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Epistemic De-Platforming

  • Manuel de Pinedo und Neftalí Villanueva
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The Political Turn in Analytic Philosophy
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch The Political Turn in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to argue for a particular epistemic policy, epistemic de-platforming, according to which nobody is a priori entitled to automatically turn their assertions into epistemically relevant alternatives, with the power to question what we know.We start with a presentation of our take on the political turn in analytic philosophy: what characterizes this trend is that philosophical concepts and theories are evaluated according to their power to help detecting hidden forms of injustice (generalizing over our pre-theoretical perceptions of injustice) and intervening to alleviate them. Building on our conception of the political turn, we highlight two epistemic paradoxes. One amounts to the idea that agents subjected to an excess of epistemic friction, for instance, by not receiving the credibility or authority that they deserve, may be said to simultaneously increase their epistemic standing and suffer an epistemic harm. The other is related to the sound attitude of disregarding any evidence that goes against what we know, leading to the allegedly dogmatic stance of rejecting beforehand future evidence and making our present knowledge an obstacle to the future acquisition of further knowledge. We contrast some epistemic policies in terms of their capacity to offer a way out from these paradoxes. Neither dogmatism nor libertarianism take into account which are, and which are not, the contextually relevant epistemic alternatives that should be considered. As an example of a pluralistic, context-dependent, epistemic policy, we explore epistemic de-platforming, a policy that, in line with our characterization of the political turn, entitles agents to ignore possibilities presented by groups whose aim is to further oppressive agendas, while recommends them to always take into account the ideas and opinions of those who have earned the right to be heard by them: their friends, allies, and loved ones.

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to argue for a particular epistemic policy, epistemic de-platforming, according to which nobody is a priori entitled to automatically turn their assertions into epistemically relevant alternatives, with the power to question what we know.We start with a presentation of our take on the political turn in analytic philosophy: what characterizes this trend is that philosophical concepts and theories are evaluated according to their power to help detecting hidden forms of injustice (generalizing over our pre-theoretical perceptions of injustice) and intervening to alleviate them. Building on our conception of the political turn, we highlight two epistemic paradoxes. One amounts to the idea that agents subjected to an excess of epistemic friction, for instance, by not receiving the credibility or authority that they deserve, may be said to simultaneously increase their epistemic standing and suffer an epistemic harm. The other is related to the sound attitude of disregarding any evidence that goes against what we know, leading to the allegedly dogmatic stance of rejecting beforehand future evidence and making our present knowledge an obstacle to the future acquisition of further knowledge. We contrast some epistemic policies in terms of their capacity to offer a way out from these paradoxes. Neither dogmatism nor libertarianism take into account which are, and which are not, the contextually relevant epistemic alternatives that should be considered. As an example of a pluralistic, context-dependent, epistemic policy, we explore epistemic de-platforming, a policy that, in line with our characterization of the political turn, entitles agents to ignore possibilities presented by groups whose aim is to further oppressive agendas, while recommends them to always take into account the ideas and opinions of those who have earned the right to be heard by them: their friends, allies, and loved ones.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements V
  3. Table of Contents VII
  4. Editor’s Introduction IX
  5. Part I: Analytic Philosophy and Social Involvement
  6. Analytic Philosophy as Philosophical Activism 1
  7. Conceptual Engineering and Neurath’s Boat: A Return to the Political Roots of Logical Empiricism 31
  8. Part II: Mind, Knowledge, and the Social World
  9. Political Epistemology 53
  10. Intellectual Vices in Conditions of Oppression: The Turn to the Political in Virtue Epistemology 77
  11. Epistemic De-Platforming 105
  12. Philosophy of Mind after Implicit Biases 135
  13. Ameliorative Inquiry in Epistemology 151
  14. Part III: Meaning, Politics, and Identity
  15. Tackling Verbal Derogation: Linguistic Meaning, Social Meaning and Constructive Contestation 173
  16. The Power to Shape Contexts: The Transmission of Descriptive and Evaluative Contents 199
  17. Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Landscaping: The Benefits and Responsibilities of Expanding Conceptual Landscaping beyond Failure Reparation 211
  18. The Meaning of ‘Woman’ and the Political Turn in Philosophy of Language 229
  19. Part IV: Epistemology and Polarization
  20. Affective Polarization and Testimonial and Discursive Injustice 257
  21. Philosophical Considerations of Political Polarization 279
  22. Notes on Contributors 299
  23. Index 303
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110612318-007

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements V
  3. Table of Contents VII
  4. Editor’s Introduction IX
  5. Part I: Analytic Philosophy and Social Involvement
  6. Analytic Philosophy as Philosophical Activism 1
  7. Conceptual Engineering and Neurath’s Boat: A Return to the Political Roots of Logical Empiricism 31
  8. Part II: Mind, Knowledge, and the Social World
  9. Political Epistemology 53
  10. Intellectual Vices in Conditions of Oppression: The Turn to the Political in Virtue Epistemology 77
  11. Epistemic De-Platforming 105
  12. Philosophy of Mind after Implicit Biases 135
  13. Ameliorative Inquiry in Epistemology 151
  14. Part III: Meaning, Politics, and Identity
  15. Tackling Verbal Derogation: Linguistic Meaning, Social Meaning and Constructive Contestation 173
  16. The Power to Shape Contexts: The Transmission of Descriptive and Evaluative Contents 199
  17. Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Landscaping: The Benefits and Responsibilities of Expanding Conceptual Landscaping beyond Failure Reparation 211
  18. The Meaning of ‘Woman’ and the Political Turn in Philosophy of Language 229
  19. Part IV: Epistemology and Polarization
  20. Affective Polarization and Testimonial and Discursive Injustice 257
  21. Philosophical Considerations of Political Polarization 279
  22. Notes on Contributors 299
  23. Index 303
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Heruntergeladen am 16.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110612318-007/html
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