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Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers

  • Chris Snijders , Marcin Bober und Uwe Matzat
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Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation

Abstract

Research on online reputation systems has shown that, in general, a higher reputation score increases trust in the seller in the sense that those with a higher reputation score get better prices for their goods (the “reputation premium”) and may be more likely to attract buyers (a higher probability of a sale). Likewise, negative feedback from buyers reduces trust in the seller. In this chapter, we analyze whether and how sellers who are confronted with negative feedback can rebuild trust by reacting appropriately.We also assess the monetary value of textual feedback, as compared to the value of the numerical reputation score. Data obtained in an online choice-based experiment allows us to analyze both the effects of buyers’ feedback text comments on the trust of a buyer in eBay sellers and the effect of a seller’s textual reaction on rebuilding trust. Our results show that textual feedback from buyers can indeed strongly affect the purchasing decisions of other buyers. Sellers can counteract the effect of negative comments, but only when the appropriate trust-rebuilding strategy is chosen in formulating the reply. The monetary value of adequate textual feedback is surprisingly high when compared to the value of the reputation score.

Abstract

Research on online reputation systems has shown that, in general, a higher reputation score increases trust in the seller in the sense that those with a higher reputation score get better prices for their goods (the “reputation premium”) and may be more likely to attract buyers (a higher probability of a sale). Likewise, negative feedback from buyers reduces trust in the seller. In this chapter, we analyze whether and how sellers who are confronted with negative feedback can rebuild trust by reacting appropriately.We also assess the monetary value of textual feedback, as compared to the value of the numerical reputation score. Data obtained in an online choice-based experiment allows us to analyze both the effects of buyers’ feedback text comments on the trust of a buyer in eBay sellers and the effect of a seller’s textual reaction on rebuilding trust. Our results show that textual feedback from buyers can indeed strongly affect the purchasing decisions of other buyers. Sellers can counteract the effect of negative comments, but only when the appropriate trust-rebuilding strategy is chosen in formulating the reply. The monetary value of adequate textual feedback is surprisingly high when compared to the value of the reputation score.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Preface VII
  3. Contents IX
  4. Part I: Foundations
  5. Introduction 3
  6. Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram 11
  7. Part II: Institutions
  8. The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: Simulating the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System 39
  9. From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court 61
  10. The Dependence of Human Cognitive and Motivational Processes on Institutional Systems 85
  11. Social Dilemmas and Solutions in Immunizations 107
  12. Part III: Social Norms
  13. When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests? 119
  14. Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism? 143
  15. Cooperation and Career Chances in Science 165
  16. Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions 189
  17. The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity 215
  18. Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
  19. Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment 239
  20. Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments 259
  21. The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward? 279
  22. Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement 303
  23. Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise 327
  24. Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
  25. Cooperation and Distrust – a Contradiction? 357
  26. Signaling Theory Evolving: Signals and Signs of Trustworthiness in Social Exchange 373
  27. Trust and Promises as Friendly Advances 393
  28. Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers 421
  29. Part VI: Game Theory
  30. Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation 447
  31. A Note on the Strategic Determination of the Required Number of Volunteers 471
  32. Is No News Bad News? A Hostage Trust Game with Incomplete Information and Fairness Considerations of the Trustee 481
  33. Part VII: Experimental Methods
  34. When Prediction Fails 505
  35. Measuring Social Preferences on Amazon Mechanical Turk 527
  36. Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments 547
  37. Notes on the Editors and Contributors 567
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-020

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Preface VII
  3. Contents IX
  4. Part I: Foundations
  5. Introduction 3
  6. Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram 11
  7. Part II: Institutions
  8. The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: Simulating the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System 39
  9. From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court 61
  10. The Dependence of Human Cognitive and Motivational Processes on Institutional Systems 85
  11. Social Dilemmas and Solutions in Immunizations 107
  12. Part III: Social Norms
  13. When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests? 119
  14. Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism? 143
  15. Cooperation and Career Chances in Science 165
  16. Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions 189
  17. The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity 215
  18. Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
  19. Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment 239
  20. Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments 259
  21. The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward? 279
  22. Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement 303
  23. Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise 327
  24. Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
  25. Cooperation and Distrust – a Contradiction? 357
  26. Signaling Theory Evolving: Signals and Signs of Trustworthiness in Social Exchange 373
  27. Trust and Promises as Friendly Advances 393
  28. Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers 421
  29. Part VI: Game Theory
  30. Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation 447
  31. A Note on the Strategic Determination of the Required Number of Volunteers 471
  32. Is No News Bad News? A Hostage Trust Game with Incomplete Information and Fairness Considerations of the Trustee 481
  33. Part VII: Experimental Methods
  34. When Prediction Fails 505
  35. Measuring Social Preferences on Amazon Mechanical Turk 527
  36. Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments 547
  37. Notes on the Editors and Contributors 567
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Heruntergeladen am 3.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110472974-020/html
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