Abstract
Based on two-country scenarios (entrants vs. incumbents), this paper employs the synthetic control method to quantify the macroeconomic effects of the European Union (EU) enlargement, and examines whether these effects varied before, during, and after economic crises. We find that enlargement effects are very complex, and significantly varied across economic cycles and the country groups. In particular, EU enlargement induced large and positive effects on the entrants which were merely stifled in the wake of the financial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis. In the interim, the 2004 enlargement triggered an instantaneous negative shock on the incumbents which was further exacerbated by the crises. Subsequently, the entrants recovered beyond their pre-crises gains, registering approximately 14 % higher per capita incomes by 2019, with Poland emerging as a clear winner. Meanwhile, incumbents’ per capita incomes have, on average, declined by approximately 9 %. While our findings largely support the notion that the entrants are en route to catching up with their incumbent counterparts, a formal β-convergence analysis exploiting the observed and synthetic data intuitively confirms that EU integration reduces the half-life by 50 %.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the Managing Editor (Arpad Abraham) and the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. We specially thank Chih-Sheng Hsieh, Te-Fen Lo, Yu-Li Wang, Shou-Yung Yin, Dinarti Tarigan, Damiana Simanjuntak, Dang-Long Bui, Van Chung Dong, participants of the 2021 Taiwan Economics Association Annual Conference, the 2021 Taiwan Macroeconometric Modelling Workshop, and the seminar participants at National Dong Hwa University, for thoughtful comments and discussions. Diana Carrillo, Ethel Hara, and Hope Banda are gratefully acknowledged for proofreading the manuscript. This work builds upon the research presented in the first author’s Ph.D. dissertation, and we are grateful to the committee for their constructive feedback. All remaining errors are our own responsibility.
This Appendix describes the data employed in the analysis and provides their sources.
Variable description and data sources.
| Variable name | Variable definition | Data source |
|---|---|---|
| Pop | Total population | Penn World Trade 10.0 |
| rgdp | Real GDP (at constant 2017 national prices) | Penn World Trade 10.0 |
| Im | Imports of goods and services (at constant 2015 US$) | UNCTADstat |
| Ex | Exports of goods and services (at constant 2015 US$) | UNCTADstat |
| Fdi | Per capita FDI inflow | UNCTADstat |
| public_debt | Public debt (% of GDP) | AMECO |
| competitiveness | Real unit labour cost (2015 index base) | AMECO |
| Tfp | Total factor productivity (USA = 1) | Penn World Trade 10.0 |
| Unemp | Total unemployment (% of total labor force) | World Development Indicators |
| labour_mobility | Net migration (% of total population) | World Development Indicators |
| csh_a | Share of agriculture in value added | World Development Indicators |
| csh_c | Share of private consumption (% of GDP) | World Development Indicators |
| csh_g | Share of government consumption (% of GDP) | World Development Indicators |
| csh_i | Share of investment (% of GDP) | World Development Indicators |
| csh_ind | Share of industry in value added | World Development Indicators |
| enrol_pr | Primary gross school enrolment | World Development Indicators |
| enrol_ sec | Secondary gross school enrolment | World Development Indicators |
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Notes: csh_a, csh_c, csh_g, csh_i, enrol_pr, enrol_sec and population growth rate series are used as covariates for per capita GDP. For the other outcome variables, we used the lagged values of the pre-accession endogenous variable as predictors.
This Appendix provides the donor pool contribution to the construction of each of synthetic controls.
