How Negative Knowledge Relates to Negative Certainty: An Instance of Cognitive Vulnerability
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José María Ariso
Abstract
In this chapter, I aim to show how Ortega y Gasset’s conception of “belief” and Wittgenstein’s notion of “certainty” can also be understood in negative terms; furthermore, I analyze how they relate to negative knowledge. Firstly, I delve into Ortega y Gasset’s use of the expressions “death belief” and “negative reality,” as he scarcely focused on their characteristics and consequences. Secondly, and taking as a reference Wittgenstein’s conception of “certainty,” I show in which sense we can refer to a “negative certainty” by applying this expression to the case of Edison’s invention of the incandescent bulb. Lastly, I use this very example to show how it illustrates diverse nuances of the new epistemological concept of “cognitive vulnerability” that González-Castán has developed in order to find a balance between human fallibilism and cognitive success-understood as the fact of stating true things-without stressing more one than the other.
Abstract
In this chapter, I aim to show how Ortega y Gasset’s conception of “belief” and Wittgenstein’s notion of “certainty” can also be understood in negative terms; furthermore, I analyze how they relate to negative knowledge. Firstly, I delve into Ortega y Gasset’s use of the expressions “death belief” and “negative reality,” as he scarcely focused on their characteristics and consequences. Secondly, and taking as a reference Wittgenstein’s conception of “certainty,” I show in which sense we can refer to a “negative certainty” by applying this expression to the case of Edison’s invention of the incandescent bulb. Lastly, I use this very example to show how it illustrates diverse nuances of the new epistemological concept of “cognitive vulnerability” that González-Castán has developed in order to find a balance between human fallibilism and cognitive success-understood as the fact of stating true things-without stressing more one than the other.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophical Perspective 1
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Part I: Shaping Our Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability, Repetition, and Truth 27
- How Negative Knowledge Relates to Negative Certainty: An Instance of Cognitive Vulnerability 53
- The Epistemology of “Successibility”: An Optimistic Point of View 69
- Heuristics as a Source of Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophy 87
- The Virtuous Circle of Fallibilism, Realism, and Intersubjectivity: Peirce’s Antidote to Cognitive Vulnerability 107
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Part II: Consequences of Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability: Fallibilism, Distrust, and Disagreements 127
- Bounded Normativity: The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium as a Principle of Rationality 149
- Cognitive Vulnerability and the Post-Truth Challenge 159
- Understanding, Vulnerability, and Risk 177
- Defeasible Knowledge of Dispositions: A Survey from Wittgenstein’s Epistemic Pluralism 193
- Notes on Contributors 213
- Index of Names 217
- Subject Index 221
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophical Perspective 1
-
Part I: Shaping Our Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability, Repetition, and Truth 27
- How Negative Knowledge Relates to Negative Certainty: An Instance of Cognitive Vulnerability 53
- The Epistemology of “Successibility”: An Optimistic Point of View 69
- Heuristics as a Source of Cognitive Vulnerability in Philosophy 87
- The Virtuous Circle of Fallibilism, Realism, and Intersubjectivity: Peirce’s Antidote to Cognitive Vulnerability 107
-
Part II: Consequences of Cognitive Vulnerability
- Cognitive Vulnerability: Fallibilism, Distrust, and Disagreements 127
- Bounded Normativity: The Principle of Reflective Equilibrium as a Principle of Rationality 149
- Cognitive Vulnerability and the Post-Truth Challenge 159
- Understanding, Vulnerability, and Risk 177
- Defeasible Knowledge of Dispositions: A Survey from Wittgenstein’s Epistemic Pluralism 193
- Notes on Contributors 213
- Index of Names 217
- Subject Index 221
