Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will
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Mario De Caro
Abstract
This article discusses and compares Donald Davidson’s and Hilary Putnam’s views on free will. Those views have a two-fold motive of interest: first, they are the coherent expressions of the very influential conceptions that these authors held regarding the mind-body relation, causation, the nature of the laws of nature, and the meaning of our explanatory practices; second, both Davidson and Putnam tried to articulate liberal forms of naturalism according to which normative notions are not incompatible with scientifically explainable phenomena but not reducible to them either. In conclusion I will argue that Putnam’s view is the more promising for approaching the free will issue since it is not committed to problematic form of ontological monism still accepted by Davidson.
Abstract
This article discusses and compares Donald Davidson’s and Hilary Putnam’s views on free will. Those views have a two-fold motive of interest: first, they are the coherent expressions of the very influential conceptions that these authors held regarding the mind-body relation, causation, the nature of the laws of nature, and the meaning of our explanatory practices; second, both Davidson and Putnam tried to articulate liberal forms of naturalism according to which normative notions are not incompatible with scientifically explainable phenomena but not reducible to them either. In conclusion I will argue that Putnam’s view is the more promising for approaching the free will issue since it is not committed to problematic form of ontological monism still accepted by Davidson.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- An Introduction to Hilary Putnam 1
- Introduction to this Volume 47
- Putnam’s Proof Revisited 63
- Language, Meaning, and Context Sensitivity: Confronting a “Moving-Target” 89
- Externalism and the First-Person Perspective 107
- Putnam on Trans-Theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority 131
- Mathematical Internal Realism 157
- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logic 183
- Fulfillability, Instability, and Incompleteness 207
- Putnam’s Aristotle 227
- Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will 249
- Putnam on Radical Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics 263
- Natural Laws and Human Language 289
- Balance in The Golden Bowl: Attuning Philosophy and Literary Criticism 309
- Bibliography 331
- Contributors 349
- Index 353
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- An Introduction to Hilary Putnam 1
- Introduction to this Volume 47
- Putnam’s Proof Revisited 63
- Language, Meaning, and Context Sensitivity: Confronting a “Moving-Target” 89
- Externalism and the First-Person Perspective 107
- Putnam on Trans-Theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority 131
- Mathematical Internal Realism 157
- The Labyrinth of Quantum Logic 183
- Fulfillability, Instability, and Incompleteness 207
- Putnam’s Aristotle 227
- Davidson and Putnam on the Antinomy of Free Will 249
- Putnam on Radical Scepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics 263
- Natural Laws and Human Language 289
- Balance in The Golden Bowl: Attuning Philosophy and Literary Criticism 309
- Bibliography 331
- Contributors 349
- Index 353
