S. Serafin (Eds.), Right-wing extremism in Europe. Country analyses, counter strategies and labor-market oriented exit strategies (pp. 75–102). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.Suche in Google Scholar

Glick, P. & Fiske, S. T. (1997). Hostile and benevolent sexism: Measuring ambivalent sexist attitudes toward women. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 21(1), 119–135. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1997.tb00104.x10.1111/j.1471-6402.1997.tb00104.xSuche in Google Scholar

Goffman, E. (1986). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Simon & Schuster.Suche in Google Scholar

Haraldsson, A. & Wängnerud, L. (2019). The effect of media sexism on women’s political ambition: Evidence from a worldwide study. Feminist Media Studies, 19(4), 525–541. https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2018.146879710.1080/14680777.2018.1468797Suche in Google Scholar

Hirvonen, K. (2013). Sweden: When hate becomes the norm. Race & Class, 55(1), 78–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/030639681348660410.1177/0306396813486604Suche in Google Scholar

Howarth, C. (2006). Race as stigma: Positioning the stigmatised as agents, not objects. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 16(6), 442–451. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.89810.1002/casp.898Suche in Google Scholar

Humprecht, E. & Esser, F. (2017). A glass ceiling in the online age? Explaining the underrepresentation of women in online political news. European Journal of Communication, 32(5), 439–456. https://doi.org/10.1177/026732311772034310.1177/0267323117720343Suche in Google Scholar

Iordache, A. (2015). A qualitative analysis of hate speech reported to the Romanian National Council for Combating Discrimination (2003–2015). Sfera Politicii, 4(186), 50–72.Suche in Google Scholar

Kadianaki, I. & Andreouli, E. (2017). Essentialism in social representations of citizenship: An analysis of Greeks’ and migrants’ discourse. Political Psychology, 38(5), 833–848. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.1227110.1111/pops.12271Suche in Google Scholar

Kallis, A. (2013a). Breaking taboos and “mainstreaming the extreme”: The debates on restricting Islamic symbols in contemporary Europe. In R. Wodak, M. Khosravinik & B. Mral (Eds.), Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse (pp. 55–70). Bloomsbury Academic.10.5040/9781472544940.ch-004Suche in Google Scholar

Kallis, A. (2013b). Far-Right “contagion” or a failing “mainstream”? How dangerous ideas cross borders and blur boundaries. Democracy and Security, 9(3), 221–246. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.79225110.1080/17419166.2013.792251Suche in Google Scholar

Karamanidou, L. (2016). Violence against migrants in Greece: Beyond the Golden Dawn. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(11), 2002–2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.112412410.1080/01419870.2015.1124124Suche in Google Scholar

Karydis, V. (1996). Η εγκληματικότητα των μεταναστών στην Ελλάδα [Immigrants’ criminality in Greece]. Ekdoseis Papazisis.Suche in Google Scholar

Katsourides, Y., Moudouros, N. & Evagorou, E. (2018). Historical legacies and political agency: Hate speech in contemporary Cyprus. Nations and Nationalism, 24(1), 148–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.1236310.1111/nana.12363Suche in Google Scholar

Khosravinik, M. (2010). The representation of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in British newspapers: A critical discourse analysis. Journal of Language and Politics, 9(1), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.9.1.01kho10.1075/jlp.9.1.01khoSuche in Google Scholar

Klein, A. (2012). Slipping racism into the mainstream: A theory of information laundering. Communication Theory, 22(4), 427–448. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2012.01415.x10.1111/j.1468-2885.2012.01415.xSuche in Google Scholar

Kouki, H. & Vidra, Z. (2014). Introduction to the Special Issue: New forms of intolerance in European political life. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 12(4), 353–362. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2014.93329010.1080/15562948.2014.933290Suche in Google Scholar

Kuntsman, A. (2008). Between gulags and pride parades: Sexuality, nation, and haunted speech act. A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, 14(2–3), 263–287. https://doi.org/10.1215/10642684-2007-03310.1215/10642684-2007-033Suche in Google Scholar

Lialiouti, Z., Georgiadou, V., Galariotis, G. & Kafe, A. (2017). Η ξενοφοβία στην Ελλάδα ως ερευνητικό πρόβλημα: Εννοιολογικά και μεθοδολογικά ζητήματα [Xenophobia in Greece as a research problem: Conceptual and methodological issues]. Science and Society: Journal of Political and Ethical Theory, 35, 161–187. https://doi.org/10.12681/sas.1149410.12681/sas.11494Suche in Google Scholar

Lilian, D. (2007). A thorn by any other name: Sexist discourse as hate speech. Discourse & Society, 18(6), 719–740. https://doi.org/10.1177/095792650708219310.1177/0957926507082193Suche in Google Scholar

Löwstedt, A. & Mboti, N. (2017). Media racism: Beyond modernity and postmodernity. International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics, 13(1–2), 111–130. https://doi.org/10.1386/macp.13.1-2.111_110.1386/macp.13.1-2.111_1Suche in Google Scholar

Lueck, K., Due, C. & Augoustinos, M. (2015). Neoliberalism and nationalism: Representations of asylum seekers in the Australian mainstream news media. Discourse & Society, 26(5), 608–629. https://doi.org/10.1177/095792651558115910.1177/0957926515581159Suche in Google Scholar

Matsuda, M. J. (1993). Words that wound: Critical race theory, assaultive speech, and the First Amendment. Westview Press.Suche in Google Scholar

Mulvey, L. (2014). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema. In S. MacKenzie (Ed.), Film manifestos and global cinema cultures: A critical anthology (pp. 359–370). University of California Press, Berkeley.Suche in Google Scholar

