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The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward?

  • Andreas Flache , Dieko Bakker , Michael Mäs and Jacob Dijkstra
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Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation
This chapter is in the book Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation

Abstract

Peer sanctioning institutions are powerful solutions to the freerider problem in collective action. However, counter-punishment may deter sanctioning, undermining the institution. Peer-reward can be similarly vulnerable, because peers may exchange rewards for rewards (“counter-reward”) rather than enforce contributions to the collective good. Based on social exchange arguments, we hypothesize that peerreward is vulnerable in a repeated game where players are fully informed about who rewarded them in the past. Social preference arguments suggest that peer-punishment is robust under the same conditions. This contrast was tested in an experiment in which counter-sanctioning was precluded due to anonymity of enforcers in one treatment and allowed in another treatment by non-anonymity of enforcers. This was done both for a reward and for a punishment institution. In line with the exchange argument, non-anonymity boosted reward-reward exchanges. Punishment was only somewhat reduced when enforcers were not anonymous. In contrast with previous experiments, we found no effects of counter-sanctioning on contributions. Thus, nonanonymity did not undermine the effectiveness of the peer sanctioning institutions in our experiments, neither for reward nor for punishment. Our results suggest that previous claims about the vulnerability of peer-punishment to counter-punishment may not generalize to non-anonymous repeated interactions.

Abstract

Peer sanctioning institutions are powerful solutions to the freerider problem in collective action. However, counter-punishment may deter sanctioning, undermining the institution. Peer-reward can be similarly vulnerable, because peers may exchange rewards for rewards (“counter-reward”) rather than enforce contributions to the collective good. Based on social exchange arguments, we hypothesize that peerreward is vulnerable in a repeated game where players are fully informed about who rewarded them in the past. Social preference arguments suggest that peer-punishment is robust under the same conditions. This contrast was tested in an experiment in which counter-sanctioning was precluded due to anonymity of enforcers in one treatment and allowed in another treatment by non-anonymity of enforcers. This was done both for a reward and for a punishment institution. In line with the exchange argument, non-anonymity boosted reward-reward exchanges. Punishment was only somewhat reduced when enforcers were not anonymous. In contrast with previous experiments, we found no effects of counter-sanctioning on contributions. Thus, nonanonymity did not undermine the effectiveness of the peer sanctioning institutions in our experiments, neither for reward nor for punishment. Our results suggest that previous claims about the vulnerability of peer-punishment to counter-punishment may not generalize to non-anonymous repeated interactions.

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Preface VII
  3. Contents IX
  4. Part I: Foundations
  5. Introduction 3
  6. Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram 11
  7. Part II: Institutions
  8. The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: Simulating the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System 39
  9. From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court 61
  10. The Dependence of Human Cognitive and Motivational Processes on Institutional Systems 85
  11. Social Dilemmas and Solutions in Immunizations 107
  12. Part III: Social Norms
  13. When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests? 119
  14. Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism? 143
  15. Cooperation and Career Chances in Science 165
  16. Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions 189
  17. The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity 215
  18. Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
  19. Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment 239
  20. Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments 259
  21. The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward? 279
  22. Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement 303
  23. Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise 327
  24. Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
  25. Cooperation and Distrust – a Contradiction? 357
  26. Signaling Theory Evolving: Signals and Signs of Trustworthiness in Social Exchange 373
  27. Trust and Promises as Friendly Advances 393
  28. Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers 421
  29. Part VI: Game Theory
  30. Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation 447
  31. A Note on the Strategic Determination of the Required Number of Volunteers 471
  32. Is No News Bad News? A Hostage Trust Game with Incomplete Information and Fairness Considerations of the Trustee 481
  33. Part VII: Experimental Methods
  34. When Prediction Fails 505
  35. Measuring Social Preferences on Amazon Mechanical Turk 527
  36. Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments 547
  37. Notes on the Editors and Contributors 567
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-014

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Preface VII
  3. Contents IX
  4. Part I: Foundations
  5. Introduction 3
  6. Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram 11
  7. Part II: Institutions
  8. The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski: Simulating the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System 39
  9. From the Savannah to the Magistrate’s Court 61
  10. The Dependence of Human Cognitive and Motivational Processes on Institutional Systems 85
  11. Social Dilemmas and Solutions in Immunizations 107
  12. Part III: Social Norms
  13. When Do People Follow Norms and When Do They Pursue Their Interests? 119
  14. Personal Exposure to Unfavorable Environmental Conditions: Does it Stimulate Environmental Activism? 143
  15. Cooperation and Career Chances in Science 165
  16. Social Dilemmas in Science: Detecting Misconduct and Finding Institutional Solutions 189
  17. The Interplay of Social Status and Reciprocity 215
  18. Part IV: Peer-Sanctioning
  19. Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment 239
  20. Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments 259
  21. The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward? 279
  22. Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement 303
  23. Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise 327
  24. Part V: Trust and Trustworthiness
  25. Cooperation and Distrust – a Contradiction? 357
  26. Signaling Theory Evolving: Signals and Signs of Trustworthiness in Social Exchange 373
  27. Trust and Promises as Friendly Advances 393
  28. Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers 421
  29. Part VI: Game Theory
  30. Nash Dynamics, Meritocratic Matching, and Cooperation 447
  31. A Note on the Strategic Determination of the Required Number of Volunteers 471
  32. Is No News Bad News? A Hostage Trust Game with Incomplete Information and Fairness Considerations of the Trustee 481
  33. Part VII: Experimental Methods
  34. When Prediction Fails 505
  35. Measuring Social Preferences on Amazon Mechanical Turk 527
  36. Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments 547
  37. Notes on the Editors and Contributors 567
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