Verkörpertes Wissen – verkörpertes Gedächtnis
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Thomas Fuchs
Abstract
The distinction between representational and embodied knowledge (knowing that versus knowing how) has been gaining new significance through the investigation of implicit memory. This kind of memory is formed as an organism and its environment interact over time: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor as well as affect-motor schemes.We may speak of an implicit “body memory” that underlies our habits and skills, connecting body and environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actualized in appropriate situations or through overarching volitional acts, without necessarily being made explicit. In this article I analyze the structure of embodied knowledge by taking the example of learning social skills through dyadic interactions in early childhood. I argue that the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basis of intercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowing others (“Theory of Mind”) are derived from later steps of development; they are not sufficient on their own to explain interactive and empathic human capacities. This is also borne out by a psychopathological example, namely, infantile autism where primary empathy is lacking due to disturbances of intercorporeality.
Abstract
The distinction between representational and embodied knowledge (knowing that versus knowing how) has been gaining new significance through the investigation of implicit memory. This kind of memory is formed as an organism and its environment interact over time: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor as well as affect-motor schemes.We may speak of an implicit “body memory” that underlies our habits and skills, connecting body and environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actualized in appropriate situations or through overarching volitional acts, without necessarily being made explicit. In this article I analyze the structure of embodied knowledge by taking the example of learning social skills through dyadic interactions in early childhood. I argue that the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basis of intercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowing others (“Theory of Mind”) are derived from later steps of development; they are not sufficient on their own to explain interactive and empathic human capacities. This is also borne out by a psychopathological example, namely, infantile autism where primary empathy is lacking due to disturbances of intercorporeality.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Vorwort V
- Inhalt VII
- Einleitung 1
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1. Entwicklung – Sprache – Denken
- Frühkindliches Lernen in sozialen Interaktionen 33
- Verkörpertes Wissen – verkörpertes Gedächtnis 57
- Direkte Wahrnehmung, Expressivität und Imitation 79
- Leib und Leiblichkeit bei Gadamer 119
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2. Die Einheit von Wahrnehmung und Bewegung
- Wie viel Intelligenz steckt in der Mechanik unseres Körpers? 137
- Die Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen bei Viktor von Weizsäcker 161
- Alterität, Experiment, Inkarnation 191
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3. Evolution und Menschheitsentwicklung
- Menschwerdung, Verkörperung und Empathie 211
- Die Entstehung einer Figurine? 251
- Mitgeteilte und parasitäre Emergenz 281
- Auf der Grenze 313
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4. Verkörperung und Anthropologie
- Inkarnierte Geschöpfe 337
- Verkörperte Kommunikation – eine theoretische Grundlage für Psychotherapie 369
- Die Relevanz des Biologischen 387
- Kann man „schreckliche menschliche Leidenschaften“ sehen? 399
- Sachindex 423
- Namensindex 429
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Vorwort V
- Inhalt VII
- Einleitung 1
-
1. Entwicklung – Sprache – Denken
- Frühkindliches Lernen in sozialen Interaktionen 33
- Verkörpertes Wissen – verkörpertes Gedächtnis 57
- Direkte Wahrnehmung, Expressivität und Imitation 79
- Leib und Leiblichkeit bei Gadamer 119
-
2. Die Einheit von Wahrnehmung und Bewegung
- Wie viel Intelligenz steckt in der Mechanik unseres Körpers? 137
- Die Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen bei Viktor von Weizsäcker 161
- Alterität, Experiment, Inkarnation 191
-
3. Evolution und Menschheitsentwicklung
- Menschwerdung, Verkörperung und Empathie 211
- Die Entstehung einer Figurine? 251
- Mitgeteilte und parasitäre Emergenz 281
- Auf der Grenze 313
-
4. Verkörperung und Anthropologie
- Inkarnierte Geschöpfe 337
- Verkörperte Kommunikation – eine theoretische Grundlage für Psychotherapie 369
- Die Relevanz des Biologischen 387
- Kann man „schreckliche menschliche Leidenschaften“ sehen? 399
- Sachindex 423
- Namensindex 429