Norocel, O. C. (2016). Disciplinary intersections of gender and ethnicity in populist radical right media in Romania. Identities, 23(2), 247–264. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2015.105439410.1080/1070289X.2015.1054394Suche in Google Scholar

Papastergiou, V. & Takou, Ε. (2014). Eleven myths and even more truths. Migration in Greece. Rosa Luxembourg Foundation.Suche in Google Scholar

Parekh, B. (2006). Hate speech. Is there a case for banning? Public Policy Research, 12(4), 213–233. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1070-3535.2005.00405.x10.1111/j.1070-3535.2005.00405.xSuche in Google Scholar

Pohjonen, M. (2019). A comparative approach to social media extreme speech: Online hate speech as media commentary. International Journal of Communication, 13, 3088–3103. https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/31348Suche in Google Scholar

Schulzke, M. (2016). The social benefits of protecting hate speech and exposing sources of prejudice. Res Publica, 22, 225–242. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-015-9282-110.1007/s11158-015-9282-1Suche in Google Scholar

Shook, N. J., Fitzgerald, H. N., Boggs, S. T., Ford, C. G., Hopkins, P. D. & Silva, N. M. (2020). Sexism, racism, and nationalism: Factors associated with the 2016 US presidential election results? Plos One, 15(3), e0229432. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.022943210.1371/journal.pone.0229432Suche in Google Scholar

Siapera, E. & Veikou, M. (2016). The digital Golden Dawn: Emergence of a nationalist-racist digital mainstream. In A. Karatzogianni, D. Nguyen & E. Serafinelli (Eds.), The digital transformation of the public sphere: Conflict, migration, crisis and culture in digital networks (pp. 35–59). Palgrave Macmillan.10.1057/978-1-137-50456-2_3Suche in Google Scholar

Troumbetta, S. (2000). Μερικές σκέψεις σχετικά με την παράσταση του “άλλου» και το φαινόμενο του ρατσισμού στην ελληνική κοινωνία [Some thoughts on the representation of the other and the phenomenon of racism in Greek society. The Greek Review of Social Research, 101–102, 137–176. https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.99910.12681/grsr.999Suche in Google Scholar

Tsatsanis, E., Teperoglou, E. & Seriatos, A. (2020). Two-partyism reloaded: Polarisation, negative partisanship, and the return of the left-right divide in the Greek elections of 2019. In A, Bosco & S. Verney (Eds.), The Politics of Polarisation (pp. 250-279). Routledge.10.4324/9781003317012-12Suche in Google Scholar

Tsimouris, G. (2015). From mainstream to extreme. Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, 1(1), 83–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v1i1.27 http://intersections.tk.mta.hu10.17356/ieejsp.v1i1.27Suche in Google Scholar

Triantafyllidou, A. & Kouki, C. (2012, October) Μισαλλοδοξία και ρατσισμός σε έξαρση στην πολιτική ζωή της Ελλάδας [Rising intolerance in Greek political life], Policy brief. European University Institute, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/22618/ACCEPT_PLURALISM_PB_WP4_GREECE_Gr.pdf?sequence=3Suche in Google Scholar

Tsirbas, Y. (2021). The 2019 regional elections in Greece: Both regionalized and nationalized. Regional & Federal Studies, 32(4), 499–510. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2021.200040210.1080/13597566.2021.2000402Suche in Google Scholar

Tsirbas, Y. (2022). Έρευνα παρακολούθησης και καταγραφής μισαλλόδοξου προεκλογικού λόγου στο εκλογικό 2019 [Hate speech monitoring in the 2019 election] [Data set]. SoDaNet Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.17903/FK2/FG7TX7Suche in Google Scholar

Vasvari, L. O. (2013). Gendered hate speech and political discourse in recent U.S. elections and in postsocialist hungary. CLC Web: Comparative Literature and Culture, 15(4). https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.230310.7771/1481-4374.2303Suche in Google Scholar

Van Dijk, T. A. (1989). Mediating racism: The role of the media in the reproduction of racism’. In R. Wodak (Ed.), Language, power and ideology (pp. 199–226). John Benjamins Publishing Company.10.1075/ct.7.15dijSuche in Google Scholar

Van Dijk, T. A. (1991). Racism and the press. Routledge.Suche in Google Scholar

Van Dijk, T.A. (1999) Media, racism, and monitoring. In Nordenstreng K & Griffin M (Eds) International media and monitoring (pp. 307-316). Hampton Press.Suche in Google Scholar

Van Dijk, T. A. (2000). New(s) racism: A discourse analytical approach. Open University Press.Suche in Google Scholar

Vasilaki, R. & Souvlis, G. (2021). Η κανονικοποίηση του Ακροδεξιού λόγου στην Ελλάδα [Far-right speech mainstreaming in Greece]. In R. Vasilaki & G. Souvlis (Eds.), Η κανονικοποίηση του Ακροδεξιού λόγου στην Ελλάδα. Φύλο, ΜΜΕ, Ένοπλες δυνάμεις, Εκκλησία (pp. 21–32). Rosa Luxemburg Institution.Suche in Google Scholar

Ward, L. M. & Grower, P. (2020). Media and the development of gender role stereotypes. Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, 2, 177–199. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-devpsych-051120-01063010.1146/annurev-devpsych-051120-010630Suche in Google Scholar

Warner, W. & Hirschberg, J. (2012). Detecting hate speech on the world wide web. Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Language in Social Media, 19-26.Suche in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2024-03-01

Published in Print: 2025-05-28

Dieses Werk ist lizensiert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz.

Artikel in diesem Heft

https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2023-0051

Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel

hate speech; online media; Greek public sphere; discriminatory discourse; mainstreaming extremism

Creative Commons

BY 4.0