Startseite Philosophie Vom Geist des Besonderen – Zur Kritik der Unterscheidung von Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft
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Vom Geist des Besonderen – Zur Kritik der Unterscheidung von Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft

  • Eric Achermann
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Abstract

In a particular mood. A critical reexamination of the distinction between natural sciences and the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’. The paper argues that the Diltheyan distinction between the so called ‘Geistes-’ and ‘Naturwissenschaften’ is flawed by the attempt to oppose an understanding of historical singularity viz. an explanation of timeless generality. By means of mereological and set theory-arguments, it develops an alternative distinction between thematic and aspectual types of scientific reasoning. This distinction is neither dependent on the investigated material nor on the procedure of investigation but on the - mostly tacit - decision to focus either on existing entities or on general qualities. A critical analysis of classical theories that distinguish two realms of science (Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey, Weber) and the reconsideration of some analytical arguments concerning understanding and explanation (including Quine, Davidson, Dennett) serve to highlight apparently hidden similarities between the ‘two cultures’ (science and scholarship). So, our task should not consist in attributing ‘x is science’ or rather ‘x is not science’ but to show the congruity of their respective argumentative types (description, causation, intention, function, etc.) in order to improve and generalize them for the sake of a comprehensive theory of science.

Abstract

In a particular mood. A critical reexamination of the distinction between natural sciences and the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’. The paper argues that the Diltheyan distinction between the so called ‘Geistes-’ and ‘Naturwissenschaften’ is flawed by the attempt to oppose an understanding of historical singularity viz. an explanation of timeless generality. By means of mereological and set theory-arguments, it develops an alternative distinction between thematic and aspectual types of scientific reasoning. This distinction is neither dependent on the investigated material nor on the procedure of investigation but on the - mostly tacit - decision to focus either on existing entities or on general qualities. A critical analysis of classical theories that distinguish two realms of science (Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey, Weber) and the reconsideration of some analytical arguments concerning understanding and explanation (including Quine, Davidson, Dennett) serve to highlight apparently hidden similarities between the ‘two cultures’ (science and scholarship). So, our task should not consist in attributing ‘x is science’ or rather ‘x is not science’ but to show the congruity of their respective argumentative types (description, causation, intention, function, etc.) in order to improve and generalize them for the sake of a comprehensive theory of science.

Heruntergeladen am 25.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110614831-006/html?lang=de
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