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11. Fixing Interventionism

  • Lena Kästner
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Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter is in the book Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience

Summary

Interventionism has not yet offered a convincing way of handling non-causal interlevel dependence relations. Even where we permit non-causally related variables in the same interventionist graph, interventions are still designed to uncover causal relations only. This is not empirically adequate. I therefore suggest difference making interventionism (DMI): a weaker reading of Woodward’s interventionism according to which manipulability indicates general, not necessarily causal, (explanatory) dependence. This is plausible against the background of scientific practice and clears the way for using interventions in interlevel experiments.

Summary

Interventionism has not yet offered a convincing way of handling non-causal interlevel dependence relations. Even where we permit non-causally related variables in the same interventionist graph, interventions are still designed to uncover causal relations only. This is not empirically adequate. I therefore suggest difference making interventionism (DMI): a weaker reading of Woodward’s interventionism according to which manipulability indicates general, not necessarily causal, (explanatory) dependence. This is plausible against the background of scientific practice and clears the way for using interventions in interlevel experiments.

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