Band 24, Heft 1

Whether and to what extent images of man (should) play a role in ethics is highly controversial - also because the relationship between ethics and the image of man is rather unclear. The present contribution attempts to clarify this relationship and to show that the talk of the image of man in ethics is relevant and meaningful in several places. For this purpose, first of all the concept of the image of man is defined and some common misunderstandings are cleared up. Secondly, three models of the relationship between ethics and the image of man that are widespread in ethics are presented and their difficulties are examined: the (traditional) telos model, the (modern) humannature model and the (modern) reduced reason model. On the basis of a detailed critique of the third model, which underlies modern approaches to ethics, the article finally shows that ethics, if it wants to establish concrete judgements and material norms, cannot avoid explicitly or implicitly assuming substantial images of man.

The article outlines how Michael Thompson's theory of the a priori self-transparency of the human life-form can be used to gain a reflective foundation of ethical knowledge. In particular, systematic parallels to Karl-Otto-Apel's transcendental pragmatic justification procedure are worked out. These parallels do not only concern ethics, but also the criticism of the metaphysics of mentalism. The Archimedean point is not linguistic communication, but the inescapable life process in accordance with the human life-form. Despite of the architectural parallels that can be drawn between the two approaches, however, specific dissimilarities also emerge in the dialectical justification of ethics. The advantages and disadvantages these dissimilarities create for Thompson's theory are reflected in a critical evaluation based on a final comparison.

The Christian churches are the largest employers in the Federal Republic of Germany after the state civil service. This applies especially to the health and social services. After the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, the churches established their own individual and collective labor law, which deviates from state law in important points. In the Weimar Republic, however, the state labor laws had also applied to them. Since the 1950s, they have based the special provisions of their own labor law on the fact that their employees are in a „community of service“. This term originates in the legal system of the Nazi state. The essay addresses current legal controversies and criticizes the fact that the churches invoke their right to corporate selfdetermination too extensively. At present, they emphasize the religious character of the health and social services they provide, in some cases even stronger than before. The need for legal restrictions is becoming apparent for the future.

Due to a change in law in December 2019, the use of „Forensic DNA Phenotyping“, i.e. technologies for the prediction of skin, hair and eye color as well as biological age, is now permitted in the context of criminal investigations. This article discusses the reliability, utility and legitimacy of such extended DNA technologies and thus the framework conditions for their application in Germany. It is revealed how complicated, error-prone, demanding, ambitious and sensitive the use of these technologies in investigations can be if appropriate precautions are not taken and if they are not limited to prudently supervised individual cases. Finally, based on this analysis, measures for the application and regulation of extended DNA technologies in Germany are proposed.

In this paper we explore shifts in how the law and ethics allow European law enforcement officers to use forensic genetic technologies. We do so by reviewing three technologies, ‘traditional’ (STR-based) forensic DNA profiling, forensic DNA phenotyping and the searching of genetic genealogy databases. In particular, we discuss changes in how ethical boundaries have been placed around what is seen as an appropriate use of genetic technologies in European criminal justice systems. While the ‘type’ of DNA that law enforcement officers are permitted to analyse offers a useful ethical reference point, for newer forensic genomic technologies, ethical scrutiny, we argue, would also look at the specific purpose or use of the technology. Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Veränderungen in der Art und Weise, wie Akteurinnen und Akteure in der Verbrechensaufklärung und -bekämpfung forensische Gentechnologien sehen. Dazu betrachten wir drei Technologien, nämlich die „traditionelle“ (STR-basierte) forensische DNAAnalyse, die forensische DNA-Phänotypisierung und die Suche in genealogischen DNA-Datenbanken. Insbesondere diskutieren wir Veränderungen in der Art und Weise, wie ethische Grenzen hinsichtlich der Frage gezogen werden, was in den Strafrechtssystemen europäischer Länder als angemessener Einsatz von DNA-Technologien angesehen wird. Während der „Typ“ der Akteurinnen und Akteure einen nützlichen ethischen Referenzpunkt darstellt, sollte eine ethische Beurteilung auch auf den spezifischen Zweck oder Einsatz der Technologie abzielen.

The use of forensic DNA phenotyping has raised concerns with regard to epistemic reliability, discrimination, informational autonomy and data protection, whereas the real situation of victims is rarely addressed explicitly. However, the normative analysis of the possibilities and limitations of forensic DNA phenotyping must be about the prevention respectively the decrease of suffering and the improvement of the complex situation of victims that persist after a severe criminal offence. The specific design of prosecution has a decisive impact on the actual and potential dimensions of the situation of victims.

There is a concern according to which analyzing crime scene DNA to determine biogeographic origin and skin color of suspects can lead to discrimination against minority populations. This article summarizes and explains some of those parts of the investigation process that can give rise to discrimination. The second part of the paper offers an analysis of the notion of discrimination and presents different accounts of the exact ground of its moral wrongness. As it will emerge, these different accounts lead to different assessments of the use of DNA phenotype analyses in police investigations.