The Power to Shape Contexts: The Transmission of Descriptive and Evaluative Contents
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Bianca Cepollaro
Abstract
Recently, scholars have been investigating the hidden moral and political valence of apparently non-political forms of communication, by looking at how certain prima facie harmless uses of language can spread prejudice and contribute to social injustice. In this chapter I argue that while analyses such as Langton’s convincingly explain how descriptive contents are transmitted and can contribute to belief formation and knowledge transmission, a different model is required to satisfactorily account for value judgments. I submit that while individuals can come to believe and, in the good cases, know certain descriptive facts about the world only based on what others tell them, testimony cannot transmit evaluative contents in the same way. Informative evaluative presupposition contributes to the creation of beliefs and knowledge, but it does not determine them in the way in which testimony typically works with descriptive contents: I argue for this claim by examining taste, moral and aesthetic value judgments. My point does not undermine the idea that presupposing certain value contents may affect one’s audience, but challenges the idea that testimony is the right notion to account for how value talk can spread and impose contents on the participants to a conversation.
Abstract
Recently, scholars have been investigating the hidden moral and political valence of apparently non-political forms of communication, by looking at how certain prima facie harmless uses of language can spread prejudice and contribute to social injustice. In this chapter I argue that while analyses such as Langton’s convincingly explain how descriptive contents are transmitted and can contribute to belief formation and knowledge transmission, a different model is required to satisfactorily account for value judgments. I submit that while individuals can come to believe and, in the good cases, know certain descriptive facts about the world only based on what others tell them, testimony cannot transmit evaluative contents in the same way. Informative evaluative presupposition contributes to the creation of beliefs and knowledge, but it does not determine them in the way in which testimony typically works with descriptive contents: I argue for this claim by examining taste, moral and aesthetic value judgments. My point does not undermine the idea that presupposing certain value contents may affect one’s audience, but challenges the idea that testimony is the right notion to account for how value talk can spread and impose contents on the participants to a conversation.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- Editor’s Introduction IX
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Part I: Analytic Philosophy and Social Involvement
- Analytic Philosophy as Philosophical Activism 1
- Conceptual Engineering and Neurath’s Boat: A Return to the Political Roots of Logical Empiricism 31
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Part II: Mind, Knowledge, and the Social World
- Political Epistemology 53
- Intellectual Vices in Conditions of Oppression: The Turn to the Political in Virtue Epistemology 77
- Epistemic De-Platforming 105
- Philosophy of Mind after Implicit Biases 135
- Ameliorative Inquiry in Epistemology 151
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Part III: Meaning, Politics, and Identity
- Tackling Verbal Derogation: Linguistic Meaning, Social Meaning and Constructive Contestation 173
- The Power to Shape Contexts: The Transmission of Descriptive and Evaluative Contents 199
- Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Landscaping: The Benefits and Responsibilities of Expanding Conceptual Landscaping beyond Failure Reparation 211
- The Meaning of ‘Woman’ and the Political Turn in Philosophy of Language 229
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Part IV: Epistemology and Polarization
- Affective Polarization and Testimonial and Discursive Injustice 257
- Philosophical Considerations of Political Polarization 279
- Notes on Contributors 299
- Index 303
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgements V
- Table of Contents VII
- Editor’s Introduction IX
-
Part I: Analytic Philosophy and Social Involvement
- Analytic Philosophy as Philosophical Activism 1
- Conceptual Engineering and Neurath’s Boat: A Return to the Political Roots of Logical Empiricism 31
-
Part II: Mind, Knowledge, and the Social World
- Political Epistemology 53
- Intellectual Vices in Conditions of Oppression: The Turn to the Political in Virtue Epistemology 77
- Epistemic De-Platforming 105
- Philosophy of Mind after Implicit Biases 135
- Ameliorative Inquiry in Epistemology 151
-
Part III: Meaning, Politics, and Identity
- Tackling Verbal Derogation: Linguistic Meaning, Social Meaning and Constructive Contestation 173
- The Power to Shape Contexts: The Transmission of Descriptive and Evaluative Contents 199
- Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Landscaping: The Benefits and Responsibilities of Expanding Conceptual Landscaping beyond Failure Reparation 211
- The Meaning of ‘Woman’ and the Political Turn in Philosophy of Language 229
-
Part IV: Epistemology and Polarization
- Affective Polarization and Testimonial and Discursive Injustice 257
- Philosophical Considerations of Political Polarization 279
- Notes on Contributors 299
- Index 303