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Scientific Realism: What’s All the Fuss?

  • Peter Achinstein
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New Approaches to Scientific Realism
This chapter is in the book New Approaches to Scientific Realism

Abstract

Scientific realists say that the inferences made by J. J. Thomson in 1897 from his experiments on cathode rays to the truth of the claim that electrons exist, and by Jean Perrin in 1908 from his experiments on Brownian motion to the truth of the claim that molecules exist, are legitimate and decisive. Anti-realists deny that such inferences are legitimate since the inferred entities are unobservable, and any inference to the existence and properties of any unobservable whatever is unwarranted. Legitimate inferences are possible only to the empirical adequacy of such theories, not their truth. My paper explores reasons for the latter bold claim and rejects them all.

Abstract

Scientific realists say that the inferences made by J. J. Thomson in 1897 from his experiments on cathode rays to the truth of the claim that electrons exist, and by Jean Perrin in 1908 from his experiments on Brownian motion to the truth of the claim that molecules exist, are legitimate and decisive. Anti-realists deny that such inferences are legitimate since the inferred entities are unobservable, and any inference to the existence and properties of any unobservable whatever is unwarranted. Legitimate inferences are possible only to the empirical adequacy of such theories, not their truth. My paper explores reasons for the latter bold claim and rejects them all.

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Contents V
  3. Novelty in Scientific Realism: New Approaches to an Ongoing Debate 1
  4. I New Framework for the Realism and Anti-realism Debate
  5. Scientific Realism: What’s All the Fuss? 27
  6. Scientific Realism and Three Problems for Inference to the Best Explanation 48
  7. Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common Sense 68
  8. II Approaches based on History and Scientific Realism
  9. Evolving Realities: Scientific Prediction and Objectivity from the Perspective of Historical Epistemology 87
  10. Do Cognitive Illusions Make Scientific Realism Deceptively Attractive? 104
  11. III Logical Approaches in Realist Terms
  12. Against Paraconsistentism 133
  13. Stratified Nomic Realism 145
  14. IV Logico-Epistemological Structural Realism and Instrumental Realism
  15. Structural Realism: The Only Defensible Realist Game in Town? 169
  16. Mathematical Language and the Changing Concept of Physical Reality 206
  17. V New Developments on Critical Scientific Realism and Pragmatic Realism
  18. Interdisciplinarity from the Perspective of Critical Scientific Realism 231
  19. Pragmatic Realism and Scientific Prediction: The Role of Complexity 251
  20. VI Realism on Causality and Representation
  21. Realism and AIM (Action, Intervention, Manipulation) Theories of Causality 291
  22. Is Physics Biased Against Alternative Possibilities? 305
  23. VII Realist Accounts on Objectivity and Facts
  24. Realistic Components in the Conception of Pragmatic Idealism: The Role of Objectivity and the Notion of “Fact” 331
  25. “Heard Enough from the Experts”? A Popperian Enquiry 348
  26. Realism in Archaeology – A Philosophical Perspective 365
  27. VIII Realism and the Social World: From Social Sciences to the Sciences of the Artificial
  28. A Structural Realist Approach to International Relations Theory 391
  29. Objectivity and Truth in Sciences of Communication and the Case of the Internet 415
  30. Index of Names 437
  31. Subject Index 447
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