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Riehls Auffassung der transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

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Kant in Österreich
This chapter is in the book Kant in Österreich

Abstract

When exposing and interpreting Kant’s transcendental Deduction (in Der philosophische Kritizismus, Geschichte und System, Volume 1), Riehl employs the same vocabulary used by Kant himself, but he attributes a realistic meaning to some of Kant’s technical expressions. Thus, in order to properly understand his view of the Deduction it is convenient to grasp Riehl’s realistic assumptions, especially his theory of sensation and his statement that pure concepts cannot be separated from their objects but by means of an operation of abstraction. Accordingly, in the present paper, I examine Riehl’s theory of sensation and his explanation of the mentioned operation of abstraction, before exposing, in the last chapter, his account of the Deductions A and B contained in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Abstract

When exposing and interpreting Kant’s transcendental Deduction (in Der philosophische Kritizismus, Geschichte und System, Volume 1), Riehl employs the same vocabulary used by Kant himself, but he attributes a realistic meaning to some of Kant’s technical expressions. Thus, in order to properly understand his view of the Deduction it is convenient to grasp Riehl’s realistic assumptions, especially his theory of sensation and his statement that pure concepts cannot be separated from their objects but by means of an operation of abstraction. Accordingly, in the present paper, I examine Riehl’s theory of sensation and his explanation of the mentioned operation of abstraction, before exposing, in the last chapter, his account of the Deductions A and B contained in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Vorwort VII
  3. Inhalt XI
  4. I: Kritischer Realismus
  5. Alois Riehl – Leben, Werk und Wirkung 1
  6. Objekt und Objektivität in Kant und Riehl 55
  7. Alois Riehl’s Epistemological Argument for Realism about Things in Themselves 73
  8. Riehls Auffassung der transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe 97
  9. Alois Riehls transzendentaler Realismus 127
  10. Alois Riehl und die Frage des psychophysischen Parallelismus 147
  11. Freedom and Determinism in Alois Riehl’s The Philosophical Criticism 163
  12. II: Wissenschaftlicher Realismus
  13. Alois Riehl and Scientific Philosophy 179
  14. Alois Riehl über Hermann von Helmholtz und die Bedeutung geometrischer Axiome 201
  15. Alois Riehl and the Principle of the Conservation of Energy 223
  16. Riehl’s ‘Objectivist’ Account of Perception 239
  17. Kantian Externalism from Riehl to Putnam 251
  18. III: Kontexte
  19. Heterothesis, Antithesis und die Transzendentalphilosophie. Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Alois Riehl und Heinrich Rickert 299
  20. Zum Einfluss von Alois Riehl auf Richard Hönigswald 323
  21. ‚Realistischer Kritizismus‘ und ‚Österreichischer Neukantianismus‘ 347
  22. Riehl als Neukantianer 371
  23. Riehls Geschichtsbegriff: Analyse und Kritik 391
  24. „Alle großen Dinge kommen aus der großen Leidenschaft her“: Zu Alois Riehls Bild von Friedrich Nietzsche 437
  25. „Alle poetischen Ideen sind Bilder“: Alois Riehl und das Problem der Form in der Kunst 455
  26. IV: Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte
  27. Transzendentale Systeme im Wien des 20. Jahrhunderts 479
  28. The Reception and Rejection of Alois Riehl’s Philosophy in Poland: Jan Stepa and Władysław Tatarkiewicz 529
  29. Appendix
  30. Alois Riehl (1824–1924): Selected Archive Sources on Life and Work 543
  31. Personenregister 577
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