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Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise
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Heski Bar-Isaac
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
24. Januar 2012
An agent, who cares about signaling his ability, chooses among different projects that generate observable outcomes. The agent's information about which project delivers a good outcome depends on both his ability and his effort. This paper examines how the agent's incentives for effort change depending on whether or not the agent's project choice is observed. If this choice is publicly observed, the agent's project choice is distorted towards particular types of projects. When the outcomes of these advantaged projects are particularly sensitive to the agent's information, such transparency boosts the agent's information-gathering incentives. However, when public observation of project choice leads the agent to choose information-insensitive projects, then such transparency dampens incentives. This provides a more nuanced view of the implications of action transparency in the literature on career concerns for experts.
Published Online: 2012-1-24
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
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- Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
- Contributions Article
- Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity"
- An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
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- Two Notes on the Blotto Game
- The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
- Multidimensional Product Differentiation with Discrete Characteristics
- Screening and Financial Contracting in the Face of Outside Competition
- On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
- Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games
- Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design
- Intergenerational Interactions in Human Capital Accumulation
- Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
- Altruism and Local Interaction
- Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns
- An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
- Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
- Topics Article
- Preference for Variety
- Information Theory and Observational Limitations in Decision Making
- Strict Concavity of the Value Function for a Family of Dynamic Accumulation Models
- A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise
- Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
- Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
- Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
- Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies
- An Axiomatization of Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not Observed
- On a Notion of Similarity with Endowments in Public Economics
- Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale
- On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core
- Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences
- Revealing Private Information in Bargaining
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
transparency;
career concerns;
expertise;
information acquisition;
information-sensitive
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
- Contributions Article
- Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity"
- An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
- Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise
- Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Two Notes on the Blotto Game
- The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
- Multidimensional Product Differentiation with Discrete Characteristics
- Screening and Financial Contracting in the Face of Outside Competition
- On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
- Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games
- Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design
- Intergenerational Interactions in Human Capital Accumulation
- Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
- Altruism and Local Interaction
- Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns
- An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
- Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
- Topics Article
- Preference for Variety
- Information Theory and Observational Limitations in Decision Making
- Strict Concavity of the Value Function for a Family of Dynamic Accumulation Models
- A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise
- Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
- Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
- Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
- Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies
- An Axiomatization of Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not Observed
- On a Notion of Similarity with Endowments in Public Economics
- Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale
- On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core
- Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences
- Revealing Private Information in Bargaining
