Startseite Altertumswissenschaften & Ägyptologie Das normative „ist“, das Sein Gottes und die Leibniz-Schelling’sche Frage
Kapitel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

Das normative „ist“, das Sein Gottes und die Leibniz-Schelling’sche Frage

  • Rafael Ferber
Veröffentlichen auch Sie bei De Gruyter Brill
Wege und Seitenwege der Philosophie
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Wege und Seitenwege der Philosophie

Abstract

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word “is”, their theories share a common feature: “is” does have a constative, but not a normative, meaning. This paper, however, (I) shows (a) that there is a normative meaning of “is” (and correspondingly a constative meaning of “ought”) and (b) that the ambiguity of “is” is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, it proposes (c) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and normative “is”. Therefore, (II) a new interpretation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument (CPR A 598/B 626) becomes possible: The difference between being as a real predicate and being as a position depends on the difference between “is” as a descriptive and “is” as a normative predicate. (III) The criterion also makes possible a new answer to Leibniz’s and Schelling’s question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”: The “is” in “there is something” can be interpreted as normative and the question then means “Why ought there be something rather than nothing?” As “there ought be nothing” is self-refuting, the question evokes an ultimate foundation in a practical sense.

Abstract

Despite the fact that Aristotle and Frege/Russell differ in how to understand the ambiguity in the meaning of the word “is”, their theories share a common feature: “is” does have a constative, but not a normative, meaning. This paper, however, (I) shows (a) that there is a normative meaning of “is” (and correspondingly a constative meaning of “ought”) and (b) that the ambiguity of “is” is itself ambiguous. Furthermore, it proposes (c) a performative criterion for making a distinction between constative and normative “is”. Therefore, (II) a new interpretation of Kant’s critique of the ontological argument (CPR A 598/B 626) becomes possible: The difference between being as a real predicate and being as a position depends on the difference between “is” as a descriptive and “is” as a normative predicate. (III) The criterion also makes possible a new answer to Leibniz’s and Schelling’s question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”: The “is” in “there is something” can be interpreted as normative and the question then means “Why ought there be something rather than nothing?” As “there ought be nothing” is self-refuting, the question evokes an ultimate foundation in a practical sense.

Heruntergeladen am 26.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110790689-007/html
Button zum nach oben scrollen