Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert
Erfordert eine Authentifizierung
Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction
-
Daniel Zhiyun LI
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
16. März 2012
We study seller cheap talk problem in a modified almost common value auction, where there are potential entrants who need to pay entry costs for entering the auction. In almost common value auctions, a seller suffers great revenue losses due to the aggravated winner's curse problem. In our modified model, the inside bidders are more sensitive to the signals sent by the seller, and by revealing the information about the object valuation, the seller faces the trade-off between the benefit of increased competition and that of higher bids by weak inside bidders. For instance, a low message will attract the potential entrants into the auction, as a result of greater winning opportunity, and a high message will encourage the weak since bidders to bid more aggressively, as a result of increased valuation. Under quite plausible conditions, there exists an informative equilibrium in this cheap talk game, which will either increase the expected revenue of the auction, or the efficiency of final allocation.
Keywords: cheap talk; almost common value auction; informative equilibrium; expected revenue; Pareto dominance
Published Online: 2012-3-16
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Sie haben derzeit keinen Zugang zu diesem Inhalt.
Sie haben derzeit keinen Zugang zu diesem Inhalt.
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
- Contributions Article
- Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity"
- An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
- Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise
- Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Two Notes on the Blotto Game
- The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
- Multidimensional Product Differentiation with Discrete Characteristics
- Screening and Financial Contracting in the Face of Outside Competition
- On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
- Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games
- Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design
- Intergenerational Interactions in Human Capital Accumulation
- Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
- Altruism and Local Interaction
- Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns
- An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
- Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
- Topics Article
- Preference for Variety
- Information Theory and Observational Limitations in Decision Making
- Strict Concavity of the Value Function for a Family of Dynamic Accumulation Models
- A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise
- Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
- Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
- Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
- Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies
- An Axiomatization of Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not Observed
- On a Notion of Similarity with Endowments in Public Economics
- Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale
- On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core
- Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences
- Revealing Private Information in Bargaining
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
cheap talk;
almost common value auction;
informative equilibrium;
expected revenue;
Pareto dominance
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
- Contributions Article
- Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity"
- An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
- Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise
- Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Two Notes on the Blotto Game
- The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
- Multidimensional Product Differentiation with Discrete Characteristics
- Screening and Financial Contracting in the Face of Outside Competition
- On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
- Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games
- Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design
- Intergenerational Interactions in Human Capital Accumulation
- Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
- Altruism and Local Interaction
- Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns
- An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
- Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
- Topics Article
- Preference for Variety
- Information Theory and Observational Limitations in Decision Making
- Strict Concavity of the Value Function for a Family of Dynamic Accumulation Models
- A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise
- Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
- Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
- Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
- Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies
- An Axiomatization of Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not Observed
- On a Notion of Similarity with Endowments in Public Economics
- Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale
- On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core
- Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences
- Revealing Private Information in Bargaining
