Putnam on Radical Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics
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Duncan Pritchard
Abstract
While there has been a lot of attention devoted to how Putnam applies content externalism to the problem of radical scepticism, there has been considerably less attention paid to his other writings on this subject. This paper examines Putnam’s wider treatment of radical scepticism. It looks at his critiques of such figures as P.F. Strawson, Barry Stroud, and Michael Williams, and considers how, under the influence of Wittgenstein, Austin, Stanley Cavell, and (more recently) Charles Travis, Putnam has developed an anti-sceptical line that is built around an occasion-sensitive semantics. While taking a generally sympathetic line to Putnam’s anti-scepticism, it is also argued on broadly Wittgensteinian grounds (albeit the Wittgenstein of On Certainty, rather than that of the Philosophical Investigations, which is the primary concern of Putnam and his key influences) that the need to adopt such a semantics in order to respond to radical scepticism is significantly overstated.
Abstract
While there has been a lot of attention devoted to how Putnam applies content externalism to the problem of radical scepticism, there has been considerably less attention paid to his other writings on this subject. This paper examines Putnam’s wider treatment of radical scepticism. It looks at his critiques of such figures as P.F. Strawson, Barry Stroud, and Michael Williams, and considers how, under the influence of Wittgenstein, Austin, Stanley Cavell, and (more recently) Charles Travis, Putnam has developed an anti-sceptical line that is built around an occasion-sensitive semantics. While taking a generally sympathetic line to Putnam’s anti-scepticism, it is also argued on broadly Wittgensteinian grounds (albeit the Wittgenstein of On Certainty, rather than that of the Philosophical Investigations, which is the primary concern of Putnam and his key influences) that the need to adopt such a semantics in order to respond to radical scepticism is significantly overstated.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- An Introduction to Hilary Putnam 1
- Introduction to this Volume 47
- Putnam’s Proof Revisited 63
- Language, Meaning, and Context Sensitivity: Confronting a “Moving-Target” 89
- Externalism and the First-Person Perspective 107
- Putnam on Trans-Theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority 131
- Mathematical Internal Realism 157
- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logic 183
- Fulfillability, Instability, and Incompleteness 207
- Putnam’s Aristotle 227
- Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will 249
- Putnam on Radical Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics 263
- Natural Laws and Human Language 289
- Balance in The Golden Bowl: Attuning Philosophy and Literary Criticism 309
- Bibliography 331
- Contributors 349
- Index 353
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- An Introduction to Hilary Putnam 1
- Introduction to this Volume 47
- Putnam’s Proof Revisited 63
- Language, Meaning, and Context Sensitivity: Confronting a “Moving-Target” 89
- Externalism and the First-Person Perspective 107
- Putnam on Trans-Theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority 131
- Mathematical Internal Realism 157
- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logic 183
- Fulfillability, Instability, and Incompleteness 207
- Putnam’s Aristotle 227
- Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will 249
- Putnam on Radical Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics 263
- Natural Laws and Human Language 289
- Balance in The Golden Bowl: Attuning Philosophy and Literary Criticism 309
- Bibliography 331
- Contributors 349
- Index 353
