Abstract
This paper examines the impact of cost and technology asymmetry on social efficiency in a vertically related industry. If production costs for final goods are asymmetric and technology is symmetric, and if the entrant’s cost is moderate, then downstream entry is socially insufficient, regardless of whether there are economies or diseconomies of scale. Extending the analysis to asymmetric production technologies and symmetric cost, we show that the issue of socially insufficient entry persists. Thus, anti-competitive entry regulations should account for cost and technology asymmetries among competing firms.
Funding source: Social Science Research Project of Shaanxi Province
Award Identifier / Grant number: 2021D051
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the Editor-in-Chief Prof. Till Requate and anonymous referees for their helpful comments and constructive suggestions. In addition, the first author is grateful for the financial support from Shaanxi Social Science Research Project (No. 2021D051) and the Social Science Research Project of Shaanxi Education Department (No. 24JT018).
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Conflict of interest: There is no competing interest among all authors.
Proof of Lemma 1
We derive q i and q j with respect to m:
Recall that all firms’ outputs should be positive. Thus, from Equation (4) and
Proof of Lemma 2
We derive w *ES with respect to m:
Letting
Proof of
∂
S
W
1
N
E
S
*
∂
m
where f
3 = −12n
3 − 20n
2 − 11n − 2, f
2 = 6a − 6c + 22an − 22cn + 20an
2 − 20cn
2 + c
i
n(11 + 40n + 36n
2), f
1 = 12ac − 11a
2
n − 11c
2
n − 6a
2 − 6c
2 + 22acn + c
i
n(−40an − 22a + 40n + 22cn − 36c
i
n
2 − 20c
i
n), and
Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly, we evaluate the numerator of
Secondly, we evaluate the denominator of
Obviously, because
Proof of
∂
S
W
D
E
S
*
∂
m
where f
3 = −20n
3 − 108n
2 − 189n − 108, f
2 = 324a − 324c + 378an − 378cn + 108an
2 − 108cn
2 + 189c
i
n + 216c
i
n
2 + 60c
i
n
3,
Proof of Proposition 2
Firstly, we evaluate the numerator of
Secondly, we evaluate the denominator of
Obviously, because
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Fair Choices During COVID-19: Firms’ Altruism and Inequality Aversion in Managing a Large Short-Time Work Scheme
- Inequality in Health Status During the COVID-19 in the UK: Does the Impact of the Second Lockdown Policy Matter?
- The Political Timing of Tax Policy: Evidence from U.S. States
- Is it a Matter of Skills? High School Choices and the Gender Gap in STEM
- Patent Licensing and Litigation
- Class Size, Student Disruption, and Academic Achievement
- Political Orientation and Policy Compliance: Evidence from COVID-19 Mobility Patterns in Korea
- Social Efficiency of Free Entry in a Vertically Related Industry with Cost and Technology Asymmetry
- Carbon Tax with Individuals’ Heterogeneous Environmental Concerns
- Equitable Redistribution and Inefficiency under Credit Rationing
- Letters
- Psychological Well-Being of Only Children: Evidence from the One-Child Policy
- Peer Effects in Child Work Decisions: Evidence from PROGRESA Cash Transfer Program
- Right Time to Focus? Time of Day and Cognitive Performance
- Employee Dissatisfaction and Intentions to Quit: New Evidence and Policy Recommendations
- On the Stability of Common Ownership Arrangements
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Fair Choices During COVID-19: Firms’ Altruism and Inequality Aversion in Managing a Large Short-Time Work Scheme
- Inequality in Health Status During the COVID-19 in the UK: Does the Impact of the Second Lockdown Policy Matter?
- The Political Timing of Tax Policy: Evidence from U.S. States
- Is it a Matter of Skills? High School Choices and the Gender Gap in STEM
- Patent Licensing and Litigation
- Class Size, Student Disruption, and Academic Achievement
- Political Orientation and Policy Compliance: Evidence from COVID-19 Mobility Patterns in Korea
- Social Efficiency of Free Entry in a Vertically Related Industry with Cost and Technology Asymmetry
- Carbon Tax with Individuals’ Heterogeneous Environmental Concerns
- Equitable Redistribution and Inefficiency under Credit Rationing
- Letters
- Psychological Well-Being of Only Children: Evidence from the One-Child Policy
- Peer Effects in Child Work Decisions: Evidence from PROGRESA Cash Transfer Program
- Right Time to Focus? Time of Day and Cognitive Performance
- Employee Dissatisfaction and Intentions to Quit: New Evidence and Policy Recommendations
- On the Stability of Common Ownership Arrangements