Kant’s Value Prescriptivism
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Oliver Sensen
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the view that Kant is a prescriptivist about value. I first argue that, according to Kant, expressions with the grammatical form that something ‘has value’ or ‘is good’ are not meant to describe this something, but to express an imperative command of what reason deems to be necessary. This includes the absolute command to respect all human beings. I then briefly describe the two kinds of imperatives Kant puts forth and relate his account of value to them. I argue that Kant’s distinction between dignity and price fits this interpretation, and I add a new discussion in which sense one can say that dignity is a value. Finally, I will meet the objection that - in the third Section of Groundwork - Kant does conceive of ‘value’ as the description of an ontological property all human beings possess in virtue of being part of an intelligible world. I argue that Kant reduces even this claim to what reason deems necessary. I conclude that Kant’s primary focus is on the imperatives that reason commands, and ‘has value’ is a secondary construction that expresses these imperatives of reason.
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the view that Kant is a prescriptivist about value. I first argue that, according to Kant, expressions with the grammatical form that something ‘has value’ or ‘is good’ are not meant to describe this something, but to express an imperative command of what reason deems to be necessary. This includes the absolute command to respect all human beings. I then briefly describe the two kinds of imperatives Kant puts forth and relate his account of value to them. I argue that Kant’s distinction between dignity and price fits this interpretation, and I add a new discussion in which sense one can say that dignity is a value. Finally, I will meet the objection that - in the third Section of Groundwork - Kant does conceive of ‘value’ as the description of an ontological property all human beings possess in virtue of being part of an intelligible world. I argue that Kant reduces even this claim to what reason deems necessary. I conclude that Kant’s primary focus is on the imperatives that reason commands, and ‘has value’ is a secondary construction that expresses these imperatives of reason.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction VII
- List of Sigla of Kant’s Works XV
- Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? 1
- Kant’s Value Prescriptivism 23
- Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork 41
- Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity 65
- Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End? 89
- The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 105
- Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the Analytics in Kant’s CPR 123
- The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 139
- Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship 163
- Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 181
- Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage 197
- Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law 217
- Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency 241
- About the Authors 263
- Index 267
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction VII
- List of Sigla of Kant’s Works XV
- Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? 1
- Kant’s Value Prescriptivism 23
- Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork 41
- Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity 65
- Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End? 89
- The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 105
- Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the Analytics in Kant’s CPR 123
- The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 139
- Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship 163
- Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 181
- Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage 197
- Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law 217
- Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency 241
- About the Authors 263
- Index 267
