Putnam on Trans-Theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority
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Gary Ebbs
Abstract
A central goal of Putnam’s philosophy is to investigate and clarify the methodological roles of statements that are so central to an inquirer’s current theory of the topics they concern that she cannot specify any way in which the statements may actually be false. My goals in this paper are (first) to explain how the problem of clarifying the methodological roles of such statements arises in Putnam’s work, (second) to explain in synchronic practical terms why it is reasonable for an inquirer to accept such statements, and (third) to contrast this synchronic practical explanation with Putnam’s diachronic theoretical explanation, according to which such statements can be revised “only by conceiving of whole new theoretical structures.”
Abstract
A central goal of Putnam’s philosophy is to investigate and clarify the methodological roles of statements that are so central to an inquirer’s current theory of the topics they concern that she cannot specify any way in which the statements may actually be false. My goals in this paper are (first) to explain how the problem of clarifying the methodological roles of such statements arises in Putnam’s work, (second) to explain in synchronic practical terms why it is reasonable for an inquirer to accept such statements, and (third) to contrast this synchronic practical explanation with Putnam’s diachronic theoretical explanation, according to which such statements can be revised “only by conceiving of whole new theoretical structures.”
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- An Introduction to Hilary Putnam 1
- Introduction to this Volume 47
- Putnam’s Proof Revisited 63
- Language, Meaning, and Context Sensitivity: Confronting a “Moving-Target” 89
- Externalism and the First-Person Perspective 107
- Putnam on Trans-Theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority 131
- Mathematical Internal Realism 157
- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logic 183
- Fulfillability, Instability, and Incompleteness 207
- Putnam’s Aristotle 227
- Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will 249
- Putnam on Radical Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics 263
- Natural Laws and Human Language 289
- Balance in The Golden Bowl: Attuning Philosophy and Literary Criticism 309
- Bibliography 331
- Contributors 349
- Index 353
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- An Introduction to Hilary Putnam 1
- Introduction to this Volume 47
- Putnam’s Proof Revisited 63
- Language, Meaning, and Context Sensitivity: Confronting a “Moving-Target” 89
- Externalism and the First-Person Perspective 107
- Putnam on Trans-Theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority 131
- Mathematical Internal Realism 157
- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logic 183
- Fulfillability, Instability, and Incompleteness 207
- Putnam’s Aristotle 227
- Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will 249
- Putnam on Radical Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics 263
- Natural Laws and Human Language 289
- Balance in The Golden Bowl: Attuning Philosophy and Literary Criticism 309
- Bibliography 331
- Contributors 349
- Index 353
