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Social Efficiency of Free Entry in a Vertically Related Industry with Cost and Technology Asymmetry

  • Ding Chen , Di Wu ORCID logo EMAIL logo , Hang Cao and Leonard F. S. Wang EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: June 23, 2025

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of cost and technology asymmetry on social efficiency in a vertically related industry. If production costs for final goods are asymmetric and technology is symmetric, and if the entrant’s cost is moderate, then downstream entry is socially insufficient, regardless of whether there are economies or diseconomies of scale. Extending the analysis to asymmetric production technologies and symmetric cost, we show that the issue of socially insufficient entry persists. Thus, anti-competitive entry regulations should account for cost and technology asymmetries among competing firms.

JEL Classification: F13; L13; L40

Corresponding authors: Di Wu, School of Economics, Institute of International Economics, Nankai University, # 94 Weijin Road, Nankai Zone, Tianjin, 330071, China, E-mail: ; and Leonard F. S. Wang, Asia Pacific Research Foundation, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, E-mail:

Funding source: Social Science Research Project of Shaanxi Province

Award Identifier / Grant number: 2021D051

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the Editor-in-Chief Prof. Till Requate and anonymous referees for their helpful comments and constructive suggestions. In addition, the first author is grateful for the financial support from Shaanxi Social Science Research Project (No. 2021D051) and the Social Science Research Project of Shaanxi Education Department (No. 24JT018).

  1. Conflict of interest: There is no competing interest among all authors.

Appendix A

Proof of Lemma 1

We derive q i and q j with respect to m:

(A.1) q i m = q j m = a ce w 1 + 2 d + c i c e n 1 + 2 d 1 + 2 d + m + n 2

Recall that all firms’ outputs should be positive. Thus, from Equation (4) and q j = a w c e 1 + 2 d + c i c e n 1 + 2 d 1 + 2 d + m + n > 0 . Due to 1 + 2 d 1 + 2 d + m + n > 0 , we have a w c e 1 + 2 d + c i c e n > 0 and then q i m = q j m < 0 .

Proof of Lemma 2

We derive w *ES with respect to m:

(A.2) w * m = n c i c e 2 m + n 2

Letting w * m = 0 , it yields c i = c e .

Proof of S W 1 N E S * m

S W 1 NES * m m = m NES * = f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 2 a c 2 c e n + 1 + 2 c i n

where f 3 = −12n 3 − 20n 2 − 11n − 2, f 2 = 6a − 6c + 22an − 22cn + 20an 2 − 20cn 2 + c i n(11 + 40n + 36n 2), f 1 = 12ac − 11a 2 n − 11c 2 n − 6a 2 − 6c 2 + 22acn + c i n(−40an − 22a + 40n + 22cn − 36c i n 2 − 20c i n), and f 0 = 2 a 3 6 a 2 c + 6 a c 2 2 c 3 + c i n 11 a 2 22 ac + 20 a c i n + 11 c 2 20 c c i n + 12 c i 2 n 2 .

Proof of Proposition 1

Firstly, we evaluate the numerator of S W 1 NES * m m = m NES * . Solving f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 = 0 with respect to c e yields three roots as follows: c e 1 NES * = c e 2 NES * = a c + 2 c i n 2 n + 1 , c e 3 NES * = 2 a 2 c + 3 c i n 3 n + 2 . Given that ac > c i , we have c e 3 NES * > a c + 2 c i n 2 n + 1 and then f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 > 0 .

Secondly, we evaluate the denominator of S W 1 NES * m m = m NES * Solving 2(ac) − 2c e (n + 1) + 2c i n = 0 with respect to c e yields c e 4 NES * = a c + c i n n + 1 . Given that ac > c i , we have c e 4 NES * > a c + 2 c i n 2 n + 1 and then 2(ac) − 2c e (n + 1) + 2c i n > s0.

Obviously, because f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 > 0 and 2(ac) − 2c e (n + 1) + 2c i n > 0, we have S W 1 NES * m m = m NES * > 0 and then entry in the final goods market is always insufficient.

Proof of S W D E S * m

S W D E S * m m = m D E S * = f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 162 3 a c c e n + 3 + c i n

where f 3 = −20n 3 − 108n 2 − 189n − 108, f 2 = 324a − 324c + 378an − 378cn + 108an 2 − 108cn 2 + 189c i n + 216c i n 2 + 60c i n 3, f 1 = 648 a c 189 a 2 n 189 c 2 n + 324 a 2 324 c 2 + 378 a c n 216 a c i n 2 378 a c i n + 216 c c i n 2 60 c i 2 2 n 3 108 c i 2 n 2 , and f 0 = 108 a 3 324 a 2 c + 324 a c 2 108 c 3 + 189 a 2 c i n 378 ac c i n + 108 a c i 2 n 2 + 189 c 2 c i n 108 c c i 2 n 2 + 20 c i 3 n 3 .

Proof of Proposition 2

Firstly, we evaluate the numerator of S W 1 D E S * m m = m D E S * . Solving f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 = 0 with respect to c e yields three roots as follows: c e 1 D E S * = c e 2 D E S * = 3 a c + 2 c i n 2 n + 3 , c e 3 D E S * = 12 a c + 5 c i n 5 n + 12 . Given that ac > c i , we have c e 3 NES * > 3 a c + 2 c i n 2 n + 3 and then f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 > 0 .

Secondly, we evaluate the denominator of S W 1 D E S * m m = m NES * Solving 3(ac) − c e (n + 3) + c i n = 0 with respect to c e yields c e 4 NES * = 3 a c + c i n n + 3 . Given that ac > c i , we have c e 4 NES * > 3 a c + 2 c i n 2 n + 3 and then 3(ac) − c e (n + 3) + c i n > 0.

Obviously, because f 3 c e 3 + f 2 c e 2 + f 1 c e + f 0 > 0 and 3(ac) − c(n + 3) + c i n > 0, we have S W 1 D E S * m m = m D E S * > 0 and then entry in the final goods market is always insufficient.

Proof of Proposition 3

Substituting m PTA * = n a 1 + n λ 1 1 c n 1 + n λ a n 2 λ 1 λ + λ 2 c n λ 1 + λ n 1 λ 2 + λ 2 into S W PTA * m , we have S W PTA * m m = m PTA * = f 4 f 5 2 a λ c n λ 1 + λ n λ 1 + 2 λ a c n λ 1 + λ , where f 4 = 1 2 n λ 1 + λ 5 > 0 and f 5 = a n λ 2 λ 1 + λ 2 c n λ 1 + λ n λ 1 2 + λ 2 2 > 0 . We consider when the market size is large enough, i.e. a ⇒ +∞, 2 a λ c n λ 1 + λ n λ 1 + 2 λ a c n λ 1 + λ 2 λ > 0 , and then entry in the final goods market is insufficient.

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Received: 2024-08-14
Accepted: 2025-06-04
Published Online: 2025-06-23

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