Startseite Philosophie Pragmatic Realism and Scientific Prediction: The Role of Complexity
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Pragmatic Realism and Scientific Prediction: The Role of Complexity

  • Wenceslao J. Gonzalez
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Abstract

According to the general emphasis of pragmatic realism in science as human activity and the role of objectivity, prediction in the social sciences, like economics, and in the sciences of the artificial, like the sciences of the Internet, cannot be seen as if it were a mere intellectual exercise of knowledge, but rather it should be oriented towards relevant issues. These could be regarding a) the validity of the theories available (which is very important in the case of economics), b) the reliability of the practical solutions to specific problems, or c) the large amount of variability in the application of the tested scientific solutions. Within this context of pragmatic realism, the evaluation of the axis of the proposal - scientific realism around activity and objectivity - comes from how scientific prediction deals with complexity, both structural and dynamic. This is crucial in the case of prediction of the social sciences, where complexity is in the social world (particularly, in economics) at different levels (micro, meso, and macro: individuals and groups, organizations and markets, governments and international institutions). In addition, it is decisive for the sciences of the artificial, which enlarge human possibilities based on predictions of the viability of the aims of the designs, as can be seen in the sciences of the Internet. The test of the dealings of prediction in these sciences with complexity should reinforce the need for objectivity while developing the scientific activity in the three spheres indicated: basic science, applied science, and application of science.

Abstract

According to the general emphasis of pragmatic realism in science as human activity and the role of objectivity, prediction in the social sciences, like economics, and in the sciences of the artificial, like the sciences of the Internet, cannot be seen as if it were a mere intellectual exercise of knowledge, but rather it should be oriented towards relevant issues. These could be regarding a) the validity of the theories available (which is very important in the case of economics), b) the reliability of the practical solutions to specific problems, or c) the large amount of variability in the application of the tested scientific solutions. Within this context of pragmatic realism, the evaluation of the axis of the proposal - scientific realism around activity and objectivity - comes from how scientific prediction deals with complexity, both structural and dynamic. This is crucial in the case of prediction of the social sciences, where complexity is in the social world (particularly, in economics) at different levels (micro, meso, and macro: individuals and groups, organizations and markets, governments and international institutions). In addition, it is decisive for the sciences of the artificial, which enlarge human possibilities based on predictions of the viability of the aims of the designs, as can be seen in the sciences of the Internet. The test of the dealings of prediction in these sciences with complexity should reinforce the need for objectivity while developing the scientific activity in the three spheres indicated: basic science, applied science, and application of science.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Contents V
  3. Novelty in Scientific Realism: New Approaches to an Ongoing Debate 1
  4. I New Framework for the Realism and Anti-realism Debate
  5. Scientific Realism: What’s All the Fuss? 27
  6. Scientific Realism and Three Problems for Inference to the Best Explanation 48
  7. Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense 68
  8. II Approaches based on History and Scientific Realism
  9. Evolving Realities: Scientific Prediction and Objectivity from the Perspective of Historical Epistemology 87
  10. Do Cognitive Illusions Make Scientific Realism Deceptively Attractive? 104
  11. III Logical Approaches in Realist Terms
  12. Against Paraconsistentism 133
  13. Stratified Nomic Realism 145
  14. IV Logico-Epistemological Structural Realism and Instrumental Realism
  15. Structural Realism: The Only Defensible Realist Game in Town? 169
  16. Mathematical Language and the Changing Concept of Physical Reality 206
  17. V New Developments on Critical Scientific Realism and Pragmatic Realism
  18. Interdisciplinarity from the Perspective of Critical Scientific Realism 231
  19. Pragmatic Realism and Scientific Prediction: The Role of Complexity 251
  20. VI Realism on Causality and Representation
  21. Realism and AIM (Action, Intervention, Manipulation) Theories of Causality 291
  22. Is Physics Biased Against Alternative Possibilities? 305
  23. VII Realist Accounts on Objectivity and Facts
  24. Realistic Components in the Conception of Pragmatic Idealism: The Role of Objectivity and the Notion of “Fact” 331
  25. “Heard Enough from the Experts”? A Popperian Enquiry 348
  26. Realism in Archaeology – A Philosophical Perspective 365
  27. VIII Realism and the Social World: From Social Sciences to the Sciences of the Artificial
  28. A Structural Realist Approach to International Relations Theory 391
  29. Objectivity and Truth in Sciences of Communication and the Case of the Internet 415
  30. Index of Names 437
  31. Subject Index 447
Heruntergeladen am 21.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110664737-012/html
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