Startseite When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests?
Kapitel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests?

Implications of Dual-Process Models and Rational Choice Theory, Tested for Protest Participation
  • Karl-Dieter Opp
Veröffentlichen auch Sie bei De Gruyter Brill
So veröffentlichen Sie bei uns
Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation

Abstract

This article addresses situations in which two kinds of goals exist that cannot be realized simultaneously. One is the goal of following a norm such as heeding speed limits; the other goal refers to interests such as saving time. Norms and interests may influence behavior in different ways. In addition to an additive effect, three interaction effects are discussed in the literature. (1) If norms reach a certain threshold, they are followed, regardless of the intensity of interests (norms proposition). (2) If interests reach a certain threshold, they are realized, regardless of the acceptance of norms (interests proposition). (3) Relatively strong norms reduce the effects of interests and vice versa (symmetric-effects proposition). TheMODE model (R.H. Fazio and collaborators) and a broad interpretation of rational choice theory are applied to generate propositions which specify underwhich conditions each effect is to be expected. In an empirical test the norm is a felt obligation to protest, whereas the interest is to avoid being the victimof state repression. The dependent variable is protest behavior. The data confirms the predicted symmetric-effects proposition. No threshold effects were found, which falsifies the norms and interests proposition.

Abstract

This article addresses situations in which two kinds of goals exist that cannot be realized simultaneously. One is the goal of following a norm such as heeding speed limits; the other goal refers to interests such as saving time. Norms and interests may influence behavior in different ways. In addition to an additive effect, three interaction effects are discussed in the literature. (1) If norms reach a certain threshold, they are followed, regardless of the intensity of interests (norms proposition). (2) If interests reach a certain threshold, they are realized, regardless of the acceptance of norms (interests proposition). (3) Relatively strong norms reduce the effects of interests and vice versa (symmetric-effects proposition). TheMODE model (R.H. Fazio and collaborators) and a broad interpretation of rational choice theory are applied to generate propositions which specify underwhich conditions each effect is to be expected. In an empirical test the norm is a felt obligation to protest, whereas the interest is to avoid being the victimof state repression. The dependent variable is protest behavior. The data confirms the predicted symmetric-effects proposition. No threshold effects were found, which falsifies the norms and interests proposition.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Preface VII
  3. Contents IX
  4. Part I: Foundations
  5. Introduction 3
  6. Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram 11
  7. Part II: Institutions
  8. The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: Simulating the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System 39
  9. From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court 61
  10. The Dependence of Human Cognitive and Motivational Processes on Institutional Systems 85
  11. Social Dilemmas and Solutions in Immunizations 107
  12. Part III: Social Norms
  13. When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests? 119
  14. Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism? 143
  15. Cooperation and Career Chances in Science 165
  16. Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions 189
  17. The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity 215
  18. Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
  19. Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment 239
  20. Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments 259
  21. The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward? 279
  22. Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement 303
  23. Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise 327
  24. Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
  25. Cooperation and Distrust – a Contradiction? 357
  26. Signaling Theory Evolving: Signals and Signs of Trustworthiness in Social Exchange 373
  27. Trust and Promises as Friendly Advances 393
  28. Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers 421
  29. Part VI: Game Theory
  30. Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation 447
  31. A Note on the Strategic Determination of the Required Number of Volunteers 471
  32. Is No News Bad News? A Hostage Trust Game with Incomplete Information and Fairness Considerations of the Trustee 481
  33. Part VII: Experimental Methods
  34. When Prediction Fails 505
  35. Measuring Social Preferences on Amazon Mechanical Turk 527
  36. Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments 547
  37. Notes on the Editors and Contributors 567
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-007

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Preface VII
  3. Contents IX
  4. Part I: Foundations
  5. Introduction 3
  6. Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram 11
  7. Part II: Institutions
  8. The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: Simulating the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System 39
  9. From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court 61
  10. The Dependence of Human Cognitive and Motivational Processes on Institutional Systems 85
  11. Social Dilemmas and Solutions in Immunizations 107
  12. Part III: Social Norms
  13. When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests? 119
  14. Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism? 143
  15. Cooperation and Career Chances in Science 165
  16. Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions 189
  17. The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity 215
  18. Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
  19. Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment 239
  20. Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments 259
  21. The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward? 279
  22. Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement 303
  23. Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise 327
  24. Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
  25. Cooperation and Distrust – a Contradiction? 357
  26. Signaling Theory Evolving: Signals and Signs of Trustworthiness in Social Exchange 373
  27. Trust and Promises as Friendly Advances 393
  28. Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers 421
  29. Part VI: Game Theory
  30. Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation 447
  31. A Note on the Strategic Determination of the Required Number of Volunteers 471
  32. Is No News Bad News? A Hostage Trust Game with Incomplete Information and Fairness Considerations of the Trustee 481
  33. Part VII: Experimental Methods
  34. When Prediction Fails 505
  35. Measuring Social Preferences on Amazon Mechanical Turk 527
  36. Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments 547
  37. Notes on the Editors and Contributors 567
Jetzt anmelden und 20% sparen
Institutioneller Zugang
Wie funktioniert Authentifizierung?
Haben Sie eine Idee, wie wir unsere Website verbessern können?
Bitte schreiben Sie uns.
© 2025 De Gruyter Brill
Heruntergeladen am 2.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110472974-007/html
Button zum nach oben scrollen