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Externalism and the First-Person Perspective

  • Sanford C. Goldberg
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Engaging Putnam
This chapter is in the book Engaging Putnam

Abstract

In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” Putnam presented an argument on behalf of an externalist approach to linguistic meaning. In due course, this argument was extended to support externalism in the philosophy of mind as well. In this paper I argue that this extension has significant implications for how we are to understand the notion of a subject’s point of view.

Abstract

In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” Putnam presented an argument on behalf of an externalist approach to linguistic meaning. In due course, this argument was extended to support externalism in the philosophy of mind as well. In this paper I argue that this extension has significant implications for how we are to understand the notion of a subject’s point of view.

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