Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough?
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Gerhard Schönrich
Abstract
Whether Kant’s conception of value is to be reconstructed realistically or anti-realistically is determined by the question of how the grounding of value and normativity in the “rational nature” of human beings (GMS, AA 04: 428.07-11) is to be understood. Are values dependent on pro-attitudes or do they exist in a robust sense as metaphysically independent entities, and what does the answer to this question mean for the fundamental value of the rational nature? Both outright realism in its varieties and outright anti-realism fail to overcome insurmountable difficulties. Kant’s fitting attitude account that can solve the dilemma is a moderate anti-realism that embraces a central realist insight. Pro-attitudes need not simply fit the object of the attitude. They must meet an inherent correctness condition if they are to be indicative of value. A fact or property is valuable if it could be valued by an agent in a correct pro-setting. Yet does this not simply replace the metaphysical value fact of realism with an equally queer normative fact of correctness? This fact would be strange only if it had to be judged from a standpoint outside the normative considerations, we have engaged in with the grounding question. Our rational nature turns out to be a reflexive value-fact.
Abstract
Whether Kant’s conception of value is to be reconstructed realistically or anti-realistically is determined by the question of how the grounding of value and normativity in the “rational nature” of human beings (GMS, AA 04: 428.07-11) is to be understood. Are values dependent on pro-attitudes or do they exist in a robust sense as metaphysically independent entities, and what does the answer to this question mean for the fundamental value of the rational nature? Both outright realism in its varieties and outright anti-realism fail to overcome insurmountable difficulties. Kant’s fitting attitude account that can solve the dilemma is a moderate anti-realism that embraces a central realist insight. Pro-attitudes need not simply fit the object of the attitude. They must meet an inherent correctness condition if they are to be indicative of value. A fact or property is valuable if it could be valued by an agent in a correct pro-setting. Yet does this not simply replace the metaphysical value fact of realism with an equally queer normative fact of correctness? This fact would be strange only if it had to be judged from a standpoint outside the normative considerations, we have engaged in with the grounding question. Our rational nature turns out to be a reflexive value-fact.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction VII
- List of Sigla of Kant’s Works XV
- Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? 1
- Kant’s Value Prescriptivism 23
- Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork 41
- Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity 65
- Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End? 89
- The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 105
- Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the Analytics in Kant’s CPR 123
- The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 139
- Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship 163
- Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 181
- Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage 197
- Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law 217
- Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency 241
- About the Authors 263
- Index 267
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction VII
- List of Sigla of Kant’s Works XV
- Kant’s Conception of Value – Realistic Enough? 1
- Kant’s Value Prescriptivism 23
- Kant on Moral Value in the Groundwork 41
- Acting for a Reason. What Kant’s Concept of Maxims Can Tell Us about Value, Human Action, and Practical Identity 65
- Blind Spots in the Formula of Humanity: What Does it Mean not to Treat Someone as an End? 89
- The Relationship between Dignity and the End in Itself in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 105
- Some Remarks on the Concept of Good in the Second Chapter of the Analytics in Kant’s CPR 123
- The Moral Value of the Will. The Concepts of Good and Evil in the Second Chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 139
- Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and the Value of Humanity – Implications for a Universal Right to Citizenship 163
- Honeste Vive and Legal Personality in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals 181
- Kant’s Problematic Theory of the Value of Marriage 197
- Is Whatever Diminishes the Hindrances to an Activity a Furthering of this Activity Itself? Kant on Moral Value from Respect for the Law 217
- Manipulation and the Value of Rational Agency 241
- About the Authors 263
- Index 267
