The Virtuous Circle of Fallibilism, Realism, and Intersubjectivity: Peirce’s Antidote to Cognitive Vulnerability
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Rosa M. Calcaterra
Abstract
The paper firstly points out the difference between fallibilism and skepticism to clarify the psychological and epistemological implications of the two concepts. This clarification will also offer a contribution to the psychologism/anti-psychologism debate, showing the difficulty of sharply separating the psychological from the epistemological, but at the same time the importance of keeping such conceptual distinction. Furthermore, a reconstruction of Peirce’s cognitive semiotics will pave the way for sustaining the interweaving between fallibilism, realism, and inter-subjectivity provided by his philosophy. This plexus is a positive hinge to prevent the overlapping between skepticism and awareness of the cognitive vulnerability of human beings.
Abstract
The paper firstly points out the difference between fallibilism and skepticism to clarify the psychological and epistemological implications of the two concepts. This clarification will also offer a contribution to the psychologism/anti-psychologism debate, showing the difficulty of sharply separating the psychological from the epistemological, but at the same time the importance of keeping such conceptual distinction. Furthermore, a reconstruction of Peirce’s cognitive semiotics will pave the way for sustaining the interweaving between fallibilism, realism, and inter-subjectivity provided by his philosophy. This plexus is a positive hinge to prevent the overlapping between skepticism and awareness of the cognitive vulnerability of human beings.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophical Perspective 1
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Part I: Shaping Our Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability, Repetition, and Truth 27
- How Negative Knowledge Relates to Negative Certainty: An Instance of Cognitive Vulnerability 53
- The Epistemology of “Successibility”: An Optimistic Point of View 69
- Heuristics as a Source of Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophy 87
- The Virtuous Circle of Fallibilism, Realism, and Intersubjectivity: Peirce’s Antidote to Cognitive Vulnerability 107
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Part II: Consequences of Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability: Fallibilism, Distrust, and Disagreements 127
- Bounded Normativity: The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium as a Principle of Rationality 149
- Cognitive Vulnerability and the Post-Truth Challenge 159
- Understanding, Vulnerability, and Risk 177
- Defeasible Knowledge of Dispositions: A Survey from Wittgenstein’s Epistemic Pluralism 193
- Notes on Contributors 213
- Index of Names 217
- Subject Index 221
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophical Perspective 1
-
Part I: Shaping Our Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability, Repetition, and Truth 27
- How Negative Knowledge Relates to Negative Certainty: An Instance of Cognitive Vulnerability 53
- The Epistemology of “Successibility”: An Optimistic Point of View 69
- Heuristics as a Source of Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophy 87
- The Virtuous Circle of Fallibilism, Realism, and Intersubjectivity: Peirce’s Antidote to Cognitive Vulnerability 107
-
Part II: Consequences of Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability: Fallibilism, Distrust, and Disagreements 127
- Bounded Normativity: The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium as a Principle of Rationality 149
- Cognitive Vulnerability and the Post-Truth Challenge 159
- Understanding, Vulnerability, and Risk 177
- Defeasible Knowledge of Dispositions: A Survey from Wittgenstein’s Epistemic Pluralism 193
- Notes on Contributors 213
- Index of Names 217
- Subject Index 221