Donor weights: GDP per capita.
| Treated unit | Donor pool |
|---|---|
| Cyprus | Albania (0.283); Australia (0.115); Canada (0.219); Israel (0.034); |
| Korea (0.350). | |
| Czech | Albania (0.227); Chile (0.034); Japan (0.353); Korea (0.252); |
| Montenegro (0.025); New Zealand (0.109). | |
| Estonia | Korea (0.543); Montenegro (0.061); Serbia (0.396). |
| Hungary | Albania (0.088); Australia (0.210); Canada (0.015); China (0.120); |
| Korea (0.061); New Zealand (0.012); Russia (0.209); Serbia (0.284). | |
| Latvia | Iceland (0.014); Korea (0.221); Russia (0.067); Serbia (0.697). |
| Lithuania | Australia (0.050); Korea (0.069); Montenegro (0.133); Russia (0.180); |
| Serbia (0.568). | |
| Malta | Canada (0.011); Israel (0.165); Korea (0.016); Norway (0.072); |
| Serbia (0.526). | |
| Poland | Argentina (0.069); Montenegro (0.220); Norway (0.101); Serbia (0.611) |
| Slovakia | Australia (0.170); China (0.471); Chile (0.175); Montenegro (0.185). |
| Slovenia | Australia (0.176); Iceland (0.036); Korea (0.175); Montenegro (0.006); |
| Norway (0.093); Serbia (0.513). | |
| Bulgaria | Albania (0.052); China (0.166); Colombia (0.405); Indonesia (0.014); |
| Korea (0.022); Russia (0.253); Turkey (0.091). | |
| Romania | China (0.228); Chile (0.203); Indonesia (0.123); Korea (0.101); |
| Russia (0.232); Turkey (0.113). | |
| Croatia | Iceland (0.320); Indonesia (0.050); Montenegro (0.409); Serbia (0.221). |
| Austria | Albania (0.132); Australia (0.034); Canada (0.295); Iceland (0.022); |
| Norway (0.065); Switzerland (0.164); United States (0.288). | |
| Belgium | Argentina (0.033); Canada (0.523); Indonesia (0.171); Israel (0.039); |
| Macedonia (0.004); Norway (0.098); Switzerland (0.091); Turkey (0.006); | |
| United States (0.034). | |
| Denmark | Canada (0.035); Israel (0.400); New Zealand (0.095); Norway (0.302); |
| Switzerland (0.115); United States (0.053). | |
| Finland | Iceland (0.427); Norway (0.193); Korea (0.379). |
| France | Albania (0.210); Australia (0.111); Canada (0.192); Iceland (0.039); |
| India (0.001); Israel (0.163); Norway (0.008); Switzerland (0.272); | |
| United States (0.003). | |
| Germany | Albania (0.003); Brazil (0.238); Israel (0.158); Norway (0.053); |
| New Zealand (0.111); Switzerland (0.438). | |
| Greece | Australia (0.438); Korea (0.083); Montenegro (0.012); Russia (0.280); |
| Serbia (0.187). | |
| Italy | Albania (0.154); Israel (0.270); Japan (0.043); Korea (0.057); |
| Norway (0.166); Switzerland (0.309). | |
| Netherlands | Iceland (0.613); Norway (0.320); Switzerland (0.044); United States (0.023). |
| Portugal | Iceland (0.431); Indonesia (0.107); Israel (0.303); Montenegro (0.054); |
| Norway (0.022); Serbia (0.048); Turkey (0.034). | |
| Spain | Albania (0.052); Australia (0.084); Canada (0.207); Iceland (0.424); |
| Israel (0.019); Korea (0.159); Switzerland (0.029); Russia (0.026). | |
| Sweden | Canada (0.453); Iceland (0.234); Korea (0.182); Norway (0.132). |
| United Kingdom | Argentina (0.009); Australia (0.512); Canada (0.129); Iceland (0.192); |
| Korea (0.143); Russia (0.013). |
-
Notes: Potential control units included all the 27 countries in the original donor pool except Saudi Arabia which did not have data for the covariates. For each treated country, the rest of the donor units not appearing in this table received zero weights.
This Appendix provides the estimations for the EU-13 membership on their per capita GDP. Particularly, in this exercise, we set each individual incumbent’s own EU accession date as the treatment year so as to demonstrate how different such an effect is from the 2004-eastern enlargement shock. Thus, for this exercise, we set 1957 for the founding members (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands); 1973 for the first enlargement members (Denmark, and the United Kingdom); 1981 for Greece; 1986 for the third enlargement states (Spain and Portugal); and 1995 for the fourth enlargement members (Austria, Finland and Sweden).
