Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals
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Sofie Møller
Abstract
Kant understands human dignity (Würde) as the dignity of a person. His definitions imply that if a human being has dignity, then he or she is a person and vice versa. Yet he also defines personality in terms of responsibility: a person is someone to whom actions can be imputed. Since any obligation presupposes imputability, personality is a condition of both ethical and juridical lawgiving. I maintain that asserting oneself as a person in relation to others implies taking legal responsibility for one’s free actions and not pretending that these were determined by other circumstances. My main point is that honeste vive presupposes moral personality, which is then given juridical form. Moral personality as the freedom of morally practical reason is what ties the two parts of The Metaphysics of Morals together. This shows that honeste vive requires that moral personality be translated into legal responsibility in our relations with others.
Abstract
Kant understands human dignity (Würde) as the dignity of a person. His definitions imply that if a human being has dignity, then he or she is a person and vice versa. Yet he also defines personality in terms of responsibility: a person is someone to whom actions can be imputed. Since any obligation presupposes imputability, personality is a condition of both ethical and juridical lawgiving. I maintain that asserting oneself as a person in relation to others implies taking legal responsibility for one’s free actions and not pretending that these were determined by other circumstances. My main point is that honeste vive presupposes moral personality, which is then given juridical form. Moral personality as the freedom of morally practical reason is what ties the two parts of The Metaphysics of Morals together. This shows that honeste vive requires that moral personality be translated into legal responsibility in our relations with others.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction VII
- List of Sigla of Kant’s Works XV
- Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? 1
- Kant’s Value Prescriptivism 23
- Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork 41
- Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity 65
- Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End? 89
- The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 105
- Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the Analytics in Kant’s CPR 123
- The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 139
- Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship 163
- Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 181
- Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage 197
- Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law 217
- Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency 241
- About the Authors 263
- Index 267
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction VII
- List of Sigla of Kant’s Works XV
- Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? 1
- Kant’s Value Prescriptivism 23
- Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork 41
- Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity 65
- Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End? 89
- The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 105
- Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the Analytics in Kant’s CPR 123
- The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 139
- Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship 163
- Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 181
- Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage 197
- Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law 217
- Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency 241
- About the Authors 263
- Index 267
