Heuristics as a Source of Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophy
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Timothy Williamson
Abstract
The chapter discusses human unreflective reliance on heuristics as a source of error in philosophy, especially in verdicts on examples. Heuristics are efficient but imperfectly reliable cognitive methods. Some are built into our perceptual systems and are hardly noticed except when they produce perceptual illusions. More general cognitive heuristics produce philosophical paradoxes. We are often unaware of using such heuristics and may even treat their outputs as analytic. Two examples are discussed in detail. The persistence heuristic has us ignore small differences by default in updating. It is unavoidable in practice, even for AI databases. It applies to precise terms as well as vague ones, but it produces sorites paradoxes for the latter because inhibitors of the default are lacking. The suppositional heuristic is humans’ primary way of assessing conditionals, but is implicitly inconsistent, and so cannot be fully reliable. Ways of mitigating the resulting unreliability are discussed.
Abstract
The chapter discusses human unreflective reliance on heuristics as a source of error in philosophy, especially in verdicts on examples. Heuristics are efficient but imperfectly reliable cognitive methods. Some are built into our perceptual systems and are hardly noticed except when they produce perceptual illusions. More general cognitive heuristics produce philosophical paradoxes. We are often unaware of using such heuristics and may even treat their outputs as analytic. Two examples are discussed in detail. The persistence heuristic has us ignore small differences by default in updating. It is unavoidable in practice, even for AI databases. It applies to precise terms as well as vague ones, but it produces sorites paradoxes for the latter because inhibitors of the default are lacking. The suppositional heuristic is humans’ primary way of assessing conditionals, but is implicitly inconsistent, and so cannot be fully reliable. Ways of mitigating the resulting unreliability are discussed.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophical Perspective 1
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Part I: Shaping Our Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability, Repetition, and Truth 27
- How Negative Knowledge Relates to Negative Certainty: An Instance of Cognitive Vulnerability 53
- The Epistemology of “Successibility”: An Optimistic Point of View 69
- Heuristics as a Source of Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophy 87
- The Virtuous Circle of Fallibilism, Realism, and Intersubjectivity: Peirce’s Antidote to Cognitive Vulnerability 107
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Part II: Consequences of Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability: Fallibilism, Distrust, and Disagreements 127
- Bounded Normativity: The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium as a Principle of Rationality 149
- Cognitive Vulnerability and the Post-Truth Challenge 159
- Understanding, Vulnerability, and Risk 177
- Defeasible Knowledge of Dispositions: A Survey from Wittgenstein’s Epistemic Pluralism 193
- Notes on Contributors 213
- Index of Names 217
- Subject Index 221
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophical Perspective 1
-
Part I: Shaping Our Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability, Repetition, and Truth 27
- How Negative Knowledge Relates to Negative Certainty: An Instance of Cognitive Vulnerability 53
- The Epistemology of “Successibility”: An Optimistic Point of View 69
- Heuristics as a Source of Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophy 87
- The Virtuous Circle of Fallibilism, Realism, and Intersubjectivity: Peirce’s Antidote to Cognitive Vulnerability 107
-
Part II: Consequences of Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability: Fallibilism, Distrust, and Disagreements 127
- Bounded Normativity: The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium as a Principle of Rationality 149
- Cognitive Vulnerability and the Post-Truth Challenge 159
- Understanding, Vulnerability, and Risk 177
- Defeasible Knowledge of Dispositions: A Survey from Wittgenstein’s Epistemic Pluralism 193
- Notes on Contributors 213
- Index of Names 217
- Subject Index 221