Effects of EU incumbents’ membership on their own per capita GDP.
| AUT | BEL | DNK | FIN | FRA | DEU | GRC | ITA | NLD | PRT | ESP | SWE | GBR | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| τ 2009 | 6.07 | 12.03 | 5.62 | 13.19 | −0.59 | 3.55 | −15.68 | 13.11 | 6.66 | 18.33 | 4.78 | 7.24 | 17.30 |
| τ 2019 | 2.95 | 8.73 | 8.08 | 5.92 | −3.35 | 7.11 | −37.66 | −2.60 | 1.82 | 17.50 | −2.68 | 9.95 | 11.04 |
-
Notes: τ 2009 and τ 2019, respectively, capture the cumulative effect of EU membership as the percentage discrepancy between the treated unit and its synthetic control in 2009 and at the end of the study period—2019.
This Appendix presents the results from the MC and partially pooled SCM estimations.

MC estimator: ATE of the 2004 enlargement on real GDP per capita (in thousand US$). Notes: the ATE is bounded within 90 % confidence intervals.

Partially pooled SCM: effects of the 2004 enlargement on real GDP per capita (in thousand US$). Notes: the ATE is bounded within 90 % confidence intervals.
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Supplementary Material
This article contains supplementary material (https://doi.org/10.1515/bejm-2023-0053).
© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Advances
- Optimal Taxation of Informal Firms: Misreporting Costs and a Tax Reform in Brazil
- Initial Beliefs Uncertainty
- Credit Resource Misallocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in China: From the Perspective of Heterogeneous Financial Frictions
- The Bitcoin Premium: A Persistent Puzzle
- Contributions
- Intermediate Goods–Skill Complementarity
- Perfect Competition and Fixed Costs: The Role of the Ownership Structure
- Optimal Monetary Policy with Government-Provided Unemployment Benefits
- Employment Protection in Dual Labor Markets: Any Amplification of Macroeconomic Shocks?
- A Tide that Lifts Some Boats: Assessing the Macroeconomic Effects of EU Enlargement
- Current Account Balances’ Divergence in the Euro Area: An Appraisal of the Underlying Forces
- Merging Structural and Reduced-Form Models for Forecasting
- Trust in Government in a Changing World: Shocks, Tax Evasion, and Economic Growth
- The Fiscal Multiplier of Public Investment: The Role of Corporate Balance Sheet
- Does Uncertainty Matter for the Fiscal Consolidation and Investment Nexus?
- Government Spending Between Active and Passive Monetary Policy: An Invariance Result
- A DSGE Model with Government-owned Banks
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Advances
- Optimal Taxation of Informal Firms: Misreporting Costs and a Tax Reform in Brazil
- Initial Beliefs Uncertainty
- Credit Resource Misallocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in China: From the Perspective of Heterogeneous Financial Frictions
- The Bitcoin Premium: A Persistent Puzzle
- Contributions
- Intermediate Goods–Skill Complementarity
- Perfect Competition and Fixed Costs: The Role of the Ownership Structure
- Optimal Monetary Policy with Government-Provided Unemployment Benefits
- Employment Protection in Dual Labor Markets: Any Amplification of Macroeconomic Shocks?
- A Tide that Lifts Some Boats: Assessing the Macroeconomic Effects of EU Enlargement
- Current Account Balances’ Divergence in the Euro Area: An Appraisal of the Underlying Forces
- Merging Structural and Reduced-Form Models for Forecasting
- Trust in Government in a Changing World: Shocks, Tax Evasion, and Economic Growth
- The Fiscal Multiplier of Public Investment: The Role of Corporate Balance Sheet
- Does Uncertainty Matter for the Fiscal Consolidation and Investment Nexus?
- Government Spending Between Active and Passive Monetary Policy: An Invariance Result
- A DSGE Model with Government-owned Banks