Ameliorative Inquiry in Epistemology
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Emily C. McWilliams
Abstract
Recently, some work in feminist epistemology has received more uptake from mainstream western analytic epistemology than it had in the past. There has been recognition of the importance of topics like epistemic injustice, standpoint epistemology, and epistemologies of ignorance, for instance. But these discussions are still often seen as orthogonal to core epistemic theorizing. Generally, they have not received uptake as fundamental contestations of the ways we understand epistemic value, or core normative epistemic concepts. I suggest that one reason for this is the perception that insofar as feminist theorizing is responsive to moral and political concerns, it is not doing epistemology because it is not theorizing about epistemic value. This perception assumes a specific kind of epistemic value monism - a view whose popularity, I argue, derives at least partly from features of the methodologies that are popular in mainstream epistemology. I show that by using a different type of methodology- ameliorative inquiry-we see that there is principled reason to doubt epistemic value monism.We can thus understand feminist theorizing in ways that are richer, more accurate, and that contribute to our understanding of the ways in which our practical, moral, and epistemic agency are intertwined.
Abstract
Recently, some work in feminist epistemology has received more uptake from mainstream western analytic epistemology than it had in the past. There has been recognition of the importance of topics like epistemic injustice, standpoint epistemology, and epistemologies of ignorance, for instance. But these discussions are still often seen as orthogonal to core epistemic theorizing. Generally, they have not received uptake as fundamental contestations of the ways we understand epistemic value, or core normative epistemic concepts. I suggest that one reason for this is the perception that insofar as feminist theorizing is responsive to moral and political concerns, it is not doing epistemology because it is not theorizing about epistemic value. This perception assumes a specific kind of epistemic value monism - a view whose popularity, I argue, derives at least partly from features of the methodologies that are popular in mainstream epistemology. I show that by using a different type of methodology- ameliorative inquiry-we see that there is principled reason to doubt epistemic value monism.We can thus understand feminist theorizing in ways that are richer, more accurate, and that contribute to our understanding of the ways in which our practical, moral, and epistemic agency are intertwined.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- Editor’s Introduction IX
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Part I: Analytic Philosophy and Social Involvement
- Analytic Philosophy as Philosophical Activism 1
- Conceptual Engineering and Neurath’s Boat: A Return to the Political Roots of Logical Empiricism 31
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Part II: Mind, Knowledge, and the Social World
- Political Epistemology 53
- Intellectual Vices in Conditions of Oppression: The Turn to the Political in Virtue Epistemology 77
- Epistemic De-Platforming 105
- Philosophy of Mind after Implicit Biases 135
- Ameliorative Inquiry in Epistemology 151
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Part III: Meaning, Politics, and Identity
- Tackling Verbal Derogation: Linguistic Meaning, Social Meaning and Constructive Contestation 173
- The Power to Shape Contexts: The Transmission of Descriptive and Evaluative Contents 199
- Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Landscaping: The Benefits and Responsibilities of Expanding Conceptual Landscaping beyond Failure Reparation 211
- The Meaning of ‘Woman’ and the Political Turn in Philosophy of Language 229
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Part IV: Epistemology and Polarization
- Affective Polarization and Testimonial and Discursive Injustice 257
- Philosophical Considerations of Political Polarization 279
- Notes on Contributors 299
- Index 303
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- Editor’s Introduction IX
-
Part I: Analytic Philosophy and Social Involvement
- Analytic Philosophy as Philosophical Activism 1
- Conceptual Engineering and Neurath’s Boat: A Return to the Political Roots of Logical Empiricism 31
-
Part II: Mind, Knowledge, and the Social World
- Political Epistemology 53
- Intellectual Vices in Conditions of Oppression: The Turn to the Political in Virtue Epistemology 77
- Epistemic De-Platforming 105
- Philosophy of Mind after Implicit Biases 135
- Ameliorative Inquiry in Epistemology 151
-
Part III: Meaning, Politics, and Identity
- Tackling Verbal Derogation: Linguistic Meaning, Social Meaning and Constructive Contestation 173
- The Power to Shape Contexts: The Transmission of Descriptive and Evaluative Contents 199
- Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Landscaping: The Benefits and Responsibilities of Expanding Conceptual Landscaping beyond Failure Reparation 211
- The Meaning of ‘Woman’ and the Political Turn in Philosophy of Language 229
-
Part IV: Epistemology and Polarization
- Affective Polarization and Testimonial and Discursive Injustice 257
- Philosophical Considerations of Political Polarization 279
- Notes on Contributors 299
- Index 303