It’s the political economy after all: Implications of the case of Israel’s media system transition on the theory of media systems

Media systems and political culture

A key landmark in comparative political communication research are the models proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Their concept is based on a Western political and cultural framework and comparable empirical parameters. Ostensibly, it is devoid of normative judgment. Before we discuss the extent to which these models fit the Israeli case, we briefly present the theoretical idea and its research developments.

Hallin and Mancini’s classification is based on four dimensions, which combine levels of formal and practical aspects within the framework of a nation-state. The dimensions are: (a) state intervention in ownership, financing, and regulation of the media system; (b) the structure and development of the media market in terms of circulation, market size, type of media (e. g., sensationalist or quality papers, information- or commentary-oriented), and target audience (elite and/or mass readership); (c) the level of journalistic professionalism and commitment to professional and ethical norms; and (d) the extent of political parallelism, that is “the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society” (p. 21) and the way that media “are associated […] with general political tendencies” (p. 27). In that last dimension, the researchers refer to a distinction between three types of connections: politics over broadcasting (direct government control), politics in broadcasting (proportional representation of political power groups within the media), and formal autonomy (professional media insulated from political control).

Based on dimensional analysis, Hallin and Mancini suggested three models located at the poles of a triangle:

1. The pluralist-polarized model characterizes the countries of southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, which experienced long periods of authoritarian regimes that were later democratized and liberalized. In this model, the state is actively involved in the shaping of the media institution, and there is high political parallelism of “politics over broadcasting”.

2. The democratic-corporatist model characterizes the countries of central and northern continental Europe and the Scandinavian states based on democratic corporatism and a state-controlled economy (usually in the form of a welfare state). This model shows strong state involvement in the media, but there is a strong liberal tradition of press freedom, rational-legal authority, substantive autonomy, and moderate political parallelism of “politics in broadcasting”. The communications market is characterized by a transition to commercial characteristics, parallel to the presence in the media system of political and social groups and a high degree of professional journalism.

3. The liberal model, shared by the North Atlantic countries (the United States, Canada, England, and Ireland), which have a long democratic tradition and a free market economy. The media preserves official autonomy, broadcasting is relatively strongly insulated from political control, political parallelism is low, and the role of the state is limited.

Since the publication of these analytical models, they have assumed a leading position in media systems theory. However, many scholars have questioned the validity of attributing a specific model (and, thus, falling into a stereotyping trap) to a particular country. They emphasize the differences and distinctiveness of countries grouped under the same cluster in each of the models (a comprehensive review of this criticism can be found in Humphreys, 2012). This critique presents a significant challenge in classifying and consolidating regimes under the same roof. Still, the empirical parameters and the classification suggested by Hallin and Mancini has enabled media researchers to examine various countries and communication systems while testing the models’ validity and attempting to expand and deepen them.

One of the exploration paths was the applicability of the models to countries beyond the Western world. In a later work, Hallin and Mancini (2012) asked whether their models could be applied to regimes outside Western democracies, and how cultural differences between countries affect the media environment beyond the political characteristics on which the original models focus. A possible answer was given by Peruško (2016), who examined 11 countries in East and Central Europe during the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the communist regime. She concluded that a uniform model of regime-communication relations could not be identified due to profound cultural differences resulting from the abolition of the communist regime and the adoption of democracy.

Peruško et al. (2015) proposed an expansion of the dimensions used to analyze the models, adding cultural variables of media audience use and analyzing national communication maps in the digital era. In the same direction, Mattoni and Ceccobelli (2018) pointed to the need for an updated and expanded version of the theoretical framework, adding to its four original dimensions indicators related to information and communication technologies and a new dimension (popular participation) with participation indicators. Along the same path, Voltmer (2008) suggested new hybrid forms that blend liberal ideals with trajectories of the past and indigenous values in new democracies.

Converging, transiting, and shifting through models

At the end of their book, Hallin and Mancini (2004) put forward a convergence hypothesis. Although they believed that the uniqueness of national political systems would retain the fundamental distinction between the three models, the authors hypothesized that globalization, the commercialization of the media institution, the adoption of professional journalistic norms, and the personalization tendency of the political media would increase the chances that the models will converge toward the liberal model, leading it to be “widely defused around the world” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 13).

A large body of research examined this hypothesis in various European countries. The conclusions remained mixed: Although some found such a trend in some countries, other studies in different countries rejected it. In hindsight, Hallin and Mancini (2017) determined that the differences between national media systems remained significant even after a decade. They admitted that the time had come to abandon the convergence hypothesis and examine more sophisticated hypotheses about changes in media systems.

Another interesting question is how these three models are differentiated and defined. Nechushtai (2018) examined the suitability of the liberal model for the current American situation and concluded that, due to the changing socio-political climate in the United States and the disruption created by the digital age in the communication market, the model is no longer valid there. She proposed replacing it with a hybrid model, which combines the liberal model with the pluralist-polarized model, which she called “polarized liberal” (p. 193).

Applying media systems models to Israel

The meaning of the changes in Israeli media policy is debated among scholars. Attempting to place these changes within a theoretical framework with explanatory validity, Israeli media scholars have turned to several directions. One of the pioneering efforts was made by Caspi and Limor (1992), who adopted the normative models proposed by Siebert et al. (1956). In their comprehensive book, they claimed that Israel developed a mixed model, combining principles of the social responsibility model on the normative level and traces of the authoritarian model on the practical level (p. 139).

This argument was criticized by other researchers who argued that there is no reason to attribute the basic principles of social responsibility to the Israeli case. Even Caspi and Limor themselves had several reservations about a far-reaching conclusion on that point. Limor (Caspi’s co-author) also rethought the claim. In a study he conducted with Nossek (Nossek and Limor, 2001), in which they analyzed the institutional arrangements in Israel, the authors concluded that Israel demonstrates a mixture of authoritarian and democratic elements. One of its most prominent authoritarian traits is the persistent and uninterrupted presence of military censorship since Israel’s inception.

Other researchers criticized the attempt to adopt Siebert et al.’s normative models to the Israeli reality. According to Schejter (2009, pp. 70–72), changes should be examined through the lenses of the paradigm shift among policymakers from powerful effect theory to cultural approaches centered on human creativity. This description reverberates Hallin’s (1994) work, which stressed that, since the 1990s, the media have no longer been perceived as an agent of socialization intended to achieve social-national goals, but as an instrument of expression that allows for multiple voices. In any case, Schejter argued that the Second Authority law should be seen as a continuation of government control over media outlets motivated by fear of the media’s influence and, in effect, exacerbating the government’s oppression of the media establishment.

One of the most extensive attempts to examine the Israeli media system through Hallin and Mancini’s models was applied by Peri (2012). He identified three significant periods in the short history of the State of Israel in which the relations between the political and media institutions changed, and claimed that there is a back-and-forth movement between the patterns. In the first stage, which began in the years preceding the establishment of the state and continued for the next two decades, the press was a tool in the hands of the political and cultural elites and was mobilized for the nation-building process and the unification of society. In the second stage, from the mid-1960s until the end of the 1980s, the political situation in Israel changed. The revolutionary project of nation-state building entered a phase of calm and routine, and the expansion of the economy led to a change in the socioeconomic policy of the Israeli government and the adoption of the neo-liberal system.

According to Peri, due to the collapse of political parallelism and collectivist norms, along with the rise of civil society and journalistic professionalism, the Israeli media underwent a process of de-ideologization and moved toward the liberal model. This development was halted in the early 1990s. It was reversed in the first decade of the 21^st century due to Israel’s complex security situation and the threat to its national security. The phenomenon of rallying around the flag, and the public pressure on the media to operate within the agreed consensual boundaries of the hegemonic discourse, brought the Israeli media system back to the pluralist-polarized model.

Critical junctures, institutionalism, and the political economy of media

Changing or shifting through models and examining different combinations of their foundations due to substantial changes in socio-political situations draw attention to periods of transition in which institutional changes occur. These periods of changing a path to a new course can be articulated as critical junctures. According to this concept, institutional changes may result from an exogenous crisis that changes institutional power relations (McChesney, 2009) or from institutional instability created by a combination of exogenous and endogenous sources often rooted in the period before the critical junction (Bannerman and Haggart, 2015). Analyzing the nature of the changing phase is essential in understanding changes in media systems.

In order to have a complete analysis of institutional changes and policymaking, it is necessary to understand the media’s relationship with other sites of power in society. In doing so, we must remember that social power relations and participation processes can include a wide range of actors and different levels of institutionalization. Therefore, it is beneficial to adopt two theoretical frameworks to analyze this array of social power: Critical Political Economy (CPE) and Historical Institutionalism (HI).

Taking a critical perspective on media and communication and incorporating historical analysis, CPE’s “primary concern is with the allocation of resources within a capitalist society” (Wasko, 2014, p. 260). Its goal is to understand the dynamics of social change and historical transformation, and to analyze social power relations that “mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources, including communication resources” (Mosco, 1996, p. 25). CPE questions the many ways that power and social control, as broadly political processes, organize social relations, design social norms, and influence systems of mass media.

In analyzing media policymaking, CPE distinguishes between three structural categories of actors: the state, the market, and the public. As important sites of power, the interrelationship between the state and the market significantly affects citizenship and public participation (Wasko, 2014). Along this line, institutional political economy argues that institutional and technological constraints shape markets to the advantage of governments and corporations (Mosco, 2015). Within this framework, institutions are embedded in the organizational structure of regimes, reflecting their political economy worldview.

A radical critique of the liberal approach and the free market paradigm emerged within European scholarship during the final decade of the twentieth century. Among the prominent voices within that Westminister school of thought, James Curran stood out as a leading advocate for a radical democracy approach that advanced an alternative conceptualization of media and society and their relationship. He contended (1993) that, in contrast to the liberal tradition, which perceives government as the seat of power and the media as vertical conduits of communication between private citizens and the state, the radical approach posits that power imbalances are a largely social phenomenon and that media should also be conceived as horizontal and diagonal channels between individuals, social groups, and social power structures. Since private media outlets are subjected to capitalist logic and reliant on influential interest groups, dismantling state control does not ensure an independent media landscape or diversified cultural representation. Consequently, claimed Curran, the media system should be organized autonomously, free from both government and market.

In reality, state control was far from being dismantled, and the relationship between the state and the market reveals an intimate collaboration between businesses and state actors in determining public policies and establishing regulatory frameworks (Harvey, 2005, pp. 76–78). Convergence of interests is also apparent in media regulation, and, contrary to the prevailing notion of media market liberalization, the state never withdrew, and its perceived sidelining was nothing more than a misconception (Birnhack and Elkin-Koren, 2003). In that sense, the free market concept serves as a realization of neoliberalism as a political endeavor championed by the economic elite. Interestingly, this agenda was led in Israel by state agents (Mandelkern, 2015).

Residing under the umbrella of New Institutionalism, HI emphasizes the formal and informal aspects of institutions that are “embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938), and “focuses on the role of institutions as Meso level structures that mediate between individual (or group) actors and large-scale forces such as capitalism” (Bannerman and Haggart, 2015, p. 2). It fills the gap addressed, among others, by Humphreys (2012) and his suggestion that it “be more explicitly employed for the study of the relationship between often highly idiosyncratic national media systems and the socio-cultural and political system in which they are embedded” (p. 172).

Within this framework, HI seeks to understand the complex network of institutional arrangements and power relations (Galperin, 2004), embodied official and informal agents and provisions (March and Olsen, 1984), and struggling conflictual forces and exercise of power that shape laws and processes in society over time (Bannerman and Haggart, 2015).

The HI method helps us research communication policy and law and study mechanisms that promote stability and change (Bannerman and Haggart, 2015). It also provides us with a suitable method for analyzing the concept of systems. As Hallin and Mancini noted, the concept of systems does not mean that they are homogeneous, but that “different elements of a system (…) may operate according to logics that are at least in part different, and indeed often in conflict or competition” (Hallin and Mancini, 2017, p.167).

In light of this theoretical and analytical background, and recognizing that states can move in different directions between Hallin and Mancini’s models, this study focuses on the point of change and transition between the models. We try to answer the question of what can be learned from the changes in the Israeli media system in the 1980s and early 1990s on the applicability of Hallin and Mancini’s models and regarding the relations between politics, society, economy, and the media.

The tension between economic, political, and cultural considerations

The beginning of the change in the Israeli media map is attributed to the recommendations of the Kubersky committee. Appointed by the government in 1978 and headed by the director general of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the committee was mandated to “investigate the issue of establishing a second television channel in Israel” (Kubersky, 1979, p. 1). The minister of education and culture and the minister of communication jointly instructed the committee to recommend before the government whether there was a need for an additional (commercial) channel and how to shape its legal framework. The government, it was stressed, cannot fund this channel should it be established.

The Kubersky committee laid down in its report (hereinafter: the report) the basic outline for establishing an independent terrestrial television channel that would be financed through advertising and operated in the form of franchises for private entities. The franchises would be granted by a new statutory public authority that would be established, which would supervise the broadcasts and operate the technical broadcasting system. Laying justifications for the needed change, the committee’s recommendations were based on three pillars: cultural values like pluralism, variety of tastes, and richness of cultural expression; political and national security aspects, based on the Isreal unique geo-political situation amongst Arab neighboring states; and economic considerations.

Although most of the committee’s reasoning was based on the cultural pillar (Schejter, 2009, p. 36), a preoccupation with economic reasoning is the focus of most of the report. This is not a purely quantitative observation but rather a substantial issue: From the second half of the 1970s, Israel suffered from a rising inflationary process due to an expansionary economic policy. The first half of the 1980s saw a deterioration into hyperinflation that soared to triple-digit rates per year (Leiderman and Liviatan, 1999; Razin, 2019). Israel faced an escalating economic crisis and needed a radical solution.

Against this backdrop, the committee had to solve a conflict: While the bottom line of the cultural and political reasons necessitated the establishment of the enterprise, the inflationary reality and the desire to restrain economic consumption cooled the enthusiasm. The committee members were bothered by the possibility that commercial advertising on the new channel would accelerate economic activity, make products more expensive, and increase private consumption.

The report highlighted the contradiction very clearly:

The basic criterion in the committee’s considerations was that the non-economic advantages, such as competition for quality, cultural pluralism, more broadcasting hours for education, knowledge, and minorities, are weighed against the unfavorable effects as well as against the adverse effects of the acceleration of economic activity in a situation of inflation. (Kubersky, 1979, p. 16)

Adding to macroeconomic inhibiting considerations was the strength of newspaper owners and editors who sought to prevent the entry of new competitors. Thirty-eight stakeholders appeared before the committee, most with a direct economic interest in the committee’s recommendations. Only three of these stakeholders were academics, and one representative appeared on behalf of the Ministry of Communications. As the report emphasizes explicitly, the most notable and influential stakeholders were the editors of the Israeli daily newspapers. They sharply opposed the establishment of a second channel, in contrast to most other views and evidence presented to the committee.

The newspaper editors took advantage of the state’s concerns regarding the inflationary crisis to serve their interests. They warned that commercial television in Israel would create pressure for the mass purchase of color TVs and a surge in demand for wage increases, ultimately widening social gaps and damaging the national economy (Kubersky, 1979, p. 93). Furthermore, they argued that “the continued existence of an independent press is in the public interest,” and the entry of a commercial channel will force them “to give up the publication of constructive material which is a service to the public” (p. 22).

The Committee referred to their arguments with sympathy, stating that “their cause is identical with the public interest” (p. 22). The report explicitly indicates that their position received special attention due to the specific weight of the daily press in a democratic-pluralistic society. Even though the report presents television as a medium that “naturally tends to blur the multifaceted sides and nuances of reality” and thus fails to serve the public to the amount the daily press does, still the wording of the report refers to “their cause” and not to the principle of an independent press.

