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On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core

  • R. R. Routledge EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 25. September 2012

Abstract

The weak sequential core is a solution concept to coalition formation under uncertainty when only non-binding agreements can be formed ex ante. Here the case where any deviation from an allocation must be robust to communication both within, and between, coalitions at the ex ante stage is considered. The communication-proof weak sequential core is advanced as an alternative solution concept. Examples, including a production economy, are used to demonstrate the differences between the solutions. Finally, sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the communication-proof weak sequential core are provided.

Published Online: 2012-9-25

©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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  3. Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
  4. Contributions Article
  5. Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity"
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Heruntergeladen am 18.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/1935-1704.1934/pdf
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