The context of mistrust: Perjury ascriptions in the courtroom
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Izabela Skoczeń
Abstract
Classical theories of linguistic pragmatics focus on communication oriented solely to the exchange of information. In such communication, beliefs about what is said are naturally intertwined with beliefs about the world. However, in linguistic exchanges oriented at attaining concrete social goals, where speakers are less trustworthy, the interactions between the mentioned beliefs are more complex. We investigate these interactions with reference to a series of experiments in a courtroom setting providing empirical support for the strategic speech inferential framework. We argue that it is the strategic context, more than the role of the speaker, which governs inferential content. We also argue that in mistrust contexts, if a statement does not conform to the state of the world, participants judge it as perjurious; by contrast, if it is objectively true, it is judged as not being a lie irrespective of the knowledge and intention to deceive attributed to the speaker.
Abstract
Classical theories of linguistic pragmatics focus on communication oriented solely to the exchange of information. In such communication, beliefs about what is said are naturally intertwined with beliefs about the world. However, in linguistic exchanges oriented at attaining concrete social goals, where speakers are less trustworthy, the interactions between the mentioned beliefs are more complex. We investigate these interactions with reference to a series of experiments in a courtroom setting providing empirical support for the strategic speech inferential framework. We argue that it is the strategic context, more than the role of the speaker, which governs inferential content. We also argue that in mistrust contexts, if a statement does not conform to the state of the world, participants judge it as perjurious; by contrast, if it is objectively true, it is judged as not being a lie irrespective of the knowledge and intention to deceive attributed to the speaker.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents VII
- Introduction: On lying and disleading 1
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I Lies and deception: The landscape of falsehood
- Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics 15
- The morality of deception 41
- Kant tell an a priori lie 65
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II Lying, deception, and speaker commitment: Empirical evidence
- Is lying morally different from misleading? An empirical investigation 89
- “I was only quoting”: Shifting viewpoint and speaker commitment 113
- Memefying deception and deceptive memefication: Multimodal deception on social media 139
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III Puffery, bluffery, bullshit: How to not quite lie
- Bald-faced bullshit and authoritarian political speech: Making sense of Johnson and Trump 165
- Practice to deceive: A natural history of the legal bluff 195
- Just saying, just kidding: Liability for accountability-avoiding speech in ordinary conversation, politics and law 227
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IV Crossing the perjury threshold: Deceit and falsehood in the courtroom
- Perjury cases and the linguist 261
- Trickery and deceit: How the pragmatics of interrogation leads innocent people to confess – and factfinders to believe their confessions 289
- The context of mistrust: Perjury ascriptions in the courtroom 309
- What counts as a lie in and out of the courtroom? The effect of discourse genre on lie judgments 353
- Lies, deception, and bullshit in law 381
- Index 409
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Contents VII
- Introduction: On lying and disleading 1
-
I Lies and deception: The landscape of falsehood
- Lying, deception, and related concepts: A conceptual map for ethics 15
- The morality of deception 41
- Kant tell an a priori lie 65
-
II Lying, deception, and speaker commitment: Empirical evidence
- Is lying morally different from misleading? An empirical investigation 89
- “I was only quoting”: Shifting viewpoint and speaker commitment 113
- Memefying deception and deceptive memefication: Multimodal deception on social media 139
-
III Puffery, bluffery, bullshit: How to not quite lie
- Bald-faced bullshit and authoritarian political speech: Making sense of Johnson and Trump 165
- Practice to deceive: A natural history of the legal bluff 195
- Just saying, just kidding: Liability for accountability-avoiding speech in ordinary conversation, politics and law 227
-
IV Crossing the perjury threshold: Deceit and falsehood in the courtroom
- Perjury cases and the linguist 261
- Trickery and deceit: How the pragmatics of interrogation leads innocent people to confess – and factfinders to believe their confessions 289
- The context of mistrust: Perjury ascriptions in the courtroom 309
- What counts as a lie in and out of the courtroom? The effect of discourse genre on lie judgments 353
- Lies, deception, and bullshit in law 381
- Index 409
