Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics
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Thomas L. Carson
Abstract
Roughly, deception is intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs. I argue that there is a limited range of reasonable views about the definition of lying and defend the following claims on which all of the reasonable definitions agree: A necessary condition for telling a lie is that one makes a statement or assertion that is insincere, namely, a statement that one believes to be false or doesn’t believe to be true. (One can’t lie unless one makes an insincere statement.) A sufficient condition for telling a lie is that one makes a statement that: a. is false, b. one believes is false, c. one makes with the intention to deceive others, and d. one makes in a context in which one implicitly or explicitly assures others that what one says is true. (Any statement that satisfies conditions a-d is a lie.) I explain the differences between lying, deception, and withholding information and propose a distinction between misleading and deceiving. Then I explain Frankfurt’s concept of bullshit (which involves indifference to the truth of one’s statements), the concepts of spin and partial truths, and the distinction between the truth and truthfulness of statements. I conclude by discussing two other important concepts: preventing people from acquiring true beliefs and undermining knowledge and trust in reliable sources of information.
Abstract
Roughly, deception is intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs. I argue that there is a limited range of reasonable views about the definition of lying and defend the following claims on which all of the reasonable definitions agree: A necessary condition for telling a lie is that one makes a statement or assertion that is insincere, namely, a statement that one believes to be false or doesn’t believe to be true. (One can’t lie unless one makes an insincere statement.) A sufficient condition for telling a lie is that one makes a statement that: a. is false, b. one believes is false, c. one makes with the intention to deceive others, and d. one makes in a context in which one implicitly or explicitly assures others that what one says is true. (Any statement that satisfies conditions a-d is a lie.) I explain the differences between lying, deception, and withholding information and propose a distinction between misleading and deceiving. Then I explain Frankfurt’s concept of bullshit (which involves indifference to the truth of one’s statements), the concepts of spin and partial truths, and the distinction between the truth and truthfulness of statements. I conclude by discussing two other important concepts: preventing people from acquiring true beliefs and undermining knowledge and trust in reliable sources of information.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Contents VII
- Introduction: On lying and disleading 1
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I Lies and deception: The landscape of falsehood
- Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics 15
- The morality of deception 41
- Kant tell an a priori lie 65
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II Lying, deception, and speaker commitment: Empirical evidence
- Is lying morally different from misleading? An empirical investigation 89
- “I was only quoting”: Shifting viewpoint and speaker commitment 113
- Memefying deception and deceptive memefication: Multimodal deception on social media 139
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III Puffery, bluffery, bullshit: How to not quite lie
- Bald-faced bullshit and authoritarian political speech: Making sense of Johnson and Trump 165
- Practice to deceive: A natural history of the legal bluff 195
- Just saying, just kidding: Liability for accountability-avoiding speech in ordinary conversation, politics and law 227
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IV Crossing the perjury threshold: Deceit and falsehood in the courtroom
- Perjury cases and the linguist 261
- Trickery and deceit: How the pragmatics of interrogation leads innocent people to confess – and factfinders to believe their confessions 289
- The context of mistrust: Perjury ascriptions in the courtroom 309
- What counts as a lie in and out of the courtroom? The effect of discourse genre on lie judgments 353
- Lies, deception, and bullshit in law 381
- Index 409
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Contents VII
- Introduction: On lying and disleading 1
-
I Lies and deception: The landscape of falsehood
- Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics 15
- The morality of deception 41
- Kant tell an a priori lie 65
-
II Lying, deception, and speaker commitment: Empirical evidence
- Is lying morally different from misleading? An empirical investigation 89
- “I was only quoting”: Shifting viewpoint and speaker commitment 113
- Memefying deception and deceptive memefication: Multimodal deception on social media 139
-
III Puffery, bluffery, bullshit: How to not quite lie
- Bald-faced bullshit and authoritarian political speech: Making sense of Johnson and Trump 165
- Practice to deceive: A natural history of the legal bluff 195
- Just saying, just kidding: Liability for accountability-avoiding speech in ordinary conversation, politics and law 227
-
IV Crossing the perjury threshold: Deceit and falsehood in the courtroom
- Perjury cases and the linguist 261
- Trickery and deceit: How the pragmatics of interrogation leads innocent people to confess – and factfinders to believe their confessions 289
- The context of mistrust: Perjury ascriptions in the courtroom 309
- What counts as a lie in and out of the courtroom? The effect of discourse genre on lie judgments 353
- Lies, deception, and bullshit in law 381
- Index 409