The outcome was a recommendation to consider ways to minimize the potential decrease in printed newspapers’ revenues due to the new channel’s advertisements. One of the options mentioned was allowing the press to participate in the franchisees. Compensations were also recommended in the case of movie theatres, especially for those operating in small towns. These recommendations would crystallize later in The Law into a compensation mechanism for daily newspapers and movie theatres, in which a certain amount of royalties will be granted to them for three years. The Law also admitted newspapers to own shares in the new franchises up to a limit.

The committee’s conclusion was a compromise between the economic and non-economic considerations: recommending the establishment of the second channel but refraining from deciding on the right timing. The compromise emphasizes the economic considerations’ inhibiting power. As the final decision was left in the hands of politicians, its actual result was a delay of more than a decade in implementation.

Consolidation of interests

The years 1984 to 1990 were characterized by a unique political situation. The political tie in the parliament and the necessity to confront the economic crisis resulted in two consecutive national unity governments in Israel, with a rotation in the position of the prime minister. The unity governments implemented an aggressive macroeconomic plan to stabilize rampant inflation.

In the thicket of political interests and power struggles within the government, two Knesset members from the right-wing Likud party proposed in 1985 a private bill to establish commercial television in Israel (Second Network on Television Law Draft, 1985). A year later, the government submitted its memorandum of law (Second Authority for Radio and Television Law Draft, 1986), also proposing the establishment of a regional radio broadcasting system. Both proposals were submitted for discussion by a special committee of the Knesset (Special Committee for the Second Channel, 1987, hereinafter: the special committee). Driven by the will for bipartisan consensus, it formulated a consolidated and updated bill.

The special committee also conducted a public hearing during eight of its 35 meetings. It received 26 written position papers and 45 oral presentations (19 of them overlap). Classifying the responses indicates that 55 % of the respondents were from industry stakeholders (economic corporations, corporate executives, supervised bodies, professional organizations, etc.), 25 % were advocacy organizations and individuals, and the remainder was divided almost equally between academic and professional experts and government organs. This body of responses reflects a reasonable and balanced distribution of interests.

However, the picture was not that bright. Stakeholders had an advantage over advocacy organizations in presenting their position orally to the committee members. Government representatives had an advantage because they regularly participated in the meetings, and so were the legal advisors of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and IETV. Furthermore, moves and deals were conducted behind the scenes, away from public scrutiny.

The explanatory notes to the law that was raised in the Knesset presented one of the main reasons for the establishment of the second channel as follows: the Israeli public is not satisfied with the means of communication at its disposal and finds refuge in watching television broadcasts from neighboring countries and local pirate cable broadcasts (Second Authority for Radio and Television Law Draft, 1986, p. 3). As can be clearly understood from this wording, the public put pressure on the government’s authority in the absence of a state response to public demand.

The Minister of communication at that time, Amnon Rubinstein (a member of the liberal center party Shinui), articulated the challenge put forward by the pirate cable television by saying that the Israeli government is facing a “problem that is getting worse reaching a point that we no longer have control over […] we are short of overcoming this phenomenon” (Special Committee for the Second Channel, 1987). The minister stated that the only solution to the problem is establishing a commercial free-to-air broadcasting channel that is easier to set up than a cable TV system.

Thus, either because of the exposure of its citizens to other-state television and its inability to control its consumption or because of the illegal activity involved in the flourishing pirate cable industry, the government had to make a move. The public pressure was accompanied by actions of Knesset members with a liberal political and economic worldview. The unity government was pushed to promote the initiative within the big political parties’ mutual balance of fear.

Another factor that assisted was an action on the verge of legality adopted by the government itself. The Minister of Communication and his assistants at that time conducted ‘experimental broadcasts’ of the second Channel without legal authorization. The purpose was to enhance the legislative process (Lael, 1994, p. 60). The broadcasts lasted four years on allocated frequencies not used until then. The ministry’s action forced the attorney general to intervene and find a legal solution to the political act. He whitewashed it post factum.

Balancing politics and economics

The explanatory notes to The Law were a combination of particularistic national considerations and economic principles of a free market. The reasons for justifying the establishment of a commercial television channel were based on two main criteria: (a) the promotion of local creativity to justify national interests, and (b) the competition in the media market in favor of the citizens to justify a neoliberal ideology of privatization. The first criterion enlisted the influence of foreign cultures on Israeli society, the fear of neighboring countries taking over frequencies, the broadcasting in Arabic and other languages for the convenience of tourists and residents of the country who do not speak Hebrew, and the raising of morale. The second enlisted the shifting from centralization to dispersal, from monopoly to competition, from public funding to private financing and dependence on one’s freedom of choice.

In the tension between the economic considerations of providing services through the market and creating business feasibility for the new broadcasting organizations and the political will to monitor their power and the extent of their influence, the government decided to favor the latter. An example is the Bank of Israel’s 1985 report (Bank of Israel, 1985). Invited by the finance ministry to examine the proposed law, it rejected concerns regarding increasing private consumption and proposed amendments to the law aimed at reducing government involvement in Channel 2. Among other things, the Bank of Israel’s report proposed to remove restrictions on the production of news broadcasts on the channel (as well as on the new cable channels), to reduce the restrictions on foreign investors, to approve commercial breaks during broadcasts on the cable channels, and to reduce content quotas. The government rejected all these recommendations.

A year later, the Knesset Information Unit (n.d.) pointed to the danger of creating an economic monopoly of the Second Authority over the establishment and operation of commercial television broadcasts. It suggested that the franchise for the broadcasting infrastructure be handed to private contractors. Seeking to preserve its ownership and control over broadcasting stations, the government also turned down this proposal.

Perhaps the most prominent example of formulating a unique mixture of politics and governmental power preservation with economics and a free market mechanism was the Channel 2 franchising model. The special committee had different options for resource distribution between channel franchises: vertical division of broadcasting days (according to the British Channel II model of the London area) and horizontal distribution of broadcasting bands. The government had to compromise between the political will, leading to multiple (and hence weaker) broadcasters, and the economic consideration of business feasibility. The final format was a combination of these two modes of distribution with a local adaptation: a vertical division between three franchisees, and a horizontal allocation of slots for IETV programs and productions of the Second Authority itself, in addition to the broadcasting tracks of the news company owned by the Second Authority and the franchisees. In any case, the transmitters of the new channel remained a national asset.

Another relevant aspect is how the statutory body that regulates commercial broadcasting (the Second Authority for Television and Radio) was designed. While the two Knesset members proposed a law that aspired to create a council of public figures with a degree of freedom and independence from the government, the government’s law evoked the opposite trend of relying on the government and appointing representatives of state employees and big economic organizations. The law passed by the Knesset invalidated the possibility of appointing political representatives and improved the mechanism of consultation with public organizations. The attempts to reach a political compromise led to the creation of a formula of an independent regulatory council composed of public figures.

However, despite determining the obligation to consult, the law did not delineate explicit guidelines for its conduct. Instead, it entrusted the determination of the precise list of public entities to be consulted and, correspondingly, the recommendation list’s character to the discretion of the government. In a High Court hearing initiated in 1999 pertaining to the appointment procedures of the second Authority’s Council (Movement for the Quality Government in Israel v. The Minister of Education, culture & Sports, 1999), it was adjudicated that the duty to consult had been ostensibly fulfilled, yet political considerations had principally influenced the council composition. Consequently, the court ordered the dissolution of the Council. In the annual report released by the State Comptroller (2011), it was asserted that the consultation process hindered the consultants from properly evaluating the government’s slate of candidates. To sum up, the warding of the law exhibited sufficient flexibility, affording the government a substantial degree of latitude in the appointment of council members and, thus, implementing politics in broadcasting.